

Attitudes among Education Division Staff during the Occupation of Japan

Harry WRAY

On October 30, 1945, Women's Active Corps Captain Eileen Donovan and fifteen other women officers—graduates of wartime America's intensive six month Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS)—made their way to Tokyo from Yokohama on the back of a truck. Donovan remembered witnessing an almost totally destroyed landscape, with only little iron safes standing where houses had once been, and a very large sign that boldly proclaimed: "You are now entering Tokyo, courtesy of the 1st Calvary Division. First in Manila. First in Tokyo." SCAP decided the sign was a little too arrogant. The word "courtesy" was changed to "home."¹ The sign was symbolic of the cocky attitude of the American occupiers.

Underlying this essay is the assumption that the attitudes of the Civil, Information, and Education (CI&E) Section's staff strongly shaped their attempts to reform Japanese education and colored their relationships with Mombusho officials and Japanese educators, and the purpose of this essay is to examine what their attitudes were. While the role of attitudes in the behavior of past and present empires, nations, and individuals cannot be established precisely, by drawing on contemporary accounts and extensive interviews, accurate generalizations can be made.²

To understand those attitudes, I have interviewed approximately 40 former members of the CI&E and approximately 50 former Mombusho officials and Japanese scholars, and undertaken research in thousands of SCAP documents, especially conference reports that detailed interactions between members of the Education Division of the CI&E and their Japanese counterparts. Most of these interviews can be found at the National Institute for Educational Research, Tokyo, or Meisei University in Hino City, Tokyo. The mountains of SCAP doc-

The author is Professor of History and International Relations, Nanzan University, 18 Yamazato-cho, Showa-ku, Nagoya, 466, Japan <wray@ic.nanzan-u.ac.jp>. He specializes in modern Japanese history, especially educational history, and has co-edited *Japan Examined, Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (University of Hawaii, 1983) and *Pearl Harbor Reexamined* (University of Hawaii, 1990).

uments are housed in the National Record Center in Suitland, Maryland, but as a result of more than a decade of copying, microfiche versions are available at the National Diet Library, where they are much better systematized. In addition, most CI&E documents are now located at the National Institute for Educational Research, at Nagoya University, and at Meisei University. The Joseph C. Trainor Collection, containing most of the important Education Division Documents, can be found at Meisei University and the National Institute for Educational Research.

The Sources of American Attitudes

Americans participating in the occupation of Japan carried with them strongly held values and attitudes fostered in seventeenth-century America, fought for in the American Revolution, shaped by frontier life, and forged into the Constitution of 1787 and subsequent amendments stretching into the twentieth century. At the core of that American experience were strong beliefs in democratic, absolute, and universalistic values shaped by twenty centuries of Christian and Western thought and practice. Through isolation, the success of settling a continent, the American experience, and the decisive role that Americans thought they had played in winning World Wars I and II, they felt confirmed in the assumption that their values and institutions were superior and universal. (They did not notice the irony in their assumption of superiority despite the fact that the nation's economic and political system had failed to overcome the Great Depression without the pump-priming benefits of a massive war effort.)³

One Japanese remarked in retrospect that the contemporary America attitude reflected a feeling that "it was America's best period. They wanted to preserve a free society. Their psychology was that they had won and they were very confident and well-intentioned."⁴ Robert King Hall, briefly Education Sub-Section Chief and then Language Reform and Higher Education Officer, was an extreme example of that attitude. He said tersely that the American victory was the "triumph of a higher moral concept over a more primitive and less acceptable one."⁵

This mind set was as strong as the catastrophic early nineteenth century assumption of Chinese intellectuals that their culture was superior to that of any other.⁶ The Americans, like the Chinese, had nothing to learn from other cultures. In contrast with the Chinese passive practice of exporting its culture, however, Americans actively set out on a mission to improve other societies by transplanting superior American practices, institutions, and thought.⁷

A delineation of contemporary beliefs and educational attitudes of Occupation personnel requires both perspective and humility. A historian needs to remember that the passage of five decades, the chastening lessons of the Vietnam War, and advances in the social and behavioral sciences provide a 20/20 hindsight view of the Allied Occupation of Japan that contemporaries lacked.

Today's altered values, cultural relativism, and greater historical perspective help us to understand that historical changes occur glacially in a tradition-laden society such as Japan, and that effective, permanent reform rises from indigenous needs. Seeing the Occupation from such perspectives can lead to an unfair judgment of those who staffed the Education Division. But the historian who fails to make judgments and draw some meaning from what occurred sinks into mere chronicling. Accordingly, although I have attempted to understand as much as possible the spirit of the time, I have not refrained from making judgments about how those attitudes shaped American attempts to reform Japanese education.

Superiority, Confidence, and a Sense of Power

To begin one has to start with General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Personnel (SCAP), a term also used interchangeably to refer to the entire administrative organization of the Occupation. His interpretations of American and Japanese history and culture shaped SCAP personnel's attitudes and behavior.⁸ First, his public statements presented largely negative views of Japan's past. He spoke of postwar Japan as "the world's great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian rule." Second, he encouraged slighting of Japanese culture by himself making the absurd judgment that Japan could not be truly democratic without becoming Christian, a view that fortunately was not implemented by those responsible for religious affairs during the Occupation. Third, MacArthur spoke of Japan's defeat as "symbolizing the collapse of a faith which left a complete vacuum morally, mentally, and physically"; this meant that Japan was a blank sheet of paper on which the American side could freely write sweeping democratic reforms. Fourth, MacArthur sought to transplant the liberal creed of American ethics and principles which he considered superior and universally applicable.⁹ Concretely, that meant fostering a free society under law, and cultivating an appreciation of basic human and civil liberties, stable representative government, and the importance of the individual so firmly that it would be difficult for a Japanese government to destroy these institutions on SCAP's withdrawal.¹⁰

At the same time, MacArthur adopted a fair and magnanimous attitude toward the Japanese people that influenced SCAP staff. He established a good climate with his early decision to apply the death sentence or mete out harsh punishments to American military who abused their power by looting, raping, and killing.¹¹ John Pelzel, language reform officer and later Public Opinion Division Chief of the CI&E, recalled MacArthur's vigorous intervention to prevent an insensitive and "bulldozing" American general from turning the imperial grounds in Kyoto into a golf course. Allegedly, a furious MacArthur called the general on the phone immediately and said, "Goddamn you! We aren't going

to have that. You stop it or I will push you off this island."¹² Sixth, MacArthur's demeanor and behavior toward the emperor and Japanese people smacked of invincibility and an assumption that he stood for a way of life and principles that could not be challenged. Historian John Curtis Perry stated it succinctly: "His god-like power, his ignorance of Japanese culture, his pronounced ethnocentricity, and his enormous self-confidence as well as the success he enjoyed there were common to the whole enterprise."¹³

As a result, the Americans would teach; the Japanese would learn. The Americans had the power; the Japanese should comply. If General MacArthur's treasured carpet flown in from the Philippines was too long by a couple of feet for his Dai Ichi Office, the steel wall would have to be removed, not the carpet cut.¹⁴ A subordinate general could demand white sand for his garden, even if it required the sand to be hauled in from the Japan Sea side because there was none to be had on the Inland Sea side.¹⁵ A sergeant in the provinces could call a train master and order that a train departure be delayed until an American group leisurely made their way to the station after lunch.¹⁶ Those of lieutenant colonel rank and above moved into beautiful Japanese homes requisitioned by and paid for by the military. For example, Colonel William Neufeld, Physical Education Youth Activities and Sports Officer, recalled that his home

was fully furnished except for linen, silver, and any special needs, radio, etc. My choice was a two story home, several rooms, and servants' quarters, and a small fenced in yard. It was Western in part in that it had wood floors in some rooms and tatami in others and walls, door, and ceiling in western style. The owners, Mr. Ashida and wife, had been moved out and were living in smaller quarters a short distance away.

Later Neufeld assumed another position and held a civil service ranking equivalent to Brigadier General. Accordingly, he received an even nicer facility.¹⁷

After they returned to America, most SCAP personnel never again exercised such power. It is a tribute to Education Division staff that most were good ambassadors and did not use power in its most naked forms to perpetrate violence, to sow injustice, or to obtain financial gain. W. Kenneth Bunce, Religious Division Chief, CI&E, characterized the contemporary attitude of most CI&E officers by saying: "The Americans, though filled with some arrogance of power and no little chauvinistic provincialism, possessed also an idealistic desire to form a new and better society in a democratic mold. . . . [However] the Americans had no desire to trample unnecessarily on the acquiescent Japanese."¹⁸ Sometimes occupation forces were amazed by their potential for abuse of power. On one visit to Sado Island, Neufeld expressed a desire to purchase a valuable ceramic. The owner regretfully informed him that Prince Chichibu had already negotiated for its purchase. When the Prince learned of Neufeld's interest he surrendered his ownership. Several months later three Sado Islanders, in native costume, arrived at Neufeld's home to present the gift and perform Sado dances.¹⁹

Lt. Colonel Mark T. Orr, Chief of the Education Division, June 1946–April 1949, with his characteristically detached perspective, could express frankly the impact that being “the mightiest power on the earth” had on staff’s thinking by saying, “We had won the war; thus our system must be superior. We were . . . at the height of our national pride, and so [we thought] we were in a way doing some favor to Japan to try to make them more like us.”²⁰

The Japanese contributed greatly to this American attitude. Their deferential attitude in the first years encouraged American use of power and assumption of a superior way of life. Japanese were initially so overwhelmed by American wealth, science, technological superiority, and efficiency that they thought the Americans had all the answers. This attitude reflected traditional Japanese realism in accepting defeat: to acquiesce, that is, to “bow to the conquerors.”

Ethnocentrism

Along with most Americans of the time, Education Division staff believed not only that democracy was the best system of government, but even naively that its practice would prevent future warfare. Short-range damage to Japanese beliefs, customs, and practices was assumed to be more than offset by long-range gains. Joseph C. Trainor, Deputy Chief of the Education Division, demonstrated that attitude when he said the Education Division was as simply and as fairly as possible trying to make a “practical application of the great ethical and cultural heritage which was America’s” to the problems Japan faced.²¹ A strong assumption was that democracy equaled decentralization of education and government, and decentralization equaled democracy.²²

Most CI&E personnel were ethnocentric and believers in wartime propaganda. This frame of mind led them, for example, to exaggerate the extent to which traditional martial arts had contributed to a fanatic warrior mentality. A member of the first United States Education Mission to Japan (USEMJ) of March–April 1946, Professor Emeritus Ernest Hilgard, remembered that the contemporary reaction to a staged *kendo* exhibition had been most disapproving. The continuation of the martial arts was viewed by the USEMJ and Education Division staff as an obstacle to eradicating militarism and inculcating democracy.²³ Consequently, Mombusho’s sponsorship of exhibitions before the Mission and staff to overcome prohibitions of the martial arts backfired. The mannerisms and vocal shrieking that were a part of *kendo*, *judo*, and other martial arts were viewed as barbarous and militaristic.²⁴ Monta Osborne, Secondary Education Branch Chief, 1946–1951, admitted, “We carried that too far. Japan was already demilitarized psychologically. It was not necessary to get rid of their wooden swords or to stop *judo*. I think we went too far in defining what is a martial sport.”²⁵ Mark Orr said,

Dr. Hidaka [Daichiro, Mombusho School Bureau Chief and later Vice Minister] was the least samurai-like person we knew. He tried to convince us that [a martial art] represented mere discipline of the mind, that it strengthened the personality, that it developed intellectual growth, that it was not what we thought it was. We associated it though in the same way we did with the military uniforms in the schools, that these were constant reminders of military in the past and made them look like robots marching and developing the military spirit. So I recall thinking we were trying to get at what we saw as the military spirit. . . . So we insisted that these things be removed. . . . Now I see no connection (laughter) between those martial arts and whether Japan would have a revived warrior spirit and resume an aggressive course in the world.²⁶

A Major Mitchell, in charge of supervising theatrical arts, reflected vintage ethnocentrism in his judgment of *no* dramas in an October 20, 1945, report when he wrote: "The '*No*' play is certainly no play. . . . It is a group of ancient dried covered fragments brought primitively to the stage from an old museum shelf."²⁷ He had no better opinion of *kabuki*. For him there were no redeeming qualities in the excessive sword play, bloodletting, and class-dominated productions he witnessed.

Gordon Bowles, an old Japan hand and a State Department representative in the first USEM, said of their report, "I think that idealism, and often ethnocentric idealism on the part of the American Mission report . . . sticks out like a sore thumb."²⁸ Edwin Wigglesworth, Higher Education Branch Chief, 1946–1947, reflected ethnocentrism when he observed that:

One of our purposes in 6-3-3-4 was to put the whole system on a chronological plan equivalent to American grades so that the movement of university graduates into American graduate schools would be facilitated. I had been in charge of evaluating students' transcripts for entrance to graduate programs at New York University and had become familiar with the differences of matching them with our entrance requirements.²⁹

Helen Mears, a member of the 1946 Labor Advisory Mission to Japan, commented:

Few of the Americans, however, had as much as read a book about Japan. Most of them had never heard of the "Pauley Report," although this was, at that time, the basic document defining Japan's economic future and so the future of the Japanese worker we were supposed to advise about. Moreover, their lack of Japanese background did not in the least bother them. Their attitude was that (a) there were certain basic economic principles which were universally true, and if you knew these and knew how to tackle a job, you could solve any economic problem, whether you knew anything about the specific situation or not; and (b) we were, in any event, not interested in what Japan had been, since our job was to turn Japan into what we wanted it to be. One of the members carried with him slim vol-

umes of Aristotle and Machiavelli, which—during the flight out—he had browsed in from time to time getting a firm grasp on basic principles.³⁰

Other insightful contemporary Americans observed that the Occupation forces in general believed that what was good for Americans would be equally good for Japanese. Dr. Florence Powdermaker, an M.D. and expert on social action, was another such person. Brought to Japan in 1948 to observe SCAP and Eighth Army operations, she observed:

An important cause of difference among some Americans arises out of their unchallenged conviction that America is the best of all possible countries and that our institutions, customs, and ideas are also the best, not only for the United States, but for the world. There is a tendency to lose sight of the realities of life in the United States and of the imperfections which they represent. There seems to be an inner necessity to convince the Japanese of their worth rather than to work cooperatively in adapting them to fit the needs here.³¹

John Pelzel remembered her attacking the observation that Japanese women were unhappy and frustrated. Her first question at one staff meeting was “Where are these women?” She said, “I go by faces.”³² She learned that Japanese had neither the money nor the specialists to do everything expected of them. She particularly scorned the American GIs and local military officers for their “abysmal ignorance” of Japanese culture and institutions. Another American, Professor Lloyd Cronbach, a psychologist, in a memorandum of May 3, 1947, to Orr, wrote, “I am astonished to find so little emphasis in the Occupation on learning about Japanese culture. I greatly fear that the only emphasis in the Occupation is on administering the culture rather than learning about it.”³³

Because they thought of themselves as tolerant, liberal, and sensitive, Education Division staff were unconscious of their inflexibility, righteousness, and parochial educational experiences. Almost none had studied comparative education, culture, society, or religion (rare college courses in those days), so staff members minimized the merits of Japanese education within the larger cultural matrix.³⁴ They were confident that they had the right answers and that a positive Japanese attitude would overcome all obstacles.³⁵ Pelzel, Delmer Brown, (a visiting expert on Higher Education), and Alfred Crofts (Higher Education Branch Chief, 1946–47) were critical of these American attitudes.³⁶ Pelzel had Helen Hefferman, Elementary Education Branch Chief, 1946–48, in mind when he said:

We got people who had been sitting in Education Departments all their life thinking that they could put into effect a perfect curriculum. They came out there [Japan] and in effect said, “I am going to make a new world in my image.” They didn’t know anything about the Japanese system. . . . Unquestionably, we thought we were superior. . . . Not only did they [staff] not know anything about Japan, but very little about their own culture—only their own little corner of it.

Pelzel observed of Hefferman that she had such an absolute sense of what was right and wrong that she failed to take into account differing cultural values.³⁷ Before Hefferman arrived the Virginia Course of Studies for elementary education was copied almost verbatim. Too late to be able to reverse the basic direction, her two main contributions were developing detailed activities, methods, and evaluations from the California Courses of Studies for units that had already been selected; and achieving an agreement that supplementary courses of studies would be published in 1948.³⁸ Her cultural imperialism was so pronounced that her attempts to introduce American practices without reference to Japanese culture sometimes provided amusement among CI&E staff not enamored of progressive education. For example, on one occasion Nugent playfully sent Bunce a copy of one of Hefferman's units that listed as one activity, "Tell how your pioneer ancestors lived." Bunce sent it back to Nugent with the note, "Yes, and also tell about your ancestors fighting the Indians."³⁹

Orr admitted that "while most staff members made a conscious effort to avoid it, they were inevitably guided by their experience and training at home. This sometimes led to plans or proposals which were not appropriate for the Japanese situation."⁴⁰ Shortly after the Occupation ended James Doi, a *nisei* who often acted as an Education Division translator-interpreter and worked in its Textbook Branch, interviewed many Mombusho officials for his doctoral dissertation. Their consensus was that it was not so much a "democratic way of life" that the Occupation forces had introduced into Japan, but the "American way of life."⁴¹ As one example of what they meant, they pointed out that staff emphasis on child-centered education was not essential to creating a democracy.

The most blatant example of ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, however, was the almost successful effort of Robert King Hall to reform the Japanese written language by abolishing Chinese characters (*kanji*) and substituting roman letters (*romaji*). He was so persuasive in presenting his views to the USEMJ subcommittee on language reform that the USEMJ also recommended the adoption of *romaji* in their report.⁴² Dr. Kenneth Yasuda, a professor of Japanese literature, expert on the *Manyoshu* and *haiku*, a *nisei* interpreter for the Tokyo War Crime Trials, and later a member of Education Division, thought the proposal to replace *kanji* with *romaji* was a good example of Americans not really understanding Japan or Japanese history.

"Well-intentioned" Democratic Missionaries

The approximately 50 Mombusho officials and Japanese educators I interviewed emphasized over and over again that the Americans were "well intentioned." When I mentioned this point to Trainor, he quickly understood that there was an underlying qualification to this remark and laughingly said, "That's fair enough. What's the rest of the sentence?"⁴³ Yasuda said, "That is why the Japanese said

their intention was good. That was a very diplomatic way of saying it. They didn't come out and say bluntly, 'You don't understand us at all'."⁴⁴

American assumptions reflected a mentality similar to that of America's nineteenth century missionaries. Convinced of the superiority of their values and institutions, Education Division personnel felt they were involved in a kind of crusade to form a new and better society in a democratic mold. James Doi and Kenneth Yasuda could observe the contemporary American attitude from their bicultural perspective. The former recalled that the Division staff were motivated to give the "latest and the best fashion."⁴⁵ Yasuda characterized the staff attitude as an "old-fashioned missionary attitude" in which the assumption was that "everything we have is the best" and "anything good for me is good for you."⁴⁶ Kawai Kazuo, who was bicultural as a result of originally being an editor of the *Nippon Times* and then a long-time academic at Ohio State University, and who, in 1960, wrote one of the best books on the Occupation, noted, "While few Americans can match the messianic drive of a General MacArthur, practically all seem to have a desire to impart the superior blessings of their way of life to others. Unlike some cultures that are exclusive, American culture is assimilative and proselytizing. All Americans, even those who would deny any pretensions of superiority, seem to have some measure of the missionary complex."⁴⁷ These attitudes come through strongly if one reads the staff's daily conference reports of meetings with their Mombusho counterparts and with Japanese educators.

As "missionaries" the Education Division staff possessed both good and bad attitudes. They were idealistic, morally upright, dedicated, and well-intentioned. Reischauer's characterization of the entire SCAP staff aptly fits the Education Division staff: "Many of them were entirely convinced that the particular reform or reorganization they themselves were concerned with—industrial concentration, land redistribution, local self-government, textbook revision, or whatever else it may have been—was vital to the success of the whole experiment."⁴⁸ Even Nugent, a more realistic man who hated progressive education and the word "experiment" for the Occupation, said, "Our greatest work is a missionary work with the Japanese side who are progressive, who are liberal, and who are forward-looking in education."⁴⁹

Sincere American good will toward Japan came through in my approximately forty interviews with CI&E staff. They liked to think that the reforms they were associated with had played a role in assisting Japan's spectacular post-war economic and educational achievements. Verna Carley, a member of the Higher Education Branch who was in charge of teacher education, recalled fondly how, while in control of the Institute for Educational Leadership (IFEL), she had helped administer funds and programs that trained 10,000 outstanding leaders in education.⁵⁰ She, Billie Hollingshead (Secondary Education Branch),

Trainor, and others zealously worked to improve Japanese teaching. Such thinking by Occupation staff prompted Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, in his memoir of the Occupation, to comment repeatedly on cases where American idealism prevailed over practical wisdom.⁵¹

Hardworking and Dedicated

At the risk of seeming to be partisan, I will state that the first group of Americans who staffed the Education Division were ethically and morally as fine a group of persons as could be found. They were honest, dedicated, hardworking men and women.⁵² Nugent, Hall, Wigglesworth, Osborne, Orr, Trainor, and Hollingshead, to name a few, were all workaholics. In the first year and a half of the Occupation most staff worked at least fifty to fifty-five hours a week; even after that period, all of the above continued to work at least as long. Orr said, "I think for most of the time we worked long hours because when we weren't working at some project or staff effort, we were reading and trying to learn more background, or getting ideas for another project—on what to do next. Our jobs were on our minds most of the time."⁵³ Donovan commented about Trainor's dedication: "He was a terribly hard working man . . . and he used to work nights, night after night over there. I would only work a few nights a week. And I remember him coming back to the hotel . . . exhausted [at ten o'clock] and saying, 'will you come down and have a coke with me so I can forget some of this'."⁵⁴ Trainor himself said that Division staff, especially those who stayed on for two or more years, had a strong sense of commitment and "a feeling you had been doing important work for Japan, Japanese teachers, and school children."⁵⁵ Verna Carley was another dedicated and humane person. She was a frequent visitor to Kimura Toshio's home. (Kimura was her counterpart in the Ministry of Education in charge of a new program for teacher education.) Like several other Education Division staff who became good friends with Japanese families, she shared groceries and clothes with the Kimura family.⁵⁶

Lulu Holmes, Higher Education Officer, and Eileen Donovan, Secondary Education Branch, won lasting places in the hearts of contemporary leaders in women's education, partly because they were good at listening to the objectives of Japanese women. Their strong attitudes and steady pressure led to equal education at all levels, to accreditation for women's colleges, and to the organization of the Japan Association of College Women. They worked selflessly with Ethel Weed (CI&E staff member responsible for women's reform) to promote women's status and greater access to education and political leadership.⁵⁷ Holmes, Donovan, Wigglesworth, Walter Eels (who succeeded Wigglesworth as Higher Education Branch Chief), and other officers of the same Branch did their best to

promote greater access to higher education and desirable educational standards by applying pressure on the Mombusho and college officials and faculty.

Americans' belief that they knew what constituted a good university and a good medical and health system gave them the confidence to insist upon higher standards for Japanese medical and nursing education. Their efforts proved inadequate to overcome completely entrenched positions and attitudes, but without them accreditation standards for new universities would have been more lax. For example, the pressures of General Crawford Sams, a doctor who was Head of the Public Health and Welfare Section, Wigglesworth, Nugent, and other SCAP personnel ended the wartime practice of at least twenty-six private medical schools of certifying as doctors persons whose educational background was graduation from a four- or five-year middle school and a two year medical program. Wigglesworth complained that "they weren't even the level of technical schools."⁵⁸ General Sams wanted to abolish them forthwith. Wigglesworth and Nugent managed a compromise plan that saved them through their integration into a more rigorous professional training system.⁵⁹ Moreover, although American progressive educators went too far in insisting that teacher education programs should be altered to fit American practices, the net effect was a considerable improvement in teacher training. The same psychologist whose criticisms were quoted earlier, Dr. Lloyd Cronbach, at the end of his tour of duty could write Orr, "It is also significant that the morale of the professional staff of the Education Division is notably high. I have rarely seen a group each of whom is so thoroughly convinced that he is doing an important job and making progress in it. The enthusiasm with which the staff work is an excellent job of superior leadership."⁶⁰

Impatient, Hasty, and Pragmatic

The above attitudes were particularly strong from 1945 through early 1948. They made all SCAP staff impatient for change. John Curtis Perry thought the American bulldozer symbolized contemporary American attitudes and actions of 1945–1947.⁶¹ Robert King Hall, for example, was a man whose actions, written directives, and policy proposals in the first four months of the Occupation greatly shaped subsequent staff policy and practices. Mark Orr, speaking of the first year, remarked that impatience was common, particularly before the USEMJ report was announced and implemented. He said, "There was a sense of responsibility in the sense that people thought, 'I don't know what to do so I will use my own ideas and get something going. Things must go on. Nothing much is happening and we must see to it that it happens'."⁶² Orr's recollection is documented adequately in the attitudes and actions of Joseph Trainor and Monta

Osborne between June and November 1946.⁶³ Similar to Hall, within less than two months of his June 1946 transfer from China, Osborne had written at least two long proposals, made some field trips to the surrounding areas, and begun with other staff to “nudge” Mombusho officials on educational reorganization (the new 6–3–3–4 system), decentralization, a new curriculum (including a new course, Social Studies), courses of study, unit activities, and a Fundamental Law on Education.⁶⁴ He asked Mombusho counterparts to “start immediately thinking about the organization of a group prepared to do the spade work for whatever projects develop from the activities of the Japan Education Committee.” On July 30, 1946, he recommended a more aggressive Division policy to remove impediments to democratizing Japan. His timetable for reforms in almost every area was breathtaking. Osborne was impatient for reform, but he had some sense of proportion. He noted critically in a field report of September 15, 1946, that a Captain Decker and the Japanese educators present had appointed him “dictator” of the Yokosuka schools, “but I declined.”⁶⁵

Division staff were eager to show tangible results as quickly as possible before reform zeal languished and the Occupation ended, a factor that led Dr. Florence Powdermaker to complain that “the reforms were too many, too fast.”⁶⁶ Harry Emerson Wildes, who served in the Occupation, wrote, “officers anxious to complete their tasks quickly and with credit to themselves attempted to democratize everything completely and all at once.”⁶⁷ But staff did not know how long momentum could be continued against reactionary forces or how long the Occupation would last. They were businesslike, pragmatic, and keen to show results in their efforts to transform Japan through education into a democratic society as rapidly as possible. Important to their thinking was the belief that reforms not achieved in the first two years might not be achieved at all—an astute assessment of the situation. Orr’s comments in response to a question regarding his and others’ knowledge of Japan when they first arrived is revealing. He said, “I don’t recall being too concerned about that. I don’t think many of us thought in those terms right away. We thought we were there to do a job. Let’s find out what it is, and then begin to do that job.”⁶⁸ He defended Kenneth Harkness, Textbook Branch Officer, for being too “pushy.” Orr said, “I’m sure all of us were pushy at times. We were there to do a job. We tried to be convincing, but sometimes we had to move ahead without the extensive discussions and reviews that might have permitted us to think things out more clearly.”⁶⁹

They (and many Japanese) were too wedded to the complete implementation of the USEMJ report and the latest fashions in the US—such as the 6–3–3–4 system or the Virginia Course of Studies. Wigglesworth defended the precipitous creation of the 6–3–3–4 system with the following valid argument:

Well, we knew that would be the problem. But if you didn't install all at once you would never get it. Very quickly it would have gone back to what they always had. To my mind this was part and parcel of the liberation [Occupation] system that you have always got to have some negatives with your pluses. . . . If you don't get your reforms through when you are in that first flush of victory, you are never going to get it done because after a while your prestige and power begins to wear off. . . . If you wanted to get any reforms done at all, you are going to have to do it in that period while you are master; otherwise it probably could never be done.⁷⁰

Sympathetic to the oppressed masses, the indoctrinated children, and the Mombusho dominated teachers, the Americans believed they had the answers to Japan's plight. When the Japanese said such-and-such would be "difficult" or "there is no precedent" for various reforms, they meant they didn't want to do it or that it wouldn't work in Japanese society. But the Americans were only challenged all the more to show that it could be done.

Even Eileen Donovan and Lulu Holmes, who prided themselves on their patient diplomacy with the Japanese, showed themselves to be frustrated with both the Japanese and their own Division for failing to move faster on the subjects of coeducation, the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (IRE), the home economics course of study, and a restructuring of the school year. In her now famous memorandum of August 6, 1946, on the IRE, Donovan wrote that it should have been abolished nine months earlier.⁷¹ In another memorandum attached to a staff study on co-education she advised pushing ahead to repeal Law 51 for elementary education without waiting for the Japan Education Reform Committee (JERC) and Mombusho recommendations. She wrote:

The undersigned officer believes it is neither necessary nor desirable to wait longer—that the Division should take a more definitely active part in leadership and initiative in this problem, and in the other reorganization questions which are and have been pending for three or four months. Whereas it is true that these problems cannot be solved overnight, nevertheless—if the thought might be expressed in the vernacular—"Time's a-wastin'."⁷²

Donovan laughingly admitted to me in an interview, "We were making suggestions; some made more suggestions than I did, because that wasn't my way of working. My way was to get them to make the suggestions, especially if it was one that I had thought of ahead of time."⁷³

A December 1946 policy decision involving Holmes and several other staff members reveals this sort of impatience.⁷⁴ They were willing to ignore three strong arguments against changing the beginning of the school year from April

to September: (a) the majority of Japanese opposed it; (b) the existing school year reflected the yearly agricultural cycle—at a time when approximately half of the Japanese populace was still agrarian; and (c) the existing school year coincided with the Japanese fiscal year. The Holmes group wanted a new school year because “reforms, if granted to be reforms, should be accomplished now.” They thought that September 1947 would be the appropriate time to initiate a new school calendar because that would coincide with the integration of the new curriculum, textbooks, and courses of study for the new 6–3–3–4 system. Other Division staff, however, successfully blocked the contemplated change by arguments that endorsed more democratic attitudes as well as sensitivity to Japanese culture, seasonal rhythms, and the logic of a coordinated school and fiscal year.

Many staff members suffered from a phenomenon characteristic of most foreigners who go abroad for the first time, namely the tendency to forget the limitations of their own institutions and practices.⁷⁵ They found themselves promoting American ideals as if they were realities. In doing so they imitated the attitude of the USEM. Characteristically, both the USEM and the Division staff glossed over their differences and promoted radical reforms as if there was complete unanimity on them in the United States. In fact, educators “back home” were (and continue) debating amongst themselves the merits of such issues as the 6–3–3–4 system, decentralization versus centralization, social studies versus traditional subjects, progressive education versus traditional education, and teacher labor unions versus professional educational associations.

Given the Japanese character and the conditions of the time, it did not take Division staff long to learn that a suggestion would be interpreted as an order. As a result, they repeatedly made “suggestions” and came to expect action upon them. Division documents and subsequent written accounts show that staff developed a term for applying pressure: “the nudge.” Hall referred to it as one of several different policies adopted by the Education Division to achieve its objectives. Yet most staff members interviewed denied the use of force, insisting rather that they only “suggested.”⁷⁶ Nugent denied using pressure, but his behavior for the first two years of the Occupation contradicts his words. For example, in a memo to Orr of January 13, 1947, Nugent suggested the “use of the nudge” at the subsequent Friday night meeting.⁷⁷ As Takemae Eiji has written, given the fear of SCAP by Japanese officials in the first three years of Occupation, “the nudge” and “suggestions” were very effective. The Japanese bureaucracy even developed a euphemistic expression for conveying that something should be done because of a SCAP official’s nudge: “From certain quarters there has been an official notice. . . .”⁷⁸

Staff impatience, inflexibility, ethnocentrism, feelings of superiority, and the failure to admit inexperience come through from time to time in the documents of 1945–48 as well as in recollections of *nisei* and non-American observers.

Owen Gauntlett, an Englishman responsible under Osborne for English education, recalled that some staff members almost “seemed Germanic” at times in their view that something had to be accomplished in a certain way.⁷⁹ And although Trainor could belittle Ministry officials for their failure to act more rapidly and Japanese educators for their alleged lack of professional skills, Gauntlett and James Doi remembered that, although the Americans tried to appear knowledgeable and invincible, they were sometimes amateurish in their planning because of lack of reference materials and time. Kenneth Yasuda thought staffing could have been greatly improved by selecting persons who were humbler, more sensitive, and less missionary-minded.⁸⁰

The American attitude could be characterized as that of a parent towards an uncomprehending child suffering from an illness. The CI&E knew the reforms that would be best for the Japanese: “This is quality medicine. Take it. You may not like its taste, but it will be good for you.” In a number of cases, Orr, Nugent, and other staff members countered Japanese objections to educational reforms for which Japan had few precedents by asserting that you can’t learn to ride a bicycle without repeated falls.⁸¹

Moral, Honest, Egalitarian

Despite their unconscious attitude of superiority, Division staff were generally open-hearted and generous with the Japanese. Far from being arrogant, they were men and women of good character who wanted to do good. In fact, among the Japanese interviewed not one has spoken of Division staff as being willfully mean or immoral; rather they were surprised at the good will of the American side. They were all too aware that, had the tables been reversed, a Japanese occupation would have been much more oppressive and lacking in good intentions and idealism.⁸²

Doi, reflecting on both the *nisei* who worked in the Occupation and the Education Division staff, was struck by the maturity, professional behavior, and high moral character of his contemporaries. In his view, they belonged to an age that took seriously the belief that an educator should be a moral example.⁸³ Staff members secured medicine that was responsible for saving several Japanese lives, including those of Minister of Education Tanaka Kotaro’s son; Mom-busho’s head of the secondary education unit in 1947, Nakamura Shin’ichi; and Akashi Yoji, now a professor emeritus at Nanzan University.⁸⁴ The last of these, Akashi, was a 15-year-old elevator boy who lost his leg in an elevator accident and almost died during a two-week coma; SCAP personnel saved his life by securing proper hospitalization and medicine. They also took up a collection for the purchase of an artificial leg. Later a few of them supported Akashi while

sending him to college for a bachelor's degree. Thereafter, he obtained an M.A. and a Ph.D. at Georgetown University.⁸⁵

Doi thought the word "puritanical" would be apt to describe most of the male staff in their sexual behavior toward the Japanese.⁸⁶ Hall, whose Columbia and Princeton superiors in the wartime military government schools had rated him as thoroughly reliable and trustworthy, exhibited that moral character.⁸⁷ When I interviewed him in 1981 on a trip back from his work in Saudi Arabia, he said, "I don't drink in Saudi Arabia, I abide by their rules. I feel I have to do so in order not to be a hypocrite before my children." Alfred Crofts recalled that Hall built up a little wall around his bed in the YHK building and tossed out a Japanese woman put inside it by a teasing staff member.⁸⁸ Hall explained his own behavior by saying, "I did for Japan and the Japanese people exactly what I would have done for Americans or American people under identical conditions [—] applied the golden rule. . . . When I went into Japan I put my hatred behind me. I tried to do a technical job to the best of my ability in the interest of the Japanese people per se and of the country I came from, America."⁸⁹

One example of such puritan attitudes occurred on a field trip involving John Nelson, Social Education Bureau Officer, Monta Osborne, and Frank Judson, the Division's audio-visual specialist.⁹⁰ One night before going to bed at a Japanese inn, Judson summoned the manager. Judson prided himself on his ability to convey meaning through a limited vocabulary and mimicry. He pointed to the seven numeral on his watch, crossed his arms, grasped his shoulders, and convulsed his body in a rotating action from the waist to indicate the group's desire to be awakened at that hour. "*Hai, wakarimashita*" (Yes, I understand), the accommodating manager said. Promptly the next morning at seven o'clock, the inn's masseur made his way into the room and began to massage Nelson. The latter, a big man, and the only person I have heard complaints about for rough, arrogant behavior, was outraged at what he mistook for sexual perversity. He grabbed the masseur and shoved him outside the room. Hundreds of such humorous (and some not so humorous) events occurred because of language and cultural barriers.

Attitudes of Division staff are demonstrated by the following anecdote told by Osborne, and verified independently by Gauntlett. The story involved an investigation and survey trip to nearby Chiba Prefecture. Osborne said:

On the trip I was accompanied by officials of the Mombusho plus prefectural education officials. I had an Army sedan that I was driving. We stopped at a school. . . . The roads were very dusty. . . . Then we got ready to leave. They waved my car [to go ahead] and I wouldn't go because the officials—they had little transportation in Japan at that time—had to ride in an open truck standing up, covered with dust. . . . So I got out of the car and I told the Mombusho man who was with me at the time,

“Whoever goes behind here is going to eat a lot of dust. I can close the windows, and you can’t. So you go first.” And it was kind of hard to arrange that. . . . And you know that story got all over Japan, absolutely all over. It gave me an entree that I wouldn’t have had otherwise. Well, it was a small thing to me, and a natural thing. I could go to Hokkaido and people had heard the story up there.⁹¹

Doi recalled that Herbert J. Wunderlich (Textbook and Curriculum Branch Chief for the first nine months of the Occupation) and Orr were sensitive to chicanery or any kind of unethical behavior. Of Wunderlich he observed that, “He had a very strong ethical, moral sense. . . . He worked well with people; he was sensitive to conflict, inner tensions. . . .”⁹² Because of the power they exercised, Education Division staff had opportunities to engage in graft and dishonesty for personal aggrandizement. (To be sure, there is a narrow line in any country between a sincere gift and a bribe intended to achieve a favor, particularly in a gift-giving country such as Japan.) Staff repeatedly had opportunities to abuse their power, particularly the Textbook Branch staff in charge of textbook approval and competitive publication. Doi, Osborne, Wigglesworth, and Neufeld all spoke of what they perceived as bribes. Osborne recalled being presented once with an extremely valuable dagger and on another occasion being offered the sexual favors of a high Mombusho official’s daughter in order to obtain a favorable action. Luanna Bowles, a devout Quaker and member of the Secondary Education Branch, severely lectured Mombusho officers on the latter occasion.

Wigglesworth said money gifts were left by committees representing private colleges and universities, especially medical schools—gifts which he promptly returned.⁹³ Doi admitted that Kenneth Harkness, Textbook and Curriculum Branch, was not particularly creative and too brusque with both the Japanese and fellow staff members, but he admired Harkness intensely for his absolute integrity in relations with the Japanese. He said, “But, you know, Harkness was straight as an arrow. He was honest. I simply describe that as midwestern, Presbyterian style.”⁹⁴

A letter from representatives of five universities to Neufeld asking him to accept employment with their universities after the Occupation ended reflected their appreciation of his efforts:

In achieving all these and many other fine results, you have never taken a domineering attitude. The feeling of the conqueror and conquered never even once existed between you and the Japanese people. You were ever ready to listen to the opinions and suggestions of others. Your goal was always the happiness and well-being of the Japanese adults and children.⁹⁵

Likewise, Orr received one of the highest of compliments when Ministry of Education officials and scholars of the Japan Education Reform Committee petitioned SCAP to deny his request for return to the United States.⁹⁶

Frustration with Local Military Government Staff Attitudes

A distinction must be made between the overbearing and brutish attitudes and behavior of some American GIs and local Military Government officers and those of the mature, professional officers who staffed the CI&E and other SCAP Sections in Tokyo. Most combat GI veterans behaved themselves, but the young high school graduates who replaced them and officers in the field did act arrogantly and arbitrarily toward the "gooks." These attitudes were abhorrent to CI&E Chief Donald R. Nugent and other Education Division staff. On their return from field trips, Education Division staff—including Hall, Howard Bell (Social Science Advisor), Osborne, James Gibson (Liaison Branch of CI&E), Rebecca Barnhart, Walter Eeels, and Verna Carley (all three of the Higher Education Branch)—reported such behavior and asked for a correction of it.⁹⁷ Osborne wrote me:

In Japan there was general agreement among professional persons in SCAP that over the years there was a serious deterioration in the behavior of American troops. It is strange, but true, that combat troops which entered Japan in 1945–46 behaved much better than their replacements. . . . On the average, they had attained a higher level of education than their postwar successors. They had enough of war, no longer hated the Japanese (despite four years of virulent anti-Japanese propaganda), were willing and anxious to make peace with the conquered people. Their successors were much younger, less educated, and, since they had no war exploits to boast of, gladly assumed the role of "conquerors." All of us, during our TDY trips to the prefectures, observed troop behavior which we felt was atrocious and which we were certain worked against the Occupation's objectives. Pushing old Japanese gentlemen off the streets of Sapporo into the gutters (by GIs) did not, one would think, contribute to the attainment of our purposes.⁹⁸

Florence Powdermaker, Helen Mears, and Lloyd Cronbach were severe in their criticisms of such behavior. Powdermaker thought that the more experienced personnel at policy and command levels should be used to improve attitudes and to restrain actions of local Military Government officers. My interview of Professor Travis Summerhill (Military Government, Eighth Army) is replete with accounts of irresponsible behavior by officers and enlisted men in Aomori, Tsuruga, and Otsu; but the point needs to be made that Summerhill was

an educated man who had participated in the quality CASA program. He condemned and reported these actions to higher authorities at risk to himself.⁹⁹ However, even at the local level, on-the-job experience sometimes resulted in an improved attitude and behavior.¹⁰⁰

Division staff and visiting experts were, on occasion, deceived by local Military Government educational officers. William Kelly developed such a bad reputation among the Japanese for his aggressive, forceful behavior vis-à-vis Nagano Prefecture officials and educators that he was called "Hurricane Kelly." Barnhart and visiting expert Francis Daly's field reports praised Kelly as "positive, constructive," but Professor Arch O. Heck was more skeptical. He reported to CI&E that Kelly's success seemed to be based on unethical and undemocratic procedures. "It is sheer hypocrisy to talk democracy and wield the big stick in an effort to get a program adopted at once in order to make a big showing at SCAP headquarters and Washington, D.C."¹⁰¹ Daly was not deceived regarding two other cases. His report to Nugent severely criticized the undemocratic actions of two men who proudly introduced themselves to him (and others) by the Japanese nicknames of "Give Them Hell" Dupell and "*Taiifu*" (Typhoon) Johnson. He believed that Captain Dupell's methods increased rather than decreased Communist numbers and activity. Both men, in his judgment, "threatened not only IFEL objectives, but those of the Occupation." CI&E records show that both Nugent and the Division staff deplored Dupell's methods¹⁰² Daly's vivid accounts of forceful and overbearing actions makes very grim reading for an American.¹⁰³

Changed Attitudes and Japanization

Education Division officers who stayed only one year were generally more impatient than those who stayed longer; likewise staff working in the first three years were more zealous and reform-minded than those of the following three and three-quarter years of the Occupation. There were several reasons staff gradually became more patient. First, between March 1949 and July 1949 MacArthur, in accordance with a 1948 order from the National Security Council (NSC-13/2), made speeches to the Japanese people and sent orders to staff that inaugurated a more passive and less reformist phase of the Occupation. The Japanese Government was encouraged "to exercise the normal powers of government" and Occupation forces to change from "stern rigidity" to the "friendly guidance of a protective force."¹⁰⁴

Second, most staff became Japanophiles. In interviews, they looked back on their duty in Japan as one of the most pleasant and satisfactory periods of their careers and fondly recalled anecdotes and Japanese friends. Persons who had

been in Japan before the war, such as Wigglesworth and Holmes, were already Japanophiles. Even four decades later Wigglesworth expressed anger at Trainor's rough scolding of Mombusho officials in 1946–47.¹⁰⁵

Third, a maturation process took place in which Americans came to realize that an American solution was not always applicable.¹⁰⁶ For example, in hindsight some Division staff recognized that decentralization of education, a number one priority, was not appropriate for Japan. Richard Farnsworth, an Elementary Education Branch officer, wrote, "It wasn't until later that I recognized that the fragmentation of the Japanese educational administration system did not make sense given the size of the country and the homogeneity of the society, but we were out to create the new democracy."¹⁰⁷ And in a letter to a civilian advisor on a Military Government team in Aomori, Lulu Holmes showed her usual sensitivity and moderation. She listed points that she thought the young man should stress in his talks with Japanese women, including: "Japanese women must continue to be responsible for well-managed homes and healthy children. They must in addition learn to so systematize their home labors that they will have additional time for community interests and responsibilities."¹⁰⁸ The Joseph Trainor and the Monta Osborne of 1949 were more methodical, patient, and open to Japanese culture and educational practices than they were in 1946. As the months passed and leisure time expanded, staff read and listened, trying to understand more thoroughly Japanese culture and institutions. Orr, Trainor, and Arthur Loomis (Education Reorganization officer and successor to Orr as Chief of the Division) created an in-service program to correct the tendency to judge everything by an American yardstick. The same Osborne who legalistically saw it as his duty to nudge the Japanese to implement literally the USEMJ Report prevented a Shinjuku gangster group from closing down and appropriating a private school by going as high as MacArthur. Osborne said the "gang leader was put in his place by SCAP."¹⁰⁹

Attitudes of Education Division toward Prewar Japanese Education

An important dynamic motivating Education Division personnel was their negative attitude toward prewar Japanese society, culture, and education. To be sure there was a representation of sympathetic "old Japan hands" such as Harold Henderson (first Education and Religion Divisions Chief), Arundel Del Re (Higher Education Advisor), W. Kenneth Bunce, Russel Durgin (Japanese YMCA Director before the war), Owen Gauntlett, Donald Nugent, Edwin Wigglesworth, Lulu Holmes, and Luanna Bowles (all of whom had taught in Japan before the war). A small minority of other Division staff, such as Donald Typer, Walter Eels, and Verna Carley, respected some aspects of prewar Japanese edu-

cation. For example, Carley said, "The Japanese were a highly educated people. . . . They had excellent universities. They were generally on the German tradition, but having studied comparative education, I understood the system and put many of them among the best in the world before the war."¹¹⁰

The majority of the staff, however, argued that the demerits far outweighed the merits of the old education system. This attitude motivated a strong desire to root out the old. MacArthur epitomized their view of Japan's post-1868 society and history when he said the knowledge gained from the time of the arrival of Perry "was forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement. Freedom of expression, freedom of action, even freedom of thought were denied through suppression of liberal education."¹¹¹ His view reflected wartime thinking in Washington, D.C., that the small liberal element that had emerged by the turn of the century had been overwhelmed in the 1930s by militaristic and ultranationalistic elements feeding on pre-Meiji values, a feudal land system, and an unholy alliance between *zaibatsu*, landlords, and the military.¹¹²

It was Washington policy to seek out what liberals there were and to assist them in all fields to build a new, peaceful Japan. The CI&E search was not very successful in the first six months. A Lieutenant John Boroff expressed the general CI&E disillusionment in this regard when he wrote: "After two weeks in this job. . . I haven't met any liberals, at least none that I would wage a dollar on. . . . [There seems to be a fear] that reprisals will be taken against them. Perhaps it is the fear that if they push liberal ideas they will be blacklisted by their countrymen."¹¹³ Gordon Bowles and Hall expressed a similar disappointment. Hall, in particular, thought the wartime experience had left most liberals "broken in spirit"—a view with which Tanaka Kotaro, Tokyo Imperial University Professor and later Minister of Education, agreed.¹¹⁴ (However, the search bore more fruit after the January 1946 directive that led to the creation of the Japan Education Committee as an advisor to the USEMJ and its successor, the Japan Education Reform Committee [JERC].¹¹⁵)

What were the deficiencies the staff found in prewar Japanese education? They were many and are well documented in SCAP records, the USEMJ Report, and *Education in Japan*, written by Education Division staff for the background reading of the USEMJ.¹¹⁶ The last judged prewar education to be elitist, nonprofessional, textbook- and teacher-centered, formalistic, drill- and rote-oriented, excessively centralized, standardized, bureaucratic, undemocratic, and male-dominated. All educational content was judged to have been saturated with militarism, ultranationalism, State Shintoism, myths, superstition, and blind acceptance of the past. Wunderlich referred to Japan as a totalitarian power "engaged in an educational despotism."¹¹⁷ Most viewed the education system as one of indoctrination rather than true education.¹¹⁸ As the USEMJ Report put it, "the Japanese educational system was basically nineteenth century in nature and

would have been due for reform in accordance with modern themes of education by the Japanese, themselves, had there been no war or American Occupation.¹¹⁹ In Hall's largely critical works on Japanese education and occupation policy he repeatedly wrote negatively of the tyranny of Japanese tradition on Japanese education.¹²⁰ Dr. Cronbach concluded that the contemporary state of Japanese psychology and educational research virtually had not developed beyond American thinking of 1924–1928.¹²¹

These negative assessments often held an element of truth, but they were flawed by two tendencies. One was to judge Japanese education by American standards, particularly progressive education standards. The truth was that most Japanese, then as now, were not overly impressed with developments in American psychology, especially progressive educational philosophy and methodology that did not fit Japanese needs. A nation seeking desperately to preserve its independence and to catch up with and overcome the West could not value excessively child-centered pedagogy, social studies functionalism, or the sentimental and romantic emphasis on individual identity and self-esteem preached by progressive educators. A second tendency was an inclination to characterize all post-1868 Japanese education in terms of the excessive militaristic, nationalistic, imperialistic, and State Shintoistic indoctrination of the wartime period, 1931–1945. This appraisal overlooked many Japanese similarities with education in advanced Western European countries. It also minimized the many achievements Japan made in post-1868 Japanese education at all levels at great cost—such as uniform financing of education to achieve a much more equal standard of elementary education throughout the country than in the U.S., a high literacy and attendance rate, good technical schools, and a high-quality academic track beginning in middle school and continuing to the university. The Education Division's generally negative assessment also ignored Japan's limited prewar economic base—an obstacle to extending greater educational opportunity. Furthermore, Japanese education did not run at all in a straight line toward totalitarian goals, as any analysis of Japanese textbook content from 1868 to 1945 clearly demonstrates.¹²² While this system had served the second part of Meiji leaders' goals of "rich country and strong military" too well, it also served to increase the country's wealth.

The most outspoken critic of the prewar system of education was Joseph Trainor. He particularly castigated it for an absence of professionalism, by which he meant that it did not embrace the tenets of progressive education. Trainor's criticisms, however, revealed as much about contemporary American education and educators as it did about the Japanese system. By the 1940s Education Division staff such as Trainor, Kenneth Harkness, and Helen Hefferman had become the second generation of advocates of Progressive Education. They had acquired from their mentors a hatred of traditional education as old-fashioned, unscien-

tific, textbook- and teacher-centered, undemocratic, divorced from societal and national needs, and too rote- and drill-centered. Exorcising it from Japan's schools may have become an unconscious crusade.¹²³

Conclusion

The Allied Occupation of Japan was surely one of the most benevolent of all occupations of a conquered nation. It did far more good than bad. It did not achieve reforms as radical as Japanese Communists and radical Socialists had desired. To do so would have meant that MacArthur would have exceeded levels of democratic reform and social justice achieved even in his own country. Conversely, reforms went far beyond what the conservative Japanese establishment intended. If the Americans had not applied pressure, the conservatives would have changed Japan very little.

Had the Americans been less confident, crusading, impatient, and ethnocentric, they would not have insisted on educational opportunity, coeducation, improved teacher training, comprehensive and objective history education, or Japanese written language reforms that greatly facilitated reading and writing. The Japanese people, especially women, laborers, and farmers, would have been far worse off. The success of the Occupation in achieving a middle position helped to make the Occupation moderately successful in transforming Japan into a more democratic nation, and this success can be attributed in great measure to the attitudes Occupation personnel, especially those of the Education Division, brought to their jobs.

That having been said, we have to ask whether the Occupation could have been more than moderately successful in achieving fundamental, permanent reforms if its personnel had possessed a deeper understanding of Japan's strikingly different indigenous culture. What if there had been a true partnership between the conquered and the vanquished to solve mutually agreed upon, identifiable problems? Arthur Dornheim, a language reform officer, said that most graduates of the intensive language programs for the occupation of Japan "probably did not have any solid background of Japanese history and culture"; accordingly, he complained, they could only rely on common sense in approaching their jobs.¹²⁴ It is possible to suppose that if American Occupation forces had been more knowledgeable and less ethnocentric some educational reforms would have been abandoned or tempered. Reversals in education policy by the Japanese government and educators in the decade after 1952 showed that many of the Occupation's educational goals, such as decentralization, were incompatible with Japanese tradition and culture. Other unacceptable changes included abolition of martial arts, moral education, entrance examinations, and school

ranking. Many aspects of progressive education—such as child-centered and individualistic education, emphasis on social studies, abandonment of drill and rote learning, and watered down educational standards—were also abandoned. Even the positive aspects of improving educational opportunity by the implementation of the 6–3–3–4 system produced severe casualties, such as the replacement of quality *semmon gakko* (technical schools) with today's scorned equivalents.

Although the various Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) made a significant contribution by producing graduates knowledgeable about and sensitive to Japan, these schools should have been expanded upon and continued for the rest of the Occupation for the training of all SCAP personnel, civilian or military, prior to their arrival in Japan. Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) authorities at Monterey, California, had ordered Hall and his staff to draft a continuing, in-service education plan for all Occupation staff.¹²⁵ As a result, Orr recalled, Hall directed a group at CASA that produced a complete plan for an in-service military government training course for all Occupation personnel for the duration of the Occupation.¹²⁶ Unfortunately, the plan was aborted. Still, it does not necessarily follow that a greater knowledge of Japanese culture and education prior to a person's arrival in Japan would have meant greater sensitivity. Osborne correctly pointed out that, in Hall's case, his knowledge of Japan "evidently only fed his desire and intention to change Japanese society in profound ways which would not even have been contemplated by the Education Division staff of 1946–51."¹²⁷ Because they had not taken part in CATS programs, staff who joined the Education Division after mid-1946 for the positive stage of the Occupation came with even less sensitivity and knowledge of Japanese culture and history.

As a result of their own experience and the advice of such expert consultants as Dr. Florence Powdermaker, Orr and Trainor gradually took three steps to provide orientation for new staff and visiting experts. A first step was to send orientation materials to visiting consultants and new staff prior to their arrival. A second was to get them as quickly as possible into the field working on already initiated projects—to make them more realistic. A third step was to organize lectures and create orientation materials for new staff.¹²⁸ The orientation materials sent to newcomers in the U.S. prior to their arrival delineated the general policy and organization of SCAP, the CI&E, and the Education Division; discussed the Imperial Rescript on Education and the initial directives of the Education Division to the Japanese; and outlined the nature of the USEMJ Report and the roles of the Japan Education Reform Committee and the Ministry of Education. It tried to give new staff a realistic picture of Japanese economic and social conditions and the typical work of the Education Division. The pamphlet wisely suggested that patience, persistence, enthusiasm, and understanding were the most

important qualities needed; it stressed the caveat that the “time-economy yardstick” used in the U.S. should be used with restraint in Japan.

But the extreme paucity of courses, articles, and books on Japanese history, society, and culture—as well as a lack of comparative courses on education, culture, history, society, and politics at contemporary American universities—limited the ability of the American government to sensitize all Occupation forces and the Education Division to accomplish an in-depth orientation. The constraints on sensitizing education staff to Japan are dramatized by the limited availability of materials. The reading list suggested for orientation included only ten books:

- Ruth Benedict, *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946);
- John F. Embree, *The Japanese Nation* (1945), and *Suye Mura, A Japanese Village* (1946);
- Hugh L. Keenlyside and A. F. Thomas, *A History of Japanese Education and the Present Educational System* (1937);
- Frank Alanson Lombard, *Pre-Meiji Education in Japan: A Study of Japanese Education Previous to the Restoration of 1868* (1913);
- Nitobe Inazo, *Bushido* (1900);
- Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan—Past and Present* (1946);
- Robert Reischauer, *Japan: Government and Politics* (1939);
- George Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (1931);
- Glenn Trewartha, *Japan: Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography* (1947).

Even some of these materials were not available until after the first years of the Occupation; moreover, it is doubtful if even this limited reading list was studied because of the brief time recruited staff had to prepare themselves before arriving in Japan. Even after arriving in Japan most staff, until 1950, found themselves so busy with daily work activities that they had little time to do much background reading.

Although the goal of informing and sensitizing staff to Japanese culture was desirable, it was simply too much to expect Americans in 1945–1952 to be free of the prejudicial attitudes pounded into them in the course of a savage war or produced by American accomplishments—and to be at the same time cultural relativists. As valid as James Doi, Kenneth Yasuda, Lloyd Cronbach, John Pelzel, and Florence Powdermaker’s criticisms were, they were made from either the bicultural perspective of a *nisei* or the professionally sensitive and enlightened views of a psychologist, a sociologist, or an anthropologist. Fewer than ten percent of Occupation forces could claim such a background.

Notes

¹ Interview of Eileen Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980, p. 4. Donovan's remarks on the sign were not recorded. Correspondence of Donovan, 1 Apr. 1986.

² Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1985), ch. 7; Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), ch. 8; A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia, Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 20, 67–76, 368–71.

³ Helen Mears, *Mirror for Americans: Japan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 37, 39.

⁴ Interview of John Pelzel, 10 July 1982, pp. 13–14; Reel 49/Box 59; Report of Powdermaker; Correspondence of Osborne, 21 July 1987, p. 3; 27 July 1987, p. 9; Joseph C. Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59. The Trainor Papers are deposited at the Lou Hoover Library Archives, Stanford University, and Meisei University, Tokyo.

⁵ Robert King Hall, *Education for a New Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 20–21; Harry Wray, "Nihon senryo no sankasha, hihansha to shite no Hooru" (Robert King Hall: Participant and critic of the Occupation of Japan), *Sengo kyoikushi kenkyu* (Research Bulletin of Educational History of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Meisei University) 4 (June 1987): 73–81.

⁶ Frederick Wakeman, Jr., "High Ch'ing," in *Modern East Asia, Essays in Interpretation*, ed. James Crowley (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), pp. 1–26; Paul A. Cohen, "Ch'ing China: Confrontation with the West, 1850–1900," in Crowley, pp. 29–61.

⁷ Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935).

⁸ Joseph C. Trainor, *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor's Memoir* (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983), pp. 16, 366–67 (hereafter, *Trainor's Memoir*); Interview of W. Kenneth Bunce, 1 July 1982, pp. 13–16; interview of Walter Nichols, 27 June 1985, pp. 16–17; interview of Robert King Hall, 29 Apr. 1981, pp. 11, 25, 32.

⁹ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, III: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985) pp. 7, 287–95; Toshio Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 40–46, 81–82; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 283–284; SCAP, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948* (Washington, D.C.: Report of Government Section, 1949) vols. I & II, pp. 763, 769; John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980), ch. 5; Ray A. Moore, "Soldier of God: MacArthur's Attempt to Christianize Japan," Paper delivered at the Amherst International Conference on The Occupation of Japan, 21–23 Aug. 1980.

¹⁰ Mark T. Orr, "Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1954, pp. 191–92.

¹¹ Nishiyama Sen, a famous Japanese interpreter, thought the initial good relationship between the Japanese and Americans occurred as a result of the Japanese government's

order to the Japanese people to cooperate, as well as of the generally good behavior of combat troops; see his "The American Occupation of Japan—A Retrospective View," Foreign Press Club of Japan Symposium, 25 June 1985.

¹² Interview of Pelzel, 10 July 1982, p. 13; Correspondence of Bunce, 17 Oct. 1987.

¹³ In fact, Perry thought there was no indication from MacArthur's library that he had any genuine interest in Japanese culture; Perry, pp. 76–78.

¹⁴ Interview of Herbert Passin, 23 May 1981, p. 26; James, *Years of MacArthur*, III, pp. 59–60.

¹⁵ Nishiyama, "The American Occupation."

¹⁶ Interview of Monta Osborne, 28 Dec. 1982, p. 37; Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1981), p. 58.

¹⁷ William Neufeld, "Reminiscences," III (unpublished item in Wray Papers), pp. 5–6, 8–9.

¹⁸ Interview of Bunce, 6 July 1982, p. 13.

¹⁹ Neufeld, "Reminiscences," II, pp. 10–11; interview of Passin, 23 May 1981, p. 26.

²⁰ Interview of Mark T. Orr, 12 Jan. 1980, p. 48; *Yomiuri Shimbun Sengoshi Hanhen, Showa sengo shi: Kyoiku no ayumi* (Showa postwar history: The path of education) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1982), p. 41.

²¹ *Trainor's Memoir*, p. 12; Letter of Trainor to Orr, 13 Feb. 1953; Interview of Trainor, 9 June 1980, p. 97.

²² Interview of James Isao Doi, 18 July 1985, pp. 12–18, 37; interview of Amagi Isao, 22 Mar. 1980, and interview of Nishimura Iwao, 1 Mar. 1989. Harry Wray, "Decentralization of Education in the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952," in Thomas W. Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform* (Norfolk: City of Norfolk, Virginia, MacArthur Memorial, 1982).

²³ Conversation with Dr. Ernest Hilgard, 24 Jan. 1980. Hall played a strong role in the Mombusho decision by his "nudging" suggestion that a Japanese action to discontinue the martial arts in the schools would prevent the embarrassment of a directive prohibiting the martial arts in any form. Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, p. 80.

²⁴ Interview of Passin, 23 May 1981, p. 27; John Carrol Ruben, "The Japanese Martial Arts and the Occupation of Japan: Suppression and Second Thoughts," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1987, pp. 136–40. For the ethnocentric reactions of Donovan, Durgin, and Harkness to the staged demonstrations see: "Summary Comments on *Judo, Kendo, Archery Demonstration*, 30 Dec. 1946," National Record Center, 331/Box 5275. For other discussions of this issue see also Box 413, Box 5726, individual conference reports in Boxes 5132–34, and Trainor Papers, Reel 39/Box 45.

²⁵ Interview of Osborne, 28 Dec. 1982, p. 13.

²⁶ Interview of Orr, 12 Jan. 1980.

²⁷ National Record Center, 331/5255, CIE (A) 101750; hereafter, NRC.

²⁸ Interview of Gordon Bowles, 22 Sep. 1980, p. 29.

²⁹ Correspondence of Edwin Wigglesworth, 17 Dec. 1984, pp. 10–11.

³⁰ Mears, *Mirror for Americans: Japan*, p. 38.

³¹ Report of Powdermaker, 15 Oct. 1948, Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59. Powdermaker praised Military Government officials for conscientious effort and integrity of

purpose.

³² Interview of Pelzel, 10 July 1982, p. 13.

³³ Trainor Papers, Reel 49-1/Box 59.

³⁴ Interview of Pelzel, p. 14; Neufeld, "Reminiscences," III, p. 11; Orr, "Education Reform," pp. 206–207; T. J. Pempel, "The Tar Baby Target: Reform of the Japanese Bureaucracy," in *Democratizing Japan, The Allied Occupation*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

³⁵ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, p. 13; Correspondence of James Gibson, 30 May 1984. A contemporary *Saturday Evening Post* article of 1946 saw the staff as possessing "almost missionary zeal." NRC 331/Box 5383.

³⁶ Interview of Delmer Brown, 10 Jan. 1986, pp. 4–5; interview of Alfred Crofts, 16 July 1985, pp. 10, 21, 27.

³⁷ Interview of Pelzel, 10 July 1982, pp. 13–14.

³⁸ NRC, 331/5132-5135. Hamada Yotaro et al., *Sengo kyoiku to watakushi* (Postwar education and I) (Tokyo: Nippon Hoso Kyokai Shuppankai, 1979), pp. 97–98.

³⁹ Interview of Bunce, 29 Dec. 1982.

⁴⁰ Interview of Herbert J. Wunderlich in Mark T. Orr's office, 10 Jan. 1980. Orr's comment is found on p. 37 of the same interview.

⁴¹ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985.

⁴² Harry Wray and Katsuoka Kanji, "*Senryogun no Nihongo seisaku ni tsuite, sono 1*, (A cooperative study of Occupation policy on Japanese language reform, part 1), in *Sengo kyoikushi kenkyu* (Meisei University) 3 (June 1986).

⁴³ Interview of Trainor, 9 June 1980, p. 39.

⁴⁴ Interview of Kenneth Yasuda, p. 12.

⁴⁵ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, p. 8.

⁴⁶ Interview of Yasuda, p. 12. See also Doi, Davis Shiroma, and Takahashi Nobuo's 20 Nov. 1947 criticisms of screening procedures. Trainor Collection, Reel 45-2/Box 53.

⁴⁷ Kawai Kazuo, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 13–14

⁴⁸ Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 105.

⁴⁹ Trainor Papers, Box 49.

⁵⁰ Interview of Verna Carley by D. Clayton James, 23 Aug. 1971, p. 13, as cited in James, *Years of MacArthur*, III, p. 758.

⁵¹ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1961), pp. 54, 169.

⁵² Interview of Osborne, 28 Dec. 1982, p. 39; interview of Wigglesworth, p. 27. Wunderlich wrote of working seven days a week and until 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. during the first nine months of the Occupation; Herbert J. Wunderlich, "*Nihon senryo no omoide, 1945–46 (sono ichi)*," (Reminiscences of the Occupation of Japan) in *Sengo kyoikushi kenkyu* (Meisei University) 2 (June 1985), p. 44. According to the Weekly Report of 12 Apr. 1946, minimum working hours were reduced from 48 to 44. Trainor papers, Reel 50-1/Box 60.

⁵³ Interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980, p. 36.

- ⁵⁴ Interview of Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980, pp. 6–7.
- ⁵⁵ Interview of Trainor, 9 June 1980, p. 9. Members of the Japan Education Committee were impressed with the dedicated, business-like attitude of the Education Division staff. *Kyoiku no ayumi*, pp. 212–20.
- ⁵⁶ Interview of Izaka Yukio, 4 May 1984; Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59; Neufeld's activities on behalf of Hiroshima orphans was another good example of American goodwill. "Reminiscences," IV, p. 3.
- ⁵⁷ Lulu Holmes Papers, Reel 1, pp. 7–25; interview of Lulu H. Holmes by Helene Maxwell Brewer, "Higher Education for Women, 1946–48," 1968, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, pp. 10–15; interview of Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980, pp. 3–9, 36.
- ⁵⁸ Interview of Wigglesworth, 17 Dec. 1984, pp. 24–25; interview of Dr. Crawford Sams, 16 July 1985, pp. 18–20.
- ⁵⁹ The same Dr. Sams estimated that his Section's efforts saved 5,000,000 Japanese lives in the first three years of the Occupation. Interview of Sams, p. 22.
- ⁶⁰ Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59.
- ⁶¹ Perry, *Beneath the Eagle's Wings*, pp. 35–36.
- ⁶² Interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980.
- ⁶³ Interview of Osborne, 28 Dec. 1981, p. 38.
- ⁶⁴ Trainor Papers, Reel 16/Box 17, Reel 19/Box 21, Reel 29-3/Box 33, Reel 30-1/Box 33; NRC, 331/Box 5371; CIE (A) 00393-6.
- ⁶⁵ NRC, 331/Box 5132.
- ⁶⁶ Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59. See in the same source Francis Daly's critical report of 31 Mar. 1949 regarding impatience concerning the allegedly slow Japanese implementation and understanding of the new Science Board Law.
- ⁶⁷ Harry Emerson Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 19.
- ⁶⁸ Interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980, pp. 7–8. Correspondence of Orr, 15 Mar. 1986.
- ⁶⁹ Correspondence of Orr, 15 Mar. 1986.
- ⁷⁰ Interview of Wigglesworth, 17 Dec. 1984, pp. 25, 28–29. Wigglesworth lectured Hidaka on 14 Oct. 1946 for fifteen minutes on the importance of the 6–3–3–4 system. Trainor Papers, Reel 29-2/Box 33. Two Japanese emphasized the inflexibility of some staff. Interview of Nishimura, 1 Mar. 1980; interview of Amagi, 22 Mar. 1980.
- ⁷¹ Trainor Papers, Reel 17/Box 18, Reel 43-2/Box 51, Reel 39/Box 45; Lulu Holmes Papers, Reel 1.
- ⁷² NRC, 331/5116; Trainor Papers, Reel 57-2;
- ⁷³ Interview of Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980, pp. 8, 20–21, 36.
- ⁷⁴ Trainor Papers, Reel 42/Box 49, Reel 42-2/Box 51.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Reel 49/Box 59.
- ⁷⁶ Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, pp. 75–78; Wigglesworth's distinction between his methods and force sometimes seems tenuous and semantic. Interview of Edwin Wigglesworth, 17 Dec. 1984, p. 7; Correspondence of Hall, 29 July 1983; NRC, 331/Box 5135.
- ⁷⁷ Trainor Papers, Reel 33/Box 39; interview of Donald Nugent, 5 Feb. 1980, pp. 32–36.

⁷⁸ "Saru homen kara no otasshi ni nari," Takemae Eiji, *GHQ* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983), p. 96.

⁷⁹ Interview of Owen Gauntlett, 24 Apr. 1980, pp. 22–24. The Italian Arundel Del Re, a Higher Education Advisor, graduate of and lecturer at Oxford University, and teacher at Taipei and Tokyo Imperial Universities, was also critical of excessive U.S. zeal

⁸⁰ Interview of Yasuda.

⁸¹ Perry, p. 15; Interview of Sagara Iichi, 7 Mar. 1980; Morito Tatsuo, "Kyoiku iinkai seido hatten no koro" (The period of the development of the school board system), in *Kyoiku iinkai geppo*, April 1967.

⁸² Interview of Amagi, 12 Mar. 1980; interview of Nishimura, 1 Mar. 1980; interview of Sekiguchi Takahatsu, 27 May 1980; interview of Sagara, 7 May 1980.

⁸³ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, pp. 9–10.

⁸⁴ Interview of Sagara, 7 May 1980; interview of Nakamura Shin'ichi, 20 Jan. 1984. Nakamura was very ill with pneumonia. Unrecorded remarks of Osborne, 29 Dec. 1982; conversations with Akashi Yoji.

⁸⁵ After Education Division Chief Mark Orr had returned to the U.S., his Deputy Chief, Joseph C. Trainor, wrote him that he and his wife had nursed Orr's former driver, a Mr. Suzuki, back to health by feeding and administering medicine to him, and insisting that he not do any heavy work for a while. Many staff, like Donald Typer (Higher Education officer) and his wife, purchased clothing and food for Japanese acquaintances and friends in and out of government. Letter of Trainor to Orr, 25 May 1950; interview of Donald Typer, 23 Aug. 1985.

⁸⁶ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, p. 10.

⁸⁷ Hall Papers.

⁸⁸ Unrecorded interview of Hall, 29 Apr. 1981; interview of Crofts, pp. 20–21.

⁸⁹ Interview of Hall, 29 Apr. 1981, p. 83.

⁹⁰ Unrecorded remarks of Osborne, 29 Dec. 1982.

⁹¹ Interview of Osborne, 28 Dec. 1982, pp. 28–29. Gauntlett said of Osborne: He was "no flatterer," genuine, a man with a fine heart, and at times "quite blunt," interview of Gauntlett, 24 Apr. 1980, p. 14.

⁹² Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, p. 10.

⁹³ Ibid. Doi's recollections tangentially support Osborne's account. Correspondence of Wigglesworth, 17 Dec. 1984, p. 11. Neufeld, "Reminiscences," III, p. 14. Neufeld said one friend in the Economic and Science Section found a bucket of pearls on his desk. Interview of Neufeld, 24 and 26 Nov. 1986, p. 14; interview of Osborne, 13 Aug. 1985. Unrecorded remarks of Osborne, 29 Dec. 1982. Yoshida strongly criticized such "presents." Yoshida, *Memoirs*, p. 59.

⁹⁴ Interview of Doi, 18 July 1985, pp. 9–10.

⁹⁵ Letter to William Neufeld, 15 Mar. 1952 in Wray Papers; Correspondence of Neufeld, 5 Nov. 1987; Interview of Neufeld, 24 and 26 Nov. 1986, p. 4.

⁹⁶ Wray Papers. CI&E Chief Nugent's memo to Orr said, "I would like to deserve as fine a testimonial when I leave."

⁹⁷ Trainor Papers, Reel 17-1/Box 18, Reel 23/Box 24, Reel 49-1/Box 59.

⁹⁸ Correspondence of Osborne, 27 July 1987.

- ⁹⁹ Interview of Travis Summerhill, 16 Aug. 1986, p. 6.
- ¹⁰⁰ "The Reminiscences of Josephine Colletti McKeon," Occupation of Japan Project of the Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 1962, p. 30.
- ¹⁰¹ Trainor Papers, Reel 24-1/Box 26; Reel 27/Box 29; See Heck's memorandum of 31 Mar. 1949 on Reel 28-2/Box 35. For Powdermaker's 30 June 1948–5 July 1948 preliminary report and her discussion on coeducation of 14 Oct. 1948, see Reel 49-1/Box 59.
- ¹⁰² See sources mentioned in note 101; Reel 28-2/Box 35.
- ¹⁰³ Trainor Papers, Reel 17/Box 18, Reel 23/Box 24, Reel 49-1/Box 59.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Reel 19/Box 21, Reel 22-1/Box 24; NRC, 331/Box 5133.
- ¹⁰⁵ Correspondence of Wigglesworth, 18 Oct. 1984.
- ¹⁰⁶ Correspondence of Typer, 20 Aug. 1985.
- ¹⁰⁷ Interview of Richard Farnsworth, 8 Mar. 1987.
- ¹⁰⁸ Letter of Lulu Holmes to Dan Nishita, 10 Oct. 1946, Lulu Holmes Papers, National Institute for Education Research, Reel I.
- ¹⁰⁹ Interview of Osborne, 28 Dec. 1981, p. 41.
- ¹¹⁰ Interview of Carley by James, 23 Aug. 1971, as cited in *Years of MacArthur*, III, n. 31.
- ¹¹¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 283–84. SCAP, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, pp. 763, 769.
- ¹¹² James, *Years of MacArthur*, III, pp. 100–144; Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*, p. 105; Oral History of Joseph Ballantine, Occupation of Japan Project of the Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 2 May 1962, pp. 58–60; Oral History of Eugene Dooman, Occupation of Japan Project of the Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, May 1962, pp. 134–137; Perry, pp. 41–44.
- ¹¹³ NRC, 331/5255; CIE(A)101751.
- ¹¹⁴ Interview of Bowles, pp. 20–21; Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, p. 76.
- ¹¹⁵ For lists of liberal educators see: Trainor Papers, Reel 30-2/Box 49; NRC, 331/Boxes 5142, 5319, 5390. Robert E. Ward, "Presurrender Planning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes," in *Democratizing Japan*, ed. Ward and Sakamoto, p. 22; National Archives, Diplomatic Section, U.S. State Department, Notter File. Harley Notter was a State Department employee.
- ¹¹⁶ *Trainor's Memoir*, pp. 2–7; Japan Ministry of Education, *Guide to New Education in Japan: Fundamental Problems of the Establishment of Japan*, (Tokyo: Mombusho, 1946). A reproduction of the original can be found in: Igasaki Akio and Yoshihara Koichiro, *Sengo kyoiku no genten 1* (Original source of postwar education) (Tokyo: Gendai Shuppankai, 1975).
- ¹¹⁷ Herbert J. Wunderlich, "The Japanese Textbook Problem and Solution, 1945–46," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1952, p. 1.
- ¹¹⁸ Harry Elmer Griffith, "Japanese Normal School Education," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1950.
- ¹¹⁹ *Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan* (Tokyo: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 7.
- ¹²⁰ Hall, *Education for a New Japan.*; See also: *Kokutai no hongu* (The national

polity), ed. Robert King Hall, trans. Owen Gauntlett (Newton, Mass.: Crofton, 1974), "Introduction," pp. 34–42.

¹²¹ Trainor Papers, Reel 49-1/Box 59.

¹²² Harold J. (Harry) Wray, "Changes and Continuity in Japanese Images of the *Kokutai* and Attitudes and Roles toward the Outside World: A Content Analysis of Japanese Textbooks, 1903–1945," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1971; Harry Wray, "Nationalism and Internationalism in the Japanese Textbooks, 1918–1931," *Asian Forum*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1973), pp. 46–62.

¹²³ Dianne Ravitch, *The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945–1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), ch. 2; Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876–1957* (New York: Knopf, 1961).

¹²⁴ Interview of Arthur Dornheim and Scott George, 14 Aug. 1985.

¹²⁵ Hall Papers.

¹²⁶ Interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980, pp. 42–44.

¹²⁷ Correspondence of Osborne, 29 July 1987.

¹²⁸ Trainor Papers, Reel 49/Box 59. See also Orr's memorandum to Nugent of 10 Mar. 1947 in the same source. For another example, on Eels arrival he was taken as soon as possible to Sendai and Morioka "to speed up the orientation of Dr. Eels to his work." NRC, 331/Box 5372; Trainor Papers, Reel 58-1/Box 67. See also the orientation pamphlet of 1948, Reel 38/Box 44; NRC, 331, Boxes 5377, 5629.