

Democracy and Justice in Boston School Busing

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AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CIVIL RIGHTS have interested me since my high school days when I first listened to the “I Have a Dream” speech. This interest grew after my viewing of *Eyes on the Prize: Part II*.¹ Shocked by scenes of violent anti-busing demonstrations in Boston, I thought of tracing the results of both busing and the white opposition to it. My opportunity to do on-the-spot research in Boston came from a grant as a 1995–96 Fulbright Junior Researcher.

Considering the historiography concerning this theme, my impression is that researchers and/or journalists, including Anthony Lukas, the author of the Pulitzer-Prize-winning *Common Ground*,² as well as their intended readers, are basically interested in the reasons why desegregation efforts failed, rather than how much was accomplished given the constraints of the situation. They seemed to focus their efforts on interpretations of the secret reasons for the violent reaction by some of white Bostonians against busing. Some say the main reason was racism.³ Others say that a sense of “defended neighborhoods”—accompanied by economic class antagonism between the “poor inner-city” and the “wealthy suburbs”—deserves more attention.⁴

Arthur Garrity, the judge who decreed busing of public school students, said in an interview that most of the anti-busing demonstrators were not racists.⁵ On the other hand, Andrew Bunie of Boston College, a reliable historian on race and ethnicity, believes that racial prejudice was a main cause.⁶ However, Formisano’s interpretation of the anti-busing movement as “reactionary populism” in his *Boston Against Busing* seems to me the most persuasive argument.⁷

The busing issue was made a question of politics rather than education.

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Although Garrity, Bunie, and Formisano probably agree that race was at least one factor in the unusually strong resistance to busing: Most of the anti-busing demonstrators based their core arguments on their own senses of “democracy” and “justice.” They felt that their constitutional rights were denied by the federal district court busing order issued on June 21, 1974, just twenty years after the landmark decision of *Brown v. Board of Education* by the Federal Supreme Court. Even President Gerald Ford expressed his strong sympathy with the protesters and declared, “I respectfully disagree with the judge’s order.” Congress was also inclined toward anti-busing by this time. Only the judicial power remained committed to the cause of civil rights. Both sides, anti-busing and pro-busing alike, sang the same song, “We Shall Overcome.” As Alan Lupo, a distinguished Boston journalist, pointed out, it was a kind of tragedy.⁸

The following article is a report of my on-the-spot research in Boston conducted during a nine-month stay at Boston College as a visiting scholar from August 1995. My initial idea was to focus on both sides in the struggle, partly because my impression was that the African American community has received less attention. I was determined to interview as many people as possible during my nine-month stay in Boston as well as to reexamine previous research, unpublished documents, and statistical data. My goal of focusing on the position of the African American community was a fortunate one. Although I could arrange more than thirty interviews, it was far easier for me to reach the former black activists than the former anti-busing leaders.

Reason for Demanding “Integration”

As Thomas Atkins, former president of the Boston NAACP branch, pointed out in his interview, generally speaking it is very difficult to understand the things that happen in a different world. So it is not very unnatural that white people, including liberals, should not understand the real reasons why African American parents in Boston brought a lawsuit demanding desegregation in the public schools.⁹

According to James Jennings of the University of Massachusetts–Boston and director of the William Monroe Trotter Institute, the reason why black people in Boston abandoned typical civil rights demonstrations or other political means of achieving racial equality and submitted lawsuits to the federal court office was frustration at their inability to change the status quo.¹⁰ Even after the passing of the Racial Imbalance Act in 1965 as a result, in part, of massive demonstrations by African-Americans, there was no change in their neighborhood schools for the seven years following (see Appendix A: Chronology). There seemed to be no other options besides legal action or violent revolution to break the status

quo. Of course, most black parents did not think that having their children sit next to white students would automatically mean an improvement in their children's academic performance. As Ruth Batson, a prominent black woman activist, later explained and reconfirmed in an interview, black leaders, along with frustrated black parents, were not so much concerned with integration—meaning racially balanced schooling—as they were concerned with a lack of resources. They preferred neighborhood schools as much as anyone else in Boston. However, they knew well enough through long disappointing experience, that without integration, meaning mainly inclusion of white students in their own neighborhood schools at the expense of the inconvenience of sending some of their children to schools in other districts, the school committee would never allot their schools equal resources. According to Edward Doherty, current President of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU), and at that time a teacher in a Boston high school, most teachers in the Boston public schools (88.7% of whom were whites in 1974) agreed that Garrity's decision was justifiable, that is, the school committee was guilty of deliberate segregation of black students.¹¹

White parents with liberal tendencies who desired a better society did not mind accepting some black children in their neighborhood schools. However, even they did not want to send their children to schools in districts where minority residents were in the majority. Their main concerns were safety and the danger of losing their control over their children. They were also concerned with the quality of education. For a long time, white parents felt comfortable sending their children to Boston Latin Academy, an examination school of the highest quality, even though it is located very near to the black district of Roxbury.¹² Faced with the prospect that their children would share facilities with blacks, however, they began to worry seriously about the quality of education in schools in Roxbury for the first time in their lives.

In this sense, it can be said that the above mentioned black leaders' assumption was correct. As Mel King, one of the most influential black political leaders in Boston, stated, their strategy to include white students in their schools was intended to result in a general improvement of the entire school system. Given the lack of consensus on the meaning of "integration," along with Boston's long history as a deliberately racially divided city, some mandatory means beyond ordinary public policies seemed necessary, as former Mayor Kevin White pointed out during an interview. One of his former assistants, then a State Representative, Barney Frank, called this strategy of black leaders the "hostage theory."¹³

Basically, this "hostage theory" worked very well. As Robert Dentler's book *Schools on Trial* states, in a sense at least Garrity's Phase II implementation, which started in the second year after his decision, took these differences in perception between the black and white parents and the limitations of public policies into account.¹⁴ What they should also have taken into consideration was the

parents' preference of their neighborhood schools in a positive sense. In other words, the Phase II implementation may have lacked enough sensitivity to parents' choice. Dentler's Phase II plan included a lot of scrapping-and-building of schools as well as massive student reassignment. Fortunately, I was able to reach one of the former young white "gentry" in the South End, Ms. Patricia Bounds Corcoran, a close friend of Colin and Joan Diver, who were cited for heroism in Anthony Lukas' *Common Ground*. Ms. Corcoran herself was also mentioned in this book. According to her, the Phase II plan inevitably brought tension and turmoil, even to already integrated schools such as George Bancroft Elementary in the South End.

The shift from mandatory busing to the current "controlled choice method" in 1989 came too late. Michael Alves of Brown University stated that if Garrity had adopted a different plan from the beginning, the implementation of school desegregation would have certainly been more successful. Unfortunately, Alves stated, he created this plan only after he studied the school desegregation turmoil in Boston as Director of Desegregation Planning of the State Department of Education in the late 1970s.¹⁵

On the other hand, the notion of parents' participation, which both Phase I and II called for, left Ms. Corcoran with good memories, although she did admit that there was still racial polarization. In fact, part of a booklet titled "Why Parent Involvement?" published by the Citywide Parents Advisory Council in 1976, shows a transformation of feeling among parents as a result of desegregation. The section goes as follows:

When Phase I of Judge Garrity's court order was implemented in September of 1974, parents in this city reacted in a variety of ways. Some moved out of the city, some enrolled their children in private schools, and many kept their children at home and boycotted. The majority of parents, however, complied with the court order. Prior to the opening of schools, open house was held in all Boston Public Schools and, although filled with fear and apprehension, parents visited schools to which their children had been assigned. In many cases they found the school facilities in poor condition and were angry. They met school principals, district superintendents and school department personnel to discuss building repairs, Chapter 766, transportation, and a host of other issues. . . . Through their efforts, building repairs were made, special programs were initiated, and for the first time, parent involvement meant more than sponsoring social functions at individual schools.

Why did parent get involved? Not because they favored Phase I and II of the court order—compliance does not mean acceptance. They became involved initially out of fear for their children's safety and education. Soon, however, as parents became more and more involved in their children's schools, that fear changed to anger and then to action.

People ask, "Why parent involvement?" The answer, put quite simply, is their children. The Boston School System can become the standard of excellence in education—through strong parent participation.¹⁶

Thus, at a certain point the strategy to include white children in the schools in Roxbury was effective. However, not a few parents—both white and black—deserted the public school system within one or two years of the busing order. Then, what made the dedicated parents who intentionally stayed in the public schools finally give them up? What made them surrender to the powerful trend of "white and black flight" at last? Ms. Corcoran's answer was not busing per se, but massive school closings in 1981.¹⁷

Disparities between Education in the Suburbs and the Inner City

The late Dr. Coleman, famous for his "Coleman Report," pointed out the correlation between the "forced busing" and the "white flight" in 1975. There was a strong correlation between Garrity's mandatory busing order and the massive reduction in numbers of children, especially white children, in Boston public schools. But my research so far suggests that a few more things must be considered.

1. There has been a continuous reduction of the birth rate, coupled with movement of the white population out of the city to "suburbia" and later to the Sun Belt states, since the 1950s (see Appendix B: Tables 1 to 4).
2. The main cause of the first peak of the reduction of the student enrollment, in the school year of 1975–1976, was not the idea of integration itself. Rather, fault lies with parental experiences of the first year's turmoil and tension, along with racial polarization among the parents and students accelerated by a massive reorganization of the school system. Not until the second year of the implementation was significant student reduction seen among not only whites but also blacks. Of course there must have been a considerable number of students who simply did not go to school in the first year, 1974. But larger reductions in student enrollment occurred in 1973–74 and 1975–76 (see Appendix B: Tables 6 & 7).
3. In July 1974, in *Milliken v. Bradley*, just one month after Garrity's decision, his superiors in the Federal Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' decisions and declared by a 5–4 vote the unconstitutionality of mandatory busing beyond city borders in Detroit, where the percentage of black students was as high as 75% in 1975. I suspect that *Milliken v. Bradley* gave a decisive stimulus to the trend of "white flight." In an interview, Garrity expressed his regret that he could not have involved at

least some suburbs, such as Brookline and Newton, in his post-1974 orders because of *Milliken v. Bradley*.¹⁸

4. Then, if Garrity had included at least some of the “wealthy suburbs” in his implementation, can we suppose that it would have reduced “white flight”? My guess is no, because it would only have stimulated the flight to private schools, as was the case in larger cities in the South, where school districts are usually countywide.¹⁹ Therefore, I am very doubtful of the assumption made by John Mulkern of Bobson College.²⁰ However, I do agree with him at least on the point that inclusion of the suburbs would surely have increased the appearance of fairness and reduced the power of the opposition.
5. The final blow, the one that forced the remaining dedicated parents of all races to end efforts at desegregation, seems to have been the massive school closings (see Appendix B: Tables 5, 6, & 7). There is a strong correlation between the number of schools closed and the reduction in student enrollment in 1981. These school closings, along with large cutbacks in federal expenditures for education from the beginning of the Reagan administration in 1981, seem to have alienated the dedicated parents who might otherwise have remained.²¹

As for metropolitan desegregation proposals, school committee members, such as John Kerrigan, were among the strongest supporters for “metropolitanization” of school desegregation, that is, desegregation of schools beyond the city borders—and not African American leaders.²² However, the members’ hidden and true purpose lay not in a sincere pursuit of fairness and effective integration, but in the intention to reveal the hypocrisy of the “wealthy” suburbanites who tried to impose their sense of “justice” on the people in Boston without being influenced by it.²³

Still, another question remains, that is, why were African American leaders not very interested in the possibility of metropolitan solutions? According to former activists such as Thomas Atkins, Paul Parks, and Ruth Batson, there seem to be four answers:

1. Legally speaking, it was too difficult and risky for them to demand a metropolitan remedy from the beginning. They were not very confident that lawsuits demanding a metropolitan remedy would succeed. It would have been very difficult for them to present enough evidences to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize any guilt on the part of the suburbs in the purposeful segregation of the metropolitan area beyond the city borders.
2. There was a change in mood of the black community not only in Boston but also in the U.S. in general. Demand for “community control” was growing stronger in Boston, as well. Just a few days before the submis-

sion of the Boston desegregation lawsuit to the federal district court, the National Black Political Convention was held in Gary, Indiana, on March 10–12, 1972. There a resolution was passed criticizing busing as a means of achieving high quality education for blacks. Actually, according to his own book, it seems that Mel King tried to use the lawsuit as a political tool in return for recognition of “community control” of black neighborhood schools in negotiations with William Bulger of South Boston, one of the leading State Senators. But this drive was not successful because of strong opposition on the part of the BTU. From the 1920s, a strong patronage system has been established in the public school system that doomed any other solution than a lawsuit.

3. Blacks feared that if they had demanded a metropolitan remedy, they would have lost the strong support they had gained from suburban liberals since the passage of the Racial Imbalance Act in 1965.
4. They were afraid that the metropolitan solution proposed by John Kerrigan might have reduced their control over the METCO program, a voluntary one-way busing program of urban black students to suburban schools funded by the state budget since 1966. Their fear is understandable. As Daniel Monti’s research into the metropolitan voluntary busing program in St. Louis, Missouri, and Jeffrey Raffel’s research in the Wilmington, Delaware, metropolitan area illustrate, without strong leadership in the African American community, metropolitan remedies may only result in strengthening the status quo of a bureaucratic school system.²⁴

It is true that Boston schools as a whole had been suffering deteriorating conditions for a long time. But at any rate, it was almost impossible for all Bostonians—regardless of their backgrounds—to unite under a common cause for general improvement of their public education.

Did Obstacles to the Common Cause Disappear?

It is true that if one takes the current racial ratio of the students in the Boston public school system as the only index of the extent of the achievement of the desegregation efforts in general, the effectiveness of desegregation efforts was poor. Now more than 80% of the students are blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. However, an alternative index may be suggested by the following question: To what extent has the school desegregation process, along with the shift from the elected school committee to an appointed one, changed, in other words, improved, the notorious political culture of Boston where a political patronage system had long thrived?

As for the minority presence, particularly as seen in the change in racial composition of the faculties of the public schools, the changes are remarkable, if not adequate (see Appendix B: Table 8). It is true that although he complied with affirmative action in hiring new teachers, Edward Doherty, president of the BTU, did not hesitate to reveal his uneasiness about using affirmative action as a criterion in layoffs. He pointed out that affirmative action in layoffs caused friction among teachers.²⁵ In my opinion, reducing the number of layoffs should have been a primary goal. However, despite such unresolved matters, the minority presence has increased beyond the expectations of most former African American activists. In 1977, John O'Bryant was elected the first African American member of the School Committee, while Louise Day Hicks and John Kerrigan, former School Committee members and leading anti-busing activists, were defeated in their races for the City Council. Coupled with the shift from election to appointment of the school committee in 1991, the desegregation process changed the political culture of Boston considerably. Alan Lupo, a prominent *Boston Globe* columnist, agreed with this position.²⁶ It can be said that the School Committee stopped serving as a stepping-stone to better political careers.

Considering the Boston Busing controversy, we may also ask, to what extent has racial prejudice been overcome by the desegregation process? I would say progress has not been great. Apparently the most effective way to frustrate efforts at desegregation was not so much violent resistance as passive resistance against the public school system as a whole, as this pattern has occurred in other larger cities, including cities in the South, where school desegregation is said to have been relatively successful.²⁷ Rapid change from a manufacturing economy to a post-industrial society and the polarization of job and income composition, along with the end of the Cold War, might be said to foster a bad side of individualism. Confronted with severe backlash, black leaders I have met seem to be on the defensive, hesitating to risk gains made so far, however small. In the trend toward political conservatism which began in the Nixon administration, politicians have exploited the "failure in Boston" to gain support among the white urban working class. In fact, in the 1996 presidential primary in Massachusetts, strong support was given to Patrick Buchanan by the city of Boston.²⁸ On the other hand, the black leadership remains frustrated with the status quo, and has backed a secession movement to separate Roxbury and surrounding areas from the city of Boston. Two referenda were held, but in both of them the secessionists' proposal was rejected at the approximate rate of two to one. Their struggle to challenge the status quo has yet to reach completion.²⁹ Taking all these things into consideration, I cannot help concluding that a strong coalition among urban residents that goes beyond race and ethnicity is yet to be seen in Boston.

As for the "controlled choice" program, initiated in 1989, there are limitations as well as possibilities. Michael Alves, the designer of this plan, boasts that

Boston's plan is the most successful of all the twenty cities in the U.S. which have adopted the same plan.³⁰ However, the current situation is not that good. According to the architect of this plan, "controlled choice" was expected to maximize the possibility of voluntary integration—by permitting parents' choice—and to raise the level of academic performance of the public schools in general—by using overchosen schools as models for underchosen schools, and in this way introducing a good sense of competition. What have been the results of these efforts?

Recently the *Boston Globe* reported 1996's overchosen and underchosen schools. There were 32 overchosen schools, compared with only seven underchosen ones. Thomas Payzant, newly appointed Superintendent of Schools, was quoted as having said, "It suggests we're moving in the right direction." However, if one compares this list with the latest *Reports on Teaching and Learning* published by the Superintendent's office itself, one cannot help asking the following question: Why are the schools overchosen by parents not always the schools most highly evaluated by the Superintendent's office? As a matter of fact, one of the schools evaluated lowest by the Superintendent's office was ranked as the highest overchosen school by parents.³¹

I asked this very critical question of Robert Salamone, Principal of Ralph Waldo Emerson Elementary School located in Roxbury, with a white student ratio only 2.8%. His answer was as follows:

The parents are still most concerned with safety. They would like to see their children within eyeshot. They would like to send their children to the schools within their control. They are less concerned with educational quality yet. We have tried to attract white students but it was not successful. Not one student has come to this school so far from South Boston which is just within walking distance from here. It is true that white parents do support integration philosophically. But they would not support the implementation of it.³²

Emerson School, according to the latest *Reports on Teaching and Learning* issued by the Superintendent's office, was honored with a School Improvement Award and ranked among the top achievers. It cannot be denied that Boston is still deliberately divided by race.

On top of that, as Superintendent Payzant himself recognized, the choices themselves are limited. Overall per capita educational expenditure in Boston, \$6,618 in 1991, was ranked third among twenty-one Greater Boston districts, just below Cambridge and Wellesley. But this high ranking is very tricky because Boston's expenditure per "regular education" pupil, \$4,921, was ranked twelfth. As Robert Dentler deplores, Boston continues to do little more than maintain its big-city position within the suburban pack of school districts. Some New England districts now spend more than \$10,000 per pupil. The burden

expected to be shouldered by Boston seems to be too heavy for a single local government to cope with alone.³³ But unfortunately there are no leaders strong enough at either the state or national level to pursue equality in education.

Conclusion

When he was interviewed by Anthony Lukas a decade after the publication of *Common Ground*, Colin Diver, currently Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, said the following:

I have not been back to Boston for some years, but I suspect that its school system looks much like Philadelphia's does: ten or 20 percent white, 60 or more percent black, and various others. This compels us to recognize that social and demographic movements tend to overwhelm judicial decrees. Litigation can be successful when it deals with more tractable problems and institutions. But when it tries to reform large institutions like urban school systems, it hasn't been successful. That's because it doesn't depend for its authority on the consent of the governed, and thus it provokes stubborn, long-term resistance.³⁴

Compared with Japan's, the Supreme Court in the U.S. has an admirable record of judicial activism. I suspect that depending mainly on the consent of the majority of the governed may lead to ignoring critical realities confronting a society. However, I could not help agreeing with Diver that the judicial power to reform a society is limited. Eiichi Akimoto, a leading Japanese historian of the American economy, points out that it took national political leaders and their constituents more than two decades to accept the new economic and social realities the U.S. was faced with after World War I.³⁵ Now both the U.S. and other so-called "advanced countries" are being confronted with calls for diversity. Politicians, if there is a distance between social realities and the perception of their constituents, must persuade them to accept this inevitable trend of diversity, not only to create an ideal society but also merely to survive.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the following people for their kind cooperation in permitting interviews: Michael J. Alves, Thomas Atkins, N. B., Ruth Batson, Barry Bluestone, Andrew Bunie, K. Marie Clarke, Annmarie Coleman, Patricia Bounds Corcoran, Robert A. Dentler, Lawrence S. DiCara, Edward J. Doherty, Louis A. Elisa, W. Arthur Garrity, Charles Leslie Glenn, Ellen Jackson, James Jennings, James Kelly, Melvin King, Alan Lupo, Jean M. McGuire, Hattie B. McKinnis, Kim Marshall, John R. Mulkern, Thomas H. O'Connor, Gary Orfield,

Paul Parks, Loretta Roach, Robert Salamone, Mary Ellen Smith, Kevin M. White, Charles V. Willie, and Robert Wood.

Appendix A: Chronology

- 5/17/1954 *Brown v. Board of Education*
- 6/11/1963 NAACP Education Committee presents 14 demands to the Boston School Committee
- 9/6/1963 First Boston Sit-in at Boston School Committee building
- 2/26/1964 Second Freedom Stay-Out: One Day Boycott of Public Schools
- 4/23/1965 Martin Luther King, Jr., visits Boston
- 8/18/1965 Racial Imbalance Act is signed into state law
- 8/ /1965 Operation Exodus is begun by black parents led by Ellen Jackson
- 9/1966 METCO buses first 220 students
- 1968–71 Negotiation between State Board of Education and Boston School Committee
- 4/20/1971 *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*: busing becomes constitutional
- 3/15/1972 *Morgan v. Hennigan* is filed in the Federal District Court in Boston
- 6/21/1974 Judge Garrity's decision finds the School Committee guilty
- 7/25/1974 *Milliken v. Bradley*: Federal Supreme Court denies the constitutionality of mandatory busing beyond the city limits of Detroit
- 11/1977 John O'Bryant is elected the first African American member of the School Committee, while Louise Day Hicks loses her seat on the City Council
- 9/3/1985 Judge Garrity's final orders
- 9/1989 Controlled Choice Student Assignment Plan starts ("Forced busing" ends)
- 12/1991 Shift from an elected School Committee to a Board appointed by the Mayor
- Fall 1993 Thomas Menino is elected the first Italian American mayor
- 11/5/1996 The appointive School Committee system in Boston is reconfirmed by referendum

Appendix B: Tables

Tables 1–3: Population and Demographic Change in Boston, 1940–1990

Table 1: Population in Boston (all ages)

Year	Total (%)	White (%)	Black (%)	Latino* (%)	Asian (%)	Others (%)
1940	770,816 (100)	582,686 (75.6)	23,679 (3.1)	ND	ND	1,671 (0.2)
1950	801,444 (100)	758,700 (94.7)	42,744 (5.3)	ND	ND	ND
1960	697,197 (100)	628,704 (90.2)	68,493 (9.8)	ND	ND	ND
1970	641,071 (100)	524,709 (81.8)	104,707 (16.3)	ND	ND	ND
1980	562,994 (100)	393,937 (70.0)	126,229 (22.4)	36,068 (6.4)	15,150 (2.7)	27,678 (4.9)
1990	574,283 (100)	339,458 (59.1)**	146,695 (25.5)	59,692 (10.4)	30,457 (5.3)	35,618 (6.2)

* Including all races ** Excluding Latinos Source: U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, & 1990

Table 2: Demographic Change per Decade in Boston (all ages)

Years	Total	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Others
1940–1950	30,628	176,014	19,065	ND	ND	ND
1950–1960	-104,247	129,996	25,749	ND	ND	ND
1960–1970	-56,126	-103,999	36,214	ND	ND	ND
1970–1980	-78,077	-130,772	21,522	ND	ND	ND
1980–1990	11,289	-54,479	20,466	23,624	15,307	7,940

Source: U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, & 1990

Table 3: Population in Boston (under 18 years old)

Year	Total (%)	White (%)	Black (%)	Latino* (%)	Asian (%)
1940	203,407 (100)	196,782 (96.7)	6,216 (3.1)	ND	ND
1950	207,714 (100)	195,840 (97.8)	11,874 (5.9)	ND	ND
1960	200,172 (100)	174,081 (87.0)	26,091 (13.0)	ND	ND
1970	181,805 (100)	132,625 (72.9)	45,510 (25.0)	ND	ND
1980	121,983 (100)	63,000 (51.6)**	43,669 (35.8)	14,397 (11.8)	3,701 (3.0)
1990	109,456 (100)	40,118 (36.7)**	44,611 (40.8)	18,846 (17.2)	6,602 (6.0)

* Including any race ** Excluding Latinos Source: U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, & 1990

**Table 4: Demographic Change per Decade in Boston
(under 18 years old)**

Years	Total	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1940-1950	4,307	-942	5,656	ND	ND
1950-1960	-7,542	-21,759	14,217	ND	ND
1950-1960	-18,367	-41,456	19,419	ND	ND
1970-1980	-59,822	-69,625	-1,841	ND	ND
1980-1990	-12	527	-22,882	942	4,449

Source: U.S. Census, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, & 1990

Table 5: Student Enrollment Changes in Boston Public Schools

Year	Total	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Native Am.
1972-1973	-1,968	-3,300	329	917	97	-11
1973-1974	-7,801	-8,636	-226	852	194	15
1974-1975	-858	-3,550	1,723	533	205	231
1975-1976	-8,099	-6,846	-1,829	527	95	-46
1976-1977	-1,280	-2,771	1,146	327	-11	29
1977-1978	-3,504	-3,074	-979	424	53	72
1978-1979	-2,132	-2,345	-146	188	209	-34
1979-1980	-2,019	-2,307	29	286	625	-48
1980-1981	-4,965	-3,268	-1670	-259	255	-23
1981-1982	-2,039	-2,200	-372	289	259	-15
1982-1983	-1,647	-1,671	-515	338	182	19
1983-1984	886	25	-47	589	292	27
1984-1985	831	-43	175	316	416	-33
1985-1986	-854	-1,061	-101	298	14	-4
1986-1987	-721	-862	-137	250	51	-23
1987-1988	-261	-645	-75	257	201	1
1988-1989	413	-585	221	664	131	-18
1989-1990	946	-292	217	760	244	17
1990-1991	379	-728	319	710	71	7
1991-1992	1,485	-117	620	758	221	3
1992-1993	1,331	-294	669	774	189	-7
1993-1994	-2,036	-883	-818	-170	-180	15
1994-1995	1,590	-176	-769	829	160	2

Source: Record Management Unit, Dept. of Implementation, Boston Public Schools

Table 6: Public Schools Closed in Boston, 1973-1982

Year	Number	Year	Number
1973	6	1978	3
1974	2	1979	8
1975	17	1980	3
1976	7	1981	23
1977	6	1982	2

Source: Facilities Management, Planning & Engineering Office, Boston Public Schools, courtesy of Mr. Andrew Puleo

Table 7: Boston Public Schools Enrollment Statistics, 1967–1995

Year	Total (%)	White (%)	Black (%)	Latino (%)	Asian (%)	Native Am. (%)
1967	92,425 (100)	67,028 (72.5)	23,958 (25.9)	1,439 (1.6)	ND	ND
1968	94,174 (100)	64,500 (68.5)	25,482 (27.1)	2,516 (2.7)	1,620 (1.7)	56 (0.1)
1969	94,887 (100)	62,657 (66.0)	27,276 (28.7)	3,205 (3.4)	1,643 (1.7)	106 (0.1)
1970	96,696 (100)	62,014 (64.1)	28,822 (29.8)	4,106 (4.2)	1,674 (1.7)	80 (0.1)
1971	96,582 (100)	59,390 (61.5)	30,653 (32.7)	4,660 (4.9)	1,793 (1.9)	86 (0.1)
1972	95,615 (100)	56,893 (59.5)	31,634 (33.1)	5,135 (5.4)	1,857 (1.9)	96 (0.1)
1973	93,647 (100)	53,593 (57.2)	31,963 (34.1)	6,052 (6.5)	1,954 (2.1)	85 (0.1)
1974	85,846 (100)	44,957 (52.3)	31,737 (37.0)	6,904 (8.0)	2,148 (2.5)	10 (0.1)
1975	84,988 (100)	41,407 (48.7)	33,460 (39.4)	7,437 (8.8)	2,353 (2.8)	331 (0.4)
1976	76,889 (100)	34,561 (44.9)	31,631 (41.1)	7,964 (10.4)	2,448 (3.2)	285 (0.4)
1977	75,609 (100)	31,790 (42.0)	32,777 (43.4)	8,291 (11.0)	2,437 (3.2)	314 (0.4)
1978	72,105 (100)	28,716 (39.8)	31,798 (44.1)	8,715 (12.1)	2,490 (3.5)	386 (0.5)
1979	69,973 (100)	26,367 (37.7)	31,652 (45.2)	8,903 (12.7)	2,699 (3.9)	352 (0.5)
1980	67,954 (100)	24,060 (35.4)	31,081 (45.7)	9,189 (13.5)	3,324 (4.9)	300 (0.4)
1981	62,989 (100)	20,792 (33.0)	29,411 (46.7)	8,930 (14.2)	3,579 (5.7)	277 (0.4)
1982	60,950 (100)	18,592 (30.5)	29,039 (47.6)	9,219 (15.1)	3,838 (6.3)	262 (0.4)
1983	59,303 (100)	16,921 (28.5)	28,524 (48.1)	9,557 (16.1)	4,020 (6.8)	281 (0.5)
1984	60,189 (100)	16,946 (28.2)	28,477 (47.3)	10,146 (16.9)	4,312 (7.2)	308 (0.5)
1985	61,020 (100)	16,903 (27.7)	28,652 (47.0)	10,462 (17.1)	4,728 (7.7)	275 (0.5)
1986	60,166 (100)	15,842 (26.3)	28,551 (47.5)	10,760 (17.9)	4,742 (7.9)	271 (0.5)
1987	59,445 (100)	14,980 (25.2)	28,414 (47.8)	11,010 (18.5)	4,793 (8.1)	248 (0.4)
1988	59,184 (100)	14,335 (24.2)	28,339 (47.9)	11,267 (19.0)	4,994 (8.4)	249 (0.4)
1989	59,597 (100)	13,750 (23.1)	28,560 (47.9)	11,931 (20.0)	5,125 (8.6)	231 (0.4)
1990	60,543 (100)	13,458 (22.2)	28,777 (47.5)	12,691 (21.0)	5,369 (8.9)	248 (0.4)
1991	60,922 (100)	12,730 (20.9)	29,096 (47.8)	13,401 (22.0)	5,440 (8.9)	255 (0.4)
1992	62,407 (100)	12,613 (20.2)	29,716 (47.6)	14,159 (22.7)	5,661 (9.1)	258 (0.4)
1993	63,738 (100)	12,319 (19.3)	30,385 (47.7)	14,933 (23.4)	5,850 (9.1)	251 (0.4)
1994	61,702 (100)	11,436 (18.5)	29,567 (47.9)	14,763 (23.9)	5,670 (9.2)	266 (0.4)
1995	63,292 (100)	11,260 (17.8)	30,336 (47.9)	15,592 (24.6)	5,830 (9.2)	268 (0.4)

Source: Record Management Unit, Dept. of Implementation, Boston Public Schools

Table 8: Racial Composition of Faculty in Boston Public Schools

Year	Total (%)	White (%)	Black (%)	Others (%)
10/10/1974	5,132 (100)*	4,550 (88.7)	555 (10.8)	27 (0.5)
1975-1976	5,443 (100)	4,697 (86.3)	620 (11.4)	126 (2.3)
1976-1977	5,285 (100)	4,473 (84.6)	630 (11.9)	182 (3.4)
1977-1978	5,133 (100)	4,283 (83.4)	649 (12.6)	201 (3.9)
1978-1979	5,187 (100)	4,121 (79.5)	808 (15.6)	258 (5.0)
1979-1980	5,207 (100)	3,933 (75.5)	967 (18.6)	307 (5.9)
1980-1981	5,150 (100)	3,799 (73.8)	983 (19.1)	368 (7.1)
1981-1982	4,336 (100)	3,170 (73.1)	854 (19.7)	312 (7.2)
1982-1983	4,096 (100)	2,920 (71.3)	838 (20.5)	338 (8.3)
1983-1984	4,085 (100)	2,907 (71.2)	829 (20.3)	349 (8.5)
1984-1985	4,419 (100)	3,111 (70.4)	922 (20.9)	386 (8.7)
1985-1986	4,407 (100)	3,041 (69.0)	954 (21.6)	412 (9.4)
1986-1987	4,490 (100)	3,076 (68.5)	1,007 (22.4)	407 (9.4)
1987-1988	4,571 (100)	3,117 (68.2)	1,023 (22.4)	432 (9.4)
1988-1989	4,576 (100)	3,086 (67.3)	1,063 (23.2)	433 (9.5)
1989-1990	4,434 (100)	2,929 (66.1)	1,057 (23.8)	449 (10.1)
1990-1991	4,361 (100)	2,854 (65.4)	1,043 (23.9)	464 (10.6)
1991-1992	4,448 (100)	2,848 (64.0)	1,103 (24.8)	497 (11.2)
1992-1993	4,487 (100)	2,807 (62.6)	1,165 (26.0)	515 (11.5)
1993-1994	4,435 (100)	2,751 (62.0)	1,152 (26.0)	533 (12.0)
1994-1995	4,515 (100)	2,787 (61.7)	1,182 (26.2)	546 (12.1)
1995-1996	4,606 (100)	2,828 (61.4)	1,198 (26.0)	581 (12.6)

* Excluding 185 bilingual teachers. Source: Office of Human Resources, Boston Public Schools, courtesy of Mr. John Conley

Notes

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⁵ Interview with W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., Federal District Court Judge, 9 January 1996.

⁶ Interview with Andrew Bunie, Boston College, 30 April 1996.

⁷ Ronald P. Formisano, *Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the*

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⁹ Interview with Thomas Atkins, 21 February 1996.

¹⁰ Interview with James Jennings, 31 October 1995.

¹¹ Interview with Ruth Batson, 8 March 1996; Interview with Edward J. Doherty, February 26, 1996.

¹² Interview with K. Marie Clarke, a former moderate anti-busing leader in West Roxbury, 8 April 1996.

¹³ Interview with Melvin King, 7 November 1995; Interview Kevin M. White, Boston Univ. (former Mayor of Boston), 13 March 1996; John Mulkern and Geoffrey Kapenzi, "Report on School Desegregation" (Unpublished report with the transcriptions of the interviews, submitted to the Board of Research, Bobson College, nd. [ca. 1977]) (Interview Volume): 119.

¹⁴ Robert Dentler and Marvin B. Scott, *Schools on Trial: An Inside Account of the Boston Desegregation Case* (Cambridge, Mass.: Apt Books, 1981).

¹⁵ Interview with Patricia Bounds Corcoran, 3 April 1996; Interview with Michael J. Alves, 26 March 1996.

¹⁶ Quoted in Dentler and Scott, op. cit.: 206–207.

¹⁷ Interview with Corcoran.

¹⁸ Interview with Garrity.

¹⁹ For an instance, see Richard A. Pride and J. David Woodard, *The Burden of Busing: The Politics of Desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee (City?)*: University of Tennessee Press, 1985).

²⁰ Interview with John R. Mulkern, Bobson College, 12 March 1996.

²¹ Dentler, "School Desegregation in Boston: A Successful Attack on Racial Exclusion or a Bungle?", in Steven S. Goldberg, ed., *Civil Rights in Schools: Reading on Equal Education 12 (City?)*: AMS Press, 1995): 36–37.

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²⁴ Interview with Atkins; Interview with Paul Parks, 5 March 1996; Interview with Batson; King, *Chain of Changes: Struggles for Black Community Development* (Boston: South End Press, 1981): 163; Daniel Monti, *A Semblance of Justice: St. Louis School Desegregation and Order in Urban America* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1985; Jeffery A. Raffel, *The Politics of School Desegregation: The Metropolitan Remedy in Delaware* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

²⁵ Interview with Doherty.

²⁶ Interview with Alan Lupo, 14 Ma. 1996.

²⁷ See Robert A. Pratt, *The Color of their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond, Virginia, 1954–1989* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992).

²⁸ In the 1996 Massachusetts Republican Primary, Patrick Buchanan received 33.2% of the total votes in Boston, while 25% of the total votes in Massachusetts in general(see,

"Campaign '96," *The Boston Globe*, 6 March 1996: 11–12).

²⁹ Jennings, *The Politics of Black Empowerment: The Transformation of Black Activism in Urban America* (Wayne State University Press, 1992): 48–49.

³⁰ Interview with Alves.

³¹ "32 Schools Make Most-Wanted List," *The Boston Globe*, 2 March 1996: 13, 15; Boston Public Schools, *Reports on Teaching and Learning* (December 1995).

³² Interview with Robert Salamone, Principal of Ralph W. Emerson Elementary School in Roxbury, Boston, 2 April 1996.

³³ Boston Public Schools, *Preliminary Budget Overview* (16 March 1994): vii; Dentler, "Key Issues Facing the Boston Public Schools," *New England Journal of Public Policy* (Summer/Fall, 1994): 274.

³⁴ Lukas, "Did We Learn Something?" *New Choice* (February 1996): 56–59.

³⁵ Eiichi Akimoto, *Amerika-keizai no rekishi, 1492–1993* (A History of the American Economy, 1492–1993), (Tokyo: Daigaku Shuppan-kai [University of Tokyo Press], 1995): 261.