

## Education Policy Formation for the Allied Occupation of Japan

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AMERICAN POLICY PLANNING for the occupation of Japan and reform of all sectors of society had already begun by mid-1942 within the State, War, and Navy departments and the Office of War Information.<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously, the Army and Navy initiated military government schools for the purpose of training civilians as military reserve officers for the staffing of defeated areas. Graduates of these military government schools later were assigned to the Education Division, initially only a subsection, of the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), Supreme Command for Allied Powers—SCAP. (“SCAP” was used to identify General Douglas MacArthur as well as the entire bureaucratic organization assembled in Tokyo for the occupation.<sup>2</sup>) The Education Division planned and carried out the largest educational reform in the history of Japan and, with the exception of reforms following communist revolutions, of the world. Although pre-surrender training programs meant that the United States was much better prepared for the occupation of Japan than has been commonly believed, this article shows that, in the early years of the occupation, education policy was made and implemented in Tokyo.

Until 1975, scholarship in both Japan and the United States maintained the thesis that policy planning within the American government played the dominant role in shaping all reform during the Allied Occupation of Japan. From 1975 through 1982, however, in accordance with the American practice of releasing government documents twenty-five years after events, SCAP, State, War, and Navy documents covering the nearly seven years of the Occupation were made public. Their release has enabled researchers to understand how frequently SCAP officers in Tokyo took the initiative and how little Washington’s

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planning affected policy planning and authorization during the first two and a half years of the Occupation. Two conspicuous examples of SCAP initiatives that significantly exceeded Washington's planning were constitutional reform and women's rights.<sup>3</sup> One SCAP participant wrote:

There were no manuals to consult, no precedents to follow. Each staff section hammered out its own procedures for working with its counterpart in Japanese government. How the different sections made out in their relations with the Japanese offices was not reported in any official document; it was a matter for individual officers to pick as best they could.<sup>4</sup>

These generalizations about how SCAP played a more significant role than the American government in the demilitarization and democratization of Japan are valid also for educational reform in occupied Japan. In fact, a scholarly ten-volume work on educational reform published at Tokyo University in 1975 soon was judged inadequate and one-sided as a result of the release of American documents.<sup>5</sup>

This essay challenges preexisting interpretations by arguing that Washington, D.C., planners and military government schools played a limited role in providing educational policy to SCAP. Indeed, educational policy in the first seven months of the Occupation, the so-called negative stage, primarily reflected SCAP policies and the personality and ideology of the first chief of the CI&E, Kenneth Dyke, the chiefs of the Education Division, and their staff. Subsequently, Occupation education policy and implementation were made on the basis of the recommendations of the first United States Education Mission to Japan (USEMJ) of March–April 1946. Equally important were the interpretations of the USEMJ Report by SCAP, the Chiefs of the CI&E, Dyke and Donald R. Nugent, the chiefs and deputy chief of the Education Division, and the Education Division staff as they responded in the field to imminent needs.

### **Mayo Thesis that Washington, D.C., Policy Planning Was Significant**

Marlene Mayo produced a brilliant and detailed piece of research for the 1980 MacArthur Memorial Symposium dealing with American wartime planning for the reeducation of Japan.<sup>6</sup> But because her research was primarily based on non-SCAP documents some of her conclusions have proved to be incorrect. Mayo maintained that the State, War, and Navy departments' Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and Office of War Information had guided military government schools and CI&E action, and that the graduates of the schools must have taken policy planning with them to Tokyo. Research into similar sources by Takemae Eiji, Suzuki Eichi, and Kubo Yoshizō corroborated Mayo's view that much educational policy planning had occurred in Washington, D.C.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, proof

of any correlation between Washington's policy planning for educational reform and actual SCAP policy planning and implementation in Tokyo is weak, at least for the first two and a half years of the Occupation. One excellent account of the Occupation used the adjective "skimpy" to refer to Washington's guidance on education.<sup>8</sup>

Mayo argued that Education Division staff must have acted on the basis of Washington policy planning for the following reasons:

1. State Department policy planners occasionally lectured to students at Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), and those students "may have had the top secret papers of the Department of State."
2. Brigadier General William E. Crist, MacArthur's recently appointed chief military government officer, made a trip from Manila in mid-July 1945 to learn what Washington, D.C., policy planning had envisioned for the Occupation of Japan. When he stopped at the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) in Monterey, California, on his return he must have informed appropriate personnel there of State Department planning.
3. The State Department had completed drafts on education in 1944 and 1945, including that of Gordon Bowles, submitted on July 30, 1945, entitled: "The Post Surrender Military Government of the Japanese Empire, The Educational System."
4. CASA specifically requested State Department materials on educational policy from the War Department in early June. Mayo thought this request reflected a knowledge of Bowles's work.
5. Blacklist, an alternate plan for occupation without a military invasion, drawn up by General Crist's Military Government Section by August 6, showed "considerable knowledge both of high-level thinking in Washington and of the precise wording of various documents."
6. SWNCC 150/4, President Truman's Initial Surrender Statement on the Occupation of Japan, was cabled to MacArthur on August 29 as the general made his way to Tokyo. It included orders on education; more importantly, it dictated that the Occupation would not be by direct military rule. It stipulated that "the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese Governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration."
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had informally approved a draft directive on education on August 22 that was sent to MacArthur by a spe-

cial courier. The draft was changed by the addition of only one word when formally adopted by the JCS on 3 November 1945 as JCS 1380/15. It stated, "As soon as practicable educational institutions will be reopened. As rapidly as possible, all teachers who have been exponents of militant nationalism and aggression and those who continue actively to oppose the purposes of the military occupation will be replaced by acceptable and qualified successors. Japanese military and paramilitary training and drill in all schools will be forbidden. You will assure that curricula acceptable to you are employed in all schools."<sup>9</sup>

Three points need to be emphasized regarding the above facts and assumptions. First, the practical meaning of the August 29 Occupation order to MacArthur was that the Japanese would directly administer their own educational system.<sup>10</sup> This would mean that, if Washington's policy formulation had not progressed very far, SCAP would have to make policy in the field. To overcome that handicap SCAP initiated a request to Washington to dispatch an educational mission to Japan. As we have seen, the USEMJs report only recommended guidelines, but to the drafters' surprise the CI&E interpreted and implemented them as a Bible or blueprint for the thorough reform of Japan's educational system.<sup>11</sup> Second, Mayo interpreted CASA's request to Washington in June 1945 for educational policy materials as proof of their knowledge of the availability of such documents.<sup>12</sup> In fact, this was an impatient request for more guidance originating from CASA's Education Section Chief (Robert King Hall). On the fourteenth of the same month he had already pushed Washington unsuccessfully on his recommendation for a language reform that would have abolished kanji (Chinese characters) in favor of katakana (a cursive writing script). Mayo herself noted that a Lt. Colonel Shoemaker replied to Hall on July 21 (after Crist's return) that he had no policy materials yet but would send the State Department's advance preliminary unapproved draft as soon as it was available.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, since Shoemaker could not send the information to Hall, it seems strange to conclude that Crist, visiting in mid-July, would have been able to obtain policy guidance for Hall at Monterey. The third point, as Mayo herself admitted, is that direct evidence of Washington's impact on military government schools and SCAP was "fragmentary," "inconclusive," and "conjectural." In the next section I would like to show that, in fact, Washington provided very little educational policy planning to military government schools, to the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) at Monterey, or to MacArthur's pre-Tokyo military headquarters in Manila.

### **Extent to which Education Division Personnel Learned Policy at Military Government Schools, CASA, and Manila**

Washington provided CI&E with only very general guidelines, such as those noted in items 6 and 7 above, for the first two-and-a-half years of the Occupation. CI&E documentation and the written and oral testimony of Harold Henderson, Dr. Robert King Hall, Donald R. Nugent, and Mark T. Orr, all later chiefs of the Education Division, and Dr. Joseph C. Trainor, its deputy chief, as well as Walter Bunce, later chief of the Religious Division of CI&E, indicate that little policy direction came from Washington until the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) policy statement of April 1947.<sup>14</sup> By that time, however, SCAP actions in education had made the FEC statement redundant.

Hall was quite specific about the lack of direction from Washington and the formulation of policy in Tokyo. He could still assert in 1948:

But in so far as American foreign policy has to date affected the control and new rehabilitation of the educational system of Japan, the popular conception of a precise and comprehensive foreign policy emanating from a central government can be categorically denied. There is an official policy but it is one which has been evolved. In its incipient stages it is the discernible trend of the personal actions and attitudes of the Occupation personnel. It is a pattern of local decisions made by individual officers in the field. It is a framework of interpretations and implementations of fragmentary evidences of American policy, [and] sometimes cryptic War Department or Department of State orders.... American policy in the Occupation has been formulated by six different methods: by directive, by interpretation, by example, by nudge, by review, and by mistake.<sup>15</sup>

Hall noted that the President's Initial Post Surrender Policy Statement and Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement were combined and amended, but not adopted formally in Washington until November 23, 1945, as JCS 1380/15—approximately two months after the first two CI&E directives on education. Furthermore, JCS 1380/15 provided only the vague guidelines on education noted in item 7 above, namely, limited guidance for the negative, punitive phase of the Occupation. The wording in it that curricula “acceptable to you” should be adopted gave MacArthur's subordinates a blank check. Hall observed that his requests of the State Department for policy guidance during the existence of the Columbia and Princeton Naval Government Schools and CASA had not been answered—and thought the same was true for CATS.<sup>16</sup>

Mayo's own detailed research, Reischauer's memoir, and the oral testimony of old Japan hands in the State Department have shown that the latter all favored a “soft peace” and limited reform of all sectors of Japanese society.<sup>17</sup> In contrast to the sweeping educational reforms that ultimately were carried out in Tokyo,

the Washington-based bureaucrats, diplomats, and professors who dealt with Japan's Occupation held essentially quite conservative visions. They included Prof. George Blakeslee, Chairman of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East; Joseph Ballantine, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and Secretary of the Sub-Committee for the Far East (SFE); Prof. Hugh Borton, Secretary for the Inter-Divisional Committee for the Far East; Eugene Dooman, Assistant Secretary of State and Secretary of the State, War, and Navy Departments Coordinating Committee (SWNCC); and Joseph Grew, Under-Secretary of State and former ambassador to Japan. They envisioned a contractual agreement between Japan and the United States and a gradual creation of democracy from above, rather than sweeping reforms to democratize Japan. Ballantine ridiculed the "myth" of a pent-up demand for democratic reform by the masses of Asia because the masses were bound by traditions, customs, ignorance, and centuries of looking to the elite for leadership. Old Japan hands believed that, given Japan's poor economy, "restricted education reform was the best that could be done for a poor nation." Ballantine stated cavalierly that Japan "couldn't afford to give an education to drones ... and people who couldn't qualify for leadership." Dooman questioned whether a victor nation had the right to "reorder the social structure of the vanquished." These conservatives believed that Occupation policy should be one of encouraging liberal tendencies of the Taisho period (1912–1926) to facilitate the emergence of progressive elements. This last belief remained a constant in Washington planning.

More significantly, old Japan hands' conservative views of Occupation aims would have provided CATS graduates with little guidance for a positive, far-reaching democratic educational reform. It is true that new officials appointed to the State Department in the months preceding and following the Japanese surrender were favorable to more thorough educational reforms, but they required time to familiarize themselves with their tasks, to review old policies, and to plan new ones. Washington's inaction left a vacuum that allowed SCAP to formulate policy planning.

#### **EARLY TRAINING SCHOOLS**

During the last three and a half years of the war the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps initiated language instruction, military government, and civil affairs training schools for the purpose of preparing young, bright civilians as military reserve officers for the staffing of a planned military occupation of defeated countries. From mid-1942 until the end of the war the Army and Navy established a short one- to two-month Military Government School at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville for the occupation of defeated areas. Twelve graduates later served in the Education Division. Among them were WAC Captain

Eileen Donovan, Majors Orr, Edward Farr, and Robert McAllen, Captain Richard Farnsworth, and Lieutenant Commander Trainor.<sup>18</sup> Orr and Trainor, it should be recalled, would later be Chief and Deputy Chief, respectively, of the Education Division.<sup>19</sup> Orr recalled that no policy was advised in Charlottesville and only three lines in a handbook mentioned education at all.<sup>20</sup>

Subsequently the Navy established two longer, and more comprehensive, Naval Government programs, one at Columbia University and the other at Princeton University. The school at Columbia was a thorough, intensive, nine month academic program that graduated five classes between January 1943 and September 1944. There Hall, Bunce, and Dr. Alfred Crofts, later the Higher Education Officer in the Education Division, studied intensively six days a week international law and the history, political science, geography, and psycho-sociology of enemy nations.<sup>21</sup> According to Hall, a Harvard Ph.D. and a comparative educationist, students did not learn of any government policy.<sup>22</sup> The Columbia program focused on a national approach more appropriate to an indirect military ruling occupation rather than the direct military occupation of separate Japanese territorial areas planned at other military government schools, an approach that Trainor, Bunce, Orr, and Hall concluded would have been more appropriate for the type of Occupation that actually occurred.<sup>23</sup>

When the Navy decided to establish a shorter, less academic and more practical program at Princeton (Sep. 1944–Mar. 1945), Hall was appointed, at age 32, Assistant Director of the Curriculum (apparently *de facto* director). He drew up the more “practical” curriculum they demanded. Far from learning educational policy for occupied Japan, no unit on education was even offered in the first program. Hall’s complaint to his superiors achieved little to his satisfaction. They allowed only one ninety-minute lecture on education during the 240 class hours offered, a change that had minimal influence on the 986 graduates of the fourteen classes.<sup>24</sup>

#### **CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING SCHOOLS (CATS)**

A third type of institution where later Education Division staff could have learned of Washington’s policy planning were the CATS established by both the Army and Navy. By the end of the war CATS had graduated approximately 4,000 military reserve officers. CATS graduates who later served in the Education Division included Trainor and Herbert Wunderlich, later Chief of the Textbook and Curriculum Branch, Orr, Donovan, Farnsworth, and Farr. Seventeen military government handbooks were produced by the Office of Strategic Services and used at CATS and other military government schools. One manual dated June 13, 1944, was entitled “Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 15: Education.” CATS students learned from it about the organization,

powers, and functions of the Japanese Ministry of Education, the highly centralized structure of the school system, and its use as an instrument for political indoctrination. Significantly, however, the manual was only descriptive in nature. It suggested no policy.<sup>25</sup>

The atmosphere at CATS was business-like, professional, objective, and respectful of the Japanese people. Orr said the approach was basically that of "know the enemy."<sup>26</sup> CATS curricula devoted roughly one-third of the time to the Japanese language, one-third to Area Studies (geography, culture, economics, politics, religion, history) with primary focus on Japan, and one-third to military government. Orr's University of Michigan transcript, however, showed that he had taken twenty-six semester credits: six in Japanese area studies, six in military government: Japan, and fourteen in the Japanese language.

It is true that the CATS curriculum was enriched through occasional lectures by old Japan hands from the State Department such as Dooman, Ballantine, Borton, Bowles, and Stanley Hornbeck, China specialist and Senior Advisor on Far Eastern Affairs, as well as people such as Harry Emerson Wildes, a research specialist in the Office of War Information.<sup>27</sup> But it can be inferred that these were rare experiences for graduates, especially for those of CATS located more than four or five hours from Washington. No CATS graduates I have interviewed remembered discussions of major policy planning.

Although State and War Department officials had occasionally lectured at CATS and other military government schools, Hall, Orr, Trainor, and Wunderlich have specifically denied receiving any policy direction there. Trainor wrote:

There was little except a set of plans for combat phase activities, and from Washington there came a single basic document [President Truman's Initial Post Surrender Policy Statement of 29 August 1945 SWNCC 154/A] which told a little more of the what but very little of the how.... There is no question regarding the pertinence of the policy, but how was it to be accomplished? By the time the sun had set on that day when the groups gathered on the deck of the U.S.S. *Missouri*, General MacArthur, his staff, and his troops faced the problem with little beside their own devising to cope with it.<sup>28</sup>

The document to which Trainor referred contained only two vague sentences pertinent to education. It required the removal of persons from "supervisory and teaching positions" who had been "active exponents" of militarism and ultranationalism and the banning of all societies, institutions, and educational doctrines and practices of a militaristic and ultranationalistic nature. In fact, Suzuki's research showed that a clause calling for the development of democratic thought in SWNCC 150 was eliminated in subsequent drafts.<sup>29</sup>

Wunderlich recalled that at his CATS school little attention was given to educational policy.<sup>30</sup> Orr said specifically that CATS received "no official statements

of positive policy from the State Department or War Department."<sup>31</sup> The same lack of policy direction prevailed in other areas also. Karpinsky, the first Chief of SCAP's Labor Division, said that the vague suggestions given regarding labor at the Harvard CATS were not very helpful.<sup>32</sup>

The CATS military government curriculum organized the students into teams for combat and territorial stages. They conducted various intensive exercises as members both of individual units dealing with specialized topics (such as education, public safety, and health) as well as of larger units combining these specialized teams for exercises dealing with the occupation of a given geographic area. They learned only the most generalized policy for deploying occupation troops. One prescription was that occupying armies should practice leniency, humanitarianism, and flexibility to obtain the cooperation of conquered peoples. Manuals also enjoined the readers to familiarize themselves with local laws, customs, languages, and institutions, and to grant the conquered peoples individual liberty and property rights. The best advice was:

In general, it is unwise to impose upon occupied territory the laws and customs of another people. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government.<sup>33</sup>

On the one hand, if this advice had been followed to the letter, there would have been no effective reform, no coeducation, no abolition of the Imperial Rescript of Education of 1890 (IRE), and no extension of equal educational opportunity. On the other hand, two failures, radical language reform and decentralization of education would not have been attempted.

Mayo's analysis of the Chicago CATS program showed that the students assigned to education teams dealt with such questions as when and what type of schools should be allowed to open, and what they should do about the custom in the schools of reading the IRE and honoring the imperial family portraits kept in conspicuous places in the schools. As an exercise one team produced a plan that recommended a decentralization of education that would involve screening of educators and educational officials, textbook censorship and rewriting, and a temporary closing of the schools.<sup>34</sup> These actions were consistent with Washington's policy planning for the negative stage of the Occupation, that is, demobilization, demilitarization, and abolition of ultranationalism.

Although CATS students were instructed to be practical, the Chicago team proposed that no school should be reopened until curriculum changes had been made, a recommendation that greatly underestimated the difficulty of such a task. (The creation of a new curriculum was not accomplished until April 1947!) Hall noted that at the Chicago CATS program two officers, who later served as the Chief and Assistant Chief of the Education Division in the Korean

Occupation, completed a detailed study of the Shushin (morals) textbooks used at the elementary level immediately prior to the Occupation.<sup>35</sup>

How much did CATS programs emphasize the State Department policy of building on the heritage of Taisho democracy and searching out Taisho liberals? Orr did not remember any stress on Taisho democracy, but he did recall another closely related theme:

The whole idea was encouraged in our work that we should seek out people who had opposed the war. People who had ... a different attitude about Japan's role and what they had been doing. However, we were warned to watch out for opportunists, or people who might come under that guise just to forward their own interests. I don't think we spent much time with the larger notions that we would later find ourselves with.<sup>36</sup>

After arriving in Japan, Hall made the search for liberals the number three priority among all staff studies. Each staff officer and cooperative Americans and Japanese were enjoined to supply such names. Russel Durgin, an old Japan hand, supplied seventy-two names at the end of December.<sup>37</sup>

As one more example, Donovan sought out women of similar progressive thought for achieving women's educational reform. She recalled meeting people such as Hoshino Ai, President of Tsuda Women's College, a Quaker, Kawai Michio, Ōmori Matsuyo, and others who had been suppressed in their thinking and activities during the Pacific War. She said:

It was incredible that there were so many people who were not militarist and never had been and were pushed down. I did not realize this before going to Japan.... [T]here were so many people who had great ideas who ... began to talk. One who talked was Hoshino Ai, a graduate from Wellesley College. One day after Hoshino felt more trust in me, she took out her book, *Education for the New Women in the New Japan*, the one copy which she had managed to save from the thought control police. She told me, "Take a look at this, and see what is new." And it turned out there wasn't anything that we had at the back of our heads concerning democratic education, that she hadn't thought of and written in 1925.<sup>38</sup>

Note, however, that Donovan spoke of not knowing there were such progressive people before she had gone to Japan.

The chief weakness of CATS and other military government schools was their failure to develop Occupation planning on a national scale for specific areas such as education.<sup>39</sup> So strong was this mind-set, Trainor related, that in the morning just before President Truman announced the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, a War Department officer had discussed with the Ann Arbor CATS staff the necessity of emphasizing more fully combat phase problems. Even after instructors and students heard of the President's announcement, the afternoon

session was dominated by more instruction in the suggested area rather than dealing with larger issues.<sup>40</sup>

But the dropping of the A-bombs, the Soviet Union's military strike into the Asian theater, and the unexpectedly rapid conclusion of the war led to a decision at Potsdam to embark on an indirect military occupation by which the Japanese government would rule at SCAP's discretion. These conditions produced an urgent need to get military reserve officers to the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) at Monterey, where Washington policy planning could have been received as soon as possible. Other places where Occupation officers could have learned government policy were at Naval and Army language schools and at MacArthur's headquarters in Manila, where a staff of graduates of military government schools was being formed for assignment to Japan.

#### INTENSIVE LANGUAGE TRAINING SCHOOLS

The separate Navy and Army language schools trained mostly young men between the ages of 20 and 26, a few of whom had already studied Japanese formally or through living in Japan. Normally graduates were expected to serve eighteen months, the equivalent of their period of study.<sup>41</sup> Four graduates of these schools who later served in the Education Division were Lieutenants Scott George, Edwin Wigglesworth, James Gibson, and James Daly. Wigglesworth had prewar teaching experience at Hikone Higher Commercial School (1935–1938) and fulfilled his commitment by returning to Japan as *semmon gakkō* (technical school) officer.<sup>42</sup> But the young graduates of these language schools did not bring a high degree of knowledge about Japanese education with them since such knowledge was only incidental to their language studies. Nor could they be said to possess much knowledge about American educational practices. What they did bring with them was intelligence, flexibility, energy, language skills, and an interest in the Japanese people and culture. Accordingly, George, Daly, and Gibson were best utilized by the Education Division as members of the Liaison Branch, where they could assist with the negative phase of the Occupation, particularly the purge of Japanese educators. They were also sent to CASA and Manila on the completion of their training.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS STAGING AREA (CASA)

When Hall, Crofts, and Bunce arrived at the Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) at Monterey in April 1945 they discovered a large number of officers trained at the various schools already mentioned. These would be greatly augmented by the end of August, but some officers, as befits a staging area, were sent on to Manila prior to the end of the war. Some were dispatched temporarily to join "combat groups" planning specific invasions of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

according to their subject specialization, and then they returned to the officers' pool. Orr, Bunce, and Croft were assigned to the field of education to work under the leadership of Hall, Chief of the Education Section.<sup>43</sup>

Hall was a whirling dynamo of energy who made policy before and after arriving in Tokyo. Orr recalled of Hall:

Lt. Commander Hall immediately impressed me as a man who knew what he was about.... He was full of energy and drive. He had made a detailed study of the Japanese educational system and Japanese society. He had acquired some use of the Japanese language and had analyzed its strengths and weaknesses. He thought faster and worked harder than anyone I had met before. He had already drafted a plan for the re-opening of the Japanese schools in the event they were closed when the Occupation forces arrived. He seemed to have discovered every weakness of the Japanese educational system and to have specific remedies in mind. Moreover, he fully expected to be called to Tokyo to assume a leading role in educational reform.<sup>44</sup>

Hall was making policy to take to Tokyo. He was not receiving it.

Hall would prove to be the most important and controversial person in terms of educational reform during the first eight months of the Occupation. Two criticisms were made of him by other staff members.<sup>45</sup> The first was that he assumed that the position of Chief of the Education Subsection was his on arrival in Tokyo. The second was that he was bringing to Japan detailed blueprints for educational reforms that limited adaptation to Japanese culture and conditions. However, Hall seems to have been justified in his behavior. His orders of April 17, 1945 (found in his garage at Castine, Maine), show that Hall was appointed to the Permanent Staff at CASA and those of April 20 explicitly designated him not only Chief, but also instructed him to work up detailed plans for educational reform:

You will assume the duties of Chief of the Education Section, Internal Affairs Branch. You will prepare tentative plans for the control of the Japanese Educational System under military government; you will prepare plans for the revision of Japanese school textbooks and when given further directives will implement these plans; you will prepare plans for the revision of Japanese teaching manuals and when given further directives will implement these plans; you will through appropriate channels procure, analyze and make recommendations for the alteration of textbooks, manuals, guides, etc., necessary to the control of the Japanese Educational System; you will survey the physical resources of the Japanese School System and you will organize this material in an appropriate manner for future discrimination; you will survey personnel needs for this program and will make recommendations pertaining to the securing of appropriate personnel to instrument this program; and you will prepare tentative manuscripts reflecting these studies, analysis [sic], and

revisions, and will report in writing weekly on progress made within that Section.<sup>46</sup>

Bunce thought this order was probably written by Hall himself.<sup>47</sup> That may be true, but nonetheless it was approved by his superiors at CASA.

Hall's achievements clearly show the extent to which a staff member, not Washington, D.C., could create policy and practice. Before Hall left for Japan he had directed several significant projects; he had:

1. supervised the translation and transcription into romaji of all elementary and higher elementary Shushin and national language textbook editions published between 1903 and 1941, as well as the teachers' manuals accompanying the language readers.
2. collected educational materials and textbooks, acquainted himself with activities related to Japanese education, and familiarized himself with potential personnel for service in Tokyo. To accomplish these goals, Hall managed to obtain orders in May 1945 to visit the Universities of California at Los Angeles and Berkeley, Southern California, Washington, and Stanford Universities, the Pacific School of Religion, Pomona College, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the War Relocation Camps for Japanese at Manzanar and Tule Lake. During this trip Hall collected Japanese textbooks and educational materials, evaluated programs, obtained advice, and evaluated potential recruits for work in Japan. Later in Japan, he requested some of these persons as advisors, including one who elected to go there, Kenneth Harkness.<sup>48</sup> Hall claimed that he managed at CASA to collect almost all Japanese textbooks, from elementary school to the university level.
3. begun work on an educational manual. He made such progress on this item that when he assigned the task of editing it in Japan (12 Nov. 1945) to Lieutenant Frew and Major Orr for the purpose of the briefing of the USEMJ, he handed them a single-spaced four-page outline that they largely followed. This step was the origin of the significant CI&E publication, *Education in Japan* (15 Feb. 1946), that was used to brief the USEMJ.
4. written and submitted a staff study to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department on June 14 recommending the reform of the Japanese written language by the substitution of katakana for kanji.
5. submitted on September 16 a personnel evaluation ordered by the director of the General Planning Board on September 15. The order had requested Hall and two other officers to determine those men who had most distinguished themselves while serving in the Planning

Division of CASA from April 15 through September 15 for the purpose of commending the most outstanding. The next day Hall turned in a report that divided the top twenty-four officers into three "superior" groupings. The report recommended the top ten officers for commendation and provided detailed information on their contributions.<sup>49</sup>

6. initiated a "rough" translation of *Kokutai no Hongi* (The Cardinal Principles of the National Polity, 1937), a task completed in Tokyo by Owen Gauntlett.
7. worked on plans for the invasion of Taiwan and Japan and developed a number of studies to be carried out in various stages for the educational reform of Japan.<sup>50</sup>

This was an amazing *tour de force*.

On September 7 Hall was requested by name to report to the "Theater" [Japan]. He left for Japan on about September 17 with as many of his planning materials as he could carry.<sup>51</sup> In another essay I shall continue with Hall's story and that of other education officers as they made their way to Tokyo from CASA and Manila.

#### MANILA POLICY PLANNING

Planning at Manila did not proceed as far as Mayo has speculated. According to Karpinsky, he received no policy direction at CATS or at Manila. He was involved only in preparations for successive stages of the invasion of Japan.<sup>52</sup> Harold Henderson, Chief of the Education and Religion Subsections, CI&E, who had been at Manila, has said there was "no planning in the Philippines for the occupation of Japan because there was no thought that the war would come to a sharp end."<sup>53</sup> Planning for the occupation carried out by Farr, Bunce, and others under General Crist's direction produced only a very limited policy statement drafted by Farr on September 29. By the time the Manila group arrived in Tokyo almost a month had passed and personnel and planning were absorbed into Dyke's already functioning CI&E.

#### **Reasons for Limited Washington, D.C., Policy Guidance to Military Government Schools and SCAP**

How can the failure of the Washington planners to provide more policy direction be explained? First, although the original planning called for a Kyushu invasion in November 1945 and a Kanto plains (Tokyo area) invasion for March 1946, the war ended so abruptly that SWNCC (the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee) had not found sufficient time to formulate policy; thereafter,

SWNCC found itself so overwhelmed by daily contingencies in Europe and the Pacific that it could not give specific policy direction.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, positive educational planning received lower priority than political and economic matters and negative policy concerning the destruction of Japanese militarism, nationalism, and State Shintoism.<sup>55</sup> Because of these conditions, SWNCC draft 108, "The Post-Surrender Military Government of the Japanese Empire, the Educational System," was completed only as a preliminary draft on April 17, 1945. Takemae's research shows that SWNCC 108/2, "Policies Regarding Reform of the Japanese Education System," was not completed in Washington until October 5, 1946.<sup>56</sup> In addition, further delays in transmitting Washington, D.C., policy directives to SCAP resulted from an agreement in principle that Washington policy should obtain the prior approval of the thirteen member nations of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and SCAP.

These conditions carried two corollaries. First, considerable delay occurred from the discussion and rewriting that was necessary to obtain consensus from the 13 FEC nations. Second, of much significance, all FEC drafts went to separate SCAP sections for their prior amendment and approval or disapproval. This meant that, before the FEC sent its final policy draft to SCAP in April 1947, it had been strongly influenced by SCAP revisions to the SWNCC and FEC drafts. Proof for this assertion can be found in contemporary Education Division staff records, Orr's subsequent Ph.D. dissertation, and Trainor's memoir. Orr wrote, "Furthermore, the original draft of the [Far Eastern] Commission directive on education was submitted to SCAP for review some six weeks prior to its release and several changes were made as a result of reactions in General MacArthur's headquarters."<sup>57</sup> In short, through 1947 at least, SCAP was given the luxury of altering SWNCC and FEC policy drafts to allow MacArthur's staff to make and implement policy on the basis of their knowledge of local conditions and actions that had already been taken.

A second reason for the absence of policy direction is that until early August Washington's policy planning had proceeded under the false assumption that there would be a direct military occupation of Japan. The decision to execute an indirect military occupation using the existing Japanese government did not reach MacArthur until one day before he arrived in Japan (30 Aug. 1945). As was noted, military government schools had been concerned only with specific actions educational officers would take in combat and territorial areas as they occupied Japan in stages.

Third, the research of Mayo and Japanese scholars and the recollections of contemporary State Department personnel show that personnel shifts within the State Department from 1944 to 1946 produced delays and disagreement over the nature of U.S. policy objectives over many questions, such as the status of the

imperial household and the dissolution of the zaibatsu.<sup>58</sup> For example, Suzuki's research showed that several meetings of the Inter-Divisional Far Eastern Area Committee (FEA) led to significant amendments drafts of the Post-War Program Committee (PWC 287) and the Country and Area Committee (CAC 238). By then it was decided that reforms would have to be carried out "by the Japanese themselves."<sup>59</sup> FEA had gone so far as to conclude that they should speak in terms of societal modifications rather than societal reforms. Subsequent policy formulation was delayed by the departure of old Japan hands and their replacement by old China hands or officials (like Dean Acheson) with an anti-Japanese bias who advocated more radical Occupation policies.<sup>60</sup>

A fourth reason for the limited extent of Washington educational policy direction to SCAP was the cumbersome and time-consuming policy making process. Drafts that originated in the State Department's Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East had to obtain the approval of the State Department as a whole. Similarly, State Department policy drafts, after December 1944, had to obtain the approval of the War and the Navy departments—and vice versa—before they could become official policy. The official channel for the process was the SWNCC, and all policy documents sent to the FEC and SCAP received an appropriate SWNCC number. Inter-departmental jealousies over policy planning and implementation meant that none of the departments, State, War, nor Navy, felt comfortable until a clear consensus had been reached over the content of a SWNCC statement. SWNCC did not begin functioning efficiently until the late spring of 1945. Jurisdictional disputes between the State, War, and Navy departments over who was to formulate policy for the defeated areas were not decided in the State Department's favor until January 14, 1946—five full months after the war ended.<sup>61</sup>

The need for SWNCC agreement seems to have been an important reason why Washington, D.C., planners did not provide military government schools and CASA with policy direction prior to the Occupation. In this respect, the importance Mayo assigns to the Bowles policy draft of July 30, 1945, seems exaggerated. When General Crist returned to Washington in mid-July, the draft had not been completed and the State Department may have felt reluctant to discuss or share a preliminary draft with him, or to give a green light to it as educational policy because complete agreement on it had not yet been achieved with the War and Navy departments. A special ad hoc committee established by the State Department's Subcommittee for the Far East did not complete a draft based on the Bowles paper in the SWNCC format until October 23, 1945. That dating means it would have been too late for the paper to play a role in SCAP's first directive on education of October 22, 1945—written by Hall. But, as Mayo acknowledges, it is not even clear whether Bowles' draft was ever approved by SWNCC.<sup>62</sup>

Dyke's criticism of the vagueness of Washington policy directives is related to a fifth reason for Washington's limited policy guidance. Gordon Bowles and Dooman claimed it was deliberate.<sup>63</sup> Dooman said SWNCC policy "deliberately tried to formulate policies in the broadest possible way, so that he [Mac-Arthur] would not be tied down to any specific planning ... so that ... it would be possible for General MacArthur to do the things he considered wise and necessary in the interest of the United States."<sup>64</sup> But a more cynical reason for Washington's reluctance was MacArthur's enormous prestige. He intimidated almost everyone in policy planning, including President Truman, in the first two years of the Occupation. Reischauer complained that while he was in the State Department (late 1945–46) officials there were constantly frustrated by the War Department yielding to MacArthur.<sup>65</sup>

A sixth limit on Washington's control of SCAP can be found in four indirect sources. One is a Government Management Committee statement of 1950 made in connection with justifying a reduced SCAP role in the educational area. The Committee could not discover any SWNCC or JCS policy draft regarding Japanese education for the CI&E's guidance until SWNCC 162/D of January 8, 1946. That document's vague prescriptions could not have been very helpful: "It is not proposed to recast the culture of the Japanese, but rather to use it as far as possible, in establishing new attitudes of conforming to the basic principles of democracy and fair dealing."<sup>66</sup>

A second indirect source relates to the notations of the second Chief of the CI&E, Nugent, on the two-volume Education Division document prepared for the second USEMJ. A draft chapter dealing with "Development of Education Policy" discussed only the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and the USEMJ Report as major policy statements having any relevance to education. Nugent, however, thought the chapter should be redrafted to include the few, general sentences from the United States' Initial Post Surrender Policy Statement (IPSPS) of September 6, 1945, and the October 22 directive. What he wrote is revealing: "It appears to me that SCAP directive of 22 Oct., 1945, might well be included in its chronological place. It is pretty basic and has guided us to a greater extent than the FEC directive [of 7 April 1947]."<sup>67</sup> If the Potsdam Proclamation and the IPSPS policy statements were all that Nugent could discover to reflect Washington's contributions before April 7, 1947, it must be concluded that SCAP was largely on its own.

A third indirect proof of Washington's limited guidance comes from Mayo's research on Owen Lattimore's diary. A Lattimore entry of November 11, 1945, recorded a conversation with General Dyke in which the latter complained of "slow and inefficient policy directives from Washington; also of ... directives ... vague in wording [that were not] good guides to operations."<sup>68</sup> Mayo supplied a fourth indirect source through the criticism of General Elliot Thorpe,

Chief of Counter Intelligence, Allied Forces Pacific Area Command (AFPAC), who said, "Those of us at the working level had to come up with some answers that passed for policy in the absence of other directives."<sup>69</sup>

### **Educational Policy: How Was it Made?**

If educational policy during the first two years was made primarily in Tokyo, how was it made? As noted before, the most important educational policy guidance for the positive phase of the Occupation was the USEMJ Report of April 7, 1946. In addition, policy planning was made by the Mombusho (Ministry of Education) and the Japan Education Reform Committee (JERC), but these two organs, from mid-1946 to at least mid-1948, were largely limited by SCAP guidelines and the USEMJ Report.<sup>70</sup> Ultimately, educational policy was made by SCAP directives, by the CI&E staff's interpretations of the USEMJ Report's recommendations, and Washington's official and semi-official statements. In short, Education Division staff formulated and implemented policy in the field in their daily interaction with Mombusho counterparts, JERC members, and individual Japanese educators.<sup>71</sup> John Nelson, Adult Education Officer, wrote that

policy statements developed by duly constituted authorities provided wide latitude as to the content and processes to be followed in implementing an adult education program.... In practice, the writer was not required to follow any set pattern, nor to indoctrinate the Japanese with any preconceived opinions.<sup>72</sup>

These practices were not abnormal. MacArthur's chief secretary (Jun. 1946 to Jul. 1948), Frank J. Sackton, emphasized that none of the Washington policy directives for SCAP defined democracy; therefore, he said, "it was up to MacArthur [and his staff] to interpret, define, and implement it."<sup>73</sup>

We have already seen that statements of Orr, Trainor, Hall, and Henderson argued the thesis that CI&E personnel largely made policy. A few additional examples of proof seem appropriate to counter the argument that SCAP officers had a vested interest in exaggerating their role in policy formulation to emphasize their own importance. Hall confirmed what this writer has seen in many CI&E documents that refer to the Potsdam Declaration. Although that document only said "the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people," Hall wrote that all SCAP directives justifying reform were linked by "tortuous connection" with it.<sup>74</sup> In practice, each SCAP Section, such as CI&E, created policy from its conception of how Japan should be democratized. The relevance of this point to reform in Occupied Japan needs to be emphasized. From my research already completed on specific educational reforms I have tentatively concluded

concluded that: (a) SCAP proceeded with a more thorough reform from below than Washington officials planned; (b) individual officers pushed reform further than Division Chiefs planned; (c) Division Chiefs permitted more reform than Section Chiefs contemplated; and (d) Section Chiefs allowed more reform than MacArthur and SCAP headquarters planned.<sup>75</sup> This produced a snowballing effect. In short, the separate parts contributed to a greater totality of reform than SCAP and Washington planned.

Wunderlich complained of the lack of guidance from Washington for his area of textbooks and curriculum. He noted that criteria developed for censoring Japanese textbooks were largely the result of deliberations by himself with Nugent, other staff members, and his interaction with Tokyo Imperial University Professors Kaigo Tokiomi, Department of Education, and Kishimoto Hideo, Department of Religious Studies.<sup>76</sup> The same thing can be said for the more positive steps that Trainor and Wunderlich took between January and July 1946 to produce new Japanese textbooks.<sup>77</sup>

Monta Osborne, Secondary School Officer (Jun. 1946–1952), stated emphatically that the individual officer's personality, philosophy, and interpretation of the USEMJ Report were most significant in making educational policy in "every field."<sup>78</sup> When I sent Osborne an earlier draft of this chapter for his reactions, he made this significant amplification:

I probably should not have said "every field." Properly speaking, I should have limited my range to secondary education. You are aware that one of my early actions, after I arrived in Japan in June 1946, was to write (at Mark Orr's request) a policy paper on the reorganizations of secondary education. I first reviewed all of the policy documents in Education Division's files, but found little there that was helpful. For all practical purposes, there was scarcely any real policy guidance from Washington. Education Division had not, to my knowledge, formulated any written statement as to its reaction to the USEMJ Report. Orr and Trainor did inform me that, by and large, the Division had "bought" the report and that our paramount task would be to implement the USEMJ's recommendations, with the possible exception of those related to changes in the Japanese language, i.e., the substitution of romaji for kanji.

The policy paper that I wrote in 1946 certainly may have owed a great deal to my own interpretation of the USEMJ Report. But when this policy paper was reviewed by Orr and Trainor, I was told to go ahead and implement it. I should think that this was a clear indication that my own interpretation must have agreed with that of Orr and Trainor. In any case, my 28-page paper did become the Division's policy paper on secondary education and I proceeded to implement it to the best of my ability.<sup>79</sup>

My research on the manner in which Osborne himself summarily aborted civics education in favor of social studies between July and November 1946

amply supports his general comments.<sup>80</sup> The same point can be made for the strong role he played in establishing a new secondary educational curriculum and writing new textbooks for the April 1947 school year. Similar liberal interpretations of the USEMJ recommendations were taken by Osborne and other staff members such as Helen Hefferman, Vivian Carley, and (especially) Trainor, in the summer and early fall of 1946 in regard to curriculum, teacher training education, elementary education, history education, implementation of a 6-3-3-4 educational ladder system, and the writing of the Fundamental Law on Education.<sup>81</sup>

Hall correctly wrote that policy evolved as the “discernible trend of the personal actions and attitudes of the Occupation personnel. It is the pattern of local decisions made by individual officers in the field.”<sup>82</sup> In fact, his own strong-willed and energetic actions almost led to the accomplishment of the most radical reform of all educational reforms, namely, substitution of romaji for kanji.<sup>83</sup> In the meantime, general orders to CASA on September 17, 1945, followed by orders to specific individuals on October 13 directed 275 army officers, including nineteen WACs, to report to the occupation zone for assignment to Korea, to SCAP, or to the Sixth and Eighth Armies in Japan. Orr recalled everyone’s great relief at orders that no side arms, gas masks, or other military arms would be necessary. That was a good omen for an occupation with cooperation from the Japanese side. These officers joined those who had been dispatched earlier from CASA to Manila.<sup>84</sup> By the time they arrived in Tokyo there was still much confusion and lack of direction within the CI&E, but the absence of detailed policy guidance from Washington allowed Education Division staff to be both flexible and imaginative in policy planning and implementation for educational reform in occupied Japan.

### Conclusion

The State, War, and Navy departments and Office of War Information’s policy planning during the war gave very limited guidance to graduates of military government schools who later played a role in the Allied Occupation of Japan. Only one graduate, Robert King Hall, took detailed policies to Tokyo, but they were based on policies he had created himself and only “skimpy” Washington guidelines. Although there was sometimes a correlation between what SWNCC and the Far Eastern Commission planned for educational reform and what the CI&E’s Education Division actually formulated and implemented, the relationship was largely coincidental. The argument that the former dictated CI&E actions is tenuous. Because of delays in sending Washington policy to Tokyo, no detailed policy statement on education reached SCAP until April 7, 1947. In the

interim SCAP and the Education Division were largely on their own. On the basis of ample documentation and many interviews it can be asserted that Education Division staff carried out the educational reform of Japan on the basis of their democratic ideals, response to immediate needs in the field, familiarity with American practices, and a generous interpretation of the first USEMJ Report's recommendations.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Ward, "Pre-surrender Planning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987): 1–2.

<sup>2</sup> Takemae Eiji, *GHQ* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1983): ch. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ward, "Pre-surrender Planning," in Ward and Sakamoto, *Democratizing Japan*: 3–36; Susan Pharr, "The Politics of Human Rights," *ibid.*: 226–31, 239–41.

<sup>4</sup> Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1979): 5–6.

<sup>5</sup> Kaigo Tokiomi, ed., *Sengo nihon no kyōiku kaikaku* [Educational Reform in Postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppandai, 1975). All SCAP personnel were required to report daily conferences with Japanese government officials and educators. These conference reports are a gold mine of information for Japanese-American attitudes and interaction on every reform.

<sup>6</sup> Marlene Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament; American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-Education of Japan, 1943–1945," in Thomas W. Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform* (Norfolk: Gatling Press, 1982): 21–127.

<sup>7</sup> Takemae Eiji, "Sengo kyōiku kaikaku josetsu," [An introduction to Postwar Educational Reform], *Tokyo Keizai Daigaku kaishi*, 105, 1978: 124–68; Suzuki Eichi, *Nihon senryō to kyōiku kaikaku* [The occupation of Japan and education reform] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1983): 6 (hereafter, Suzuki, *Nihon kyōiku kaikaku*); Kubo Yoshizō, *Tainichi senryō seisaku to sengo kyōiku kaikaku* (The Occupation policy toward Japan and postwar educational reform) (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1985), (hereafter, Kubo, *Tainichi sengo kyōiku kaikaku*).

<sup>8</sup> Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992): 60.

<sup>9</sup> Mayo: 62–67.

<sup>10</sup> Takemae, *GHQ*: 82–86; Mayo: 77; D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964*, vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985): 10–11.

<sup>11</sup> Harry Wray, "The Implementation of the First United States Education Mission to Japan's Report during the Allied Occupation of Japan," in Kamikawa Rikuzō et al., eds., *Nihon no teiryū* [Undercurrent], 4, (Autumn 1990): 25–34.

<sup>12</sup> Mayo: 62.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*: 62.

<sup>14</sup> Robert King Hall, "The Battle of the Mind: American Educational Policy in Germany and Japan," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, 2, (Winter, 1948): 71; Takemae Eiji, ed., *Shōgen nihon senryōshi* [Testimony on the history of the Japanese

occupation] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983): 46 (Takemae does not believe there was much policy direction in any field for at least the first four months of the Occupation.); Joseph C. Trainor, *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan, Trainor's Memoir* (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983): 23 (hereafter, *Trainor's Memoir*); Mark Taylor Orr, "Education Reform Policy in Occupied Japan," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1954: especially 65–72 (hereafter, Orr, "Education Reform"); Personal interview of W. Kenneth Bunce, 1 Jul. 1982.

<sup>15</sup> Robert King Hall, *Education for a New Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949): 69–70, (hereafter, Hall, *EFNJ*).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*: 71–74. Hall wrote elsewhere that "the actual story of educational policy is a fantastic one of local interpretation and operational implementation based on the sketchiest of general directives." Hall, "Battle of the Mind," 62.

<sup>17</sup> Mayo: 59–61; Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986): 88–94, 97, 104–05; The Reminiscences of Joseph Ballantine, Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, 2 May 1961: 54., 58–60, 65, 230–35; The Reminiscences of Eugene H. Dooman, Occupation of Japan Project, Oral History Research Office of Columbia University, May 1962: 134–47. (Unless the same person has been interviewed twice or more, I have only listed the last name and provide no dating after the first citation.) John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980): 39–40; Personal correspondence from Gordon Bowles, 14 Feb. 1985.

<sup>18</sup> Perry: 38–40; *Trainor's Memoir*: 9–10; Orr, "Education Reform": 4–14. Orr thought all CATS officers had automatically attended it prior to entering CATS. Correspondence of Orr, 3 Mar. 1987; Mark T. Orr, "The Reformers: Japanese Education During the Allied Occupation," Florida–Japan Seminar, 3 May 1980, (hereafter, Orr, "The Reformers").

<sup>19</sup> *Trainor's Memoir*: 9.

<sup>20</sup> Personal interview of Mark T. Orr, 10 Jan. 1980; personal correspondence from Orr, 3 Mar. 1987.

<sup>21</sup> Personal interview of W. Kenneth Bunce: 4; personal interview of Robert King Hall, 29 Apr. 1981: 2–3.

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview of Dr. Alfred Crofts, 16 Jul. 1985: 7; personal interview of Hall: 4; personal interview of Bunce: 4.

<sup>23</sup> Personal interview of Bunce: 5; personal interview of Hall: 3–4. *Trainor's Memoir*: 10–14; Orr, "Education Reform: 72–73.

<sup>24</sup> Hall Papers, personal collection. A copy of them is also available at the National Education Research Institute; personal interview of Hall: 5; personal interview of Bunce: 4–5; personal correspondence from Bunce, 20 Aug. 1986.

<sup>25</sup> Takemae noted that of the seventy Civil Affairs Guides dealing with diverse Japanese topics some contained policy direction, but most of them were not completed until after the war. Hence many were not even published. *GHQ*: 75.

<sup>26</sup> Personal interview of Mark Orr: 10–14; personal interview of Eileen Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980; Herbert J. Wunderlich, "Nihon senryō no omoide, 1945–46, Sono ichi" [Memories of the occupation of Japan], *Senryō kyōikushi kenkyū*, 2, Meisei Daigaku Senryō Kyōikushi Kenkyū Senta, June 1985: 33. (hereafter, Wunderlich, "Omoide").

<sup>27</sup> Interview of Mark T. Orr by Takemae Eiji, personal collection and Takemae

Collection, Nihon Keizai Daigaku, 13 Jul. 1978: 12; Harry Emerson Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo* (New York: MacMillan, 1954).

<sup>28</sup> *Trainor's Memoir*: 23.

<sup>29</sup> Suzuki, *Nihon kyōiku kaikaku*: 24–25.

<sup>30</sup> Personal interview of Herbert Wunderlich, 10 Jan. 1980; Wunderlich, "Omoide": 33–35.

<sup>31</sup> Orr, "Education Reform": 73–74; interview of Mark T. Orr by Takemae Eiji.

<sup>32</sup> Takemae, *Shogen*: 9–11.

<sup>33</sup> *Trainor's Memoir*: 14–15; Wunderlich, "Omoide": 35–36; Personal interview of Orr; Orr, "The Reformers": 14–15; Orr, "Educational Reform": 108.

<sup>34</sup> Mayo: 31–32.

<sup>35</sup> Hall, *EFNJ*: 17. Professor Travis Summergill recalled writing a paper on the disestablishment of State Shintoism that he later shared with Bunce. Interview of Travis Summergill, 1 Aug. 1986: 2–6.

<sup>36</sup> Interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980.

<sup>37</sup> He had administered the Japan YMCA for 25 years. Hall Papers; National Record Center, 331/ Boxes 5373, 5314, 5148, 5142 (hereafter, NRC. The NRC is located in Suitland, Maryland). Trainor Papers, Box 49/ Reel 43. Box 51/ Reel 30/2; Box 34 (The Trainor papers are located in the Lou Hoover Library at Stanford University and are on micro-fiche at Meisei University's Research Center for Postwar History of Education Reform).

<sup>38</sup> Personal interview of Donovan, 11 Jan. 1980.

<sup>39</sup> Takemae, *GHQ*: 80–86; Orr, "Educational Reform": 73–74.

<sup>40</sup> *Trainor's Memoir*: 10–11.

<sup>41</sup> Personal interview of Walter Nichols, 27 Jun. 1985; interview of Scott George and Arthur Dornheim, 14 Aug. 1985; correspondence of Dornheim, 23 Aug. 1987; Grant Goodman, *Amerika no nihon, gannen* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1986):12–13; Herbert Passin, *Encounter with Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982): 50–54.

<sup>42</sup> Interview of Edwin Wigglesworth, 29 Jul. 1983; personal correspondence from Wigglesworth, 19 Jul. 1985.

<sup>43</sup> Personal interview of Summergill: 7, 10–13; Wunderlich, "Omoide": 37; personal interview of Orr, 10 Jan. 1980: 10–13; Orr, "The Reformers": 3–5.

<sup>44</sup> Orr, "The Reformers": 16–17. Orr continued, "I remember a late afternoon when the planning staff commander directed us to produce detailed plans for establishing a military civil affairs training school which would prepare army officers for duty in Japan.... Hall met with us briefly to discuss our assignment and we agreed to assemble the following morning to proceed with the task. When we gathered at the appointed time, Lt. Commander Hall presented us with a comprehensive document he had prepared overnight which fully met planning requirements down to the last paper clip."

<sup>45</sup> Personal interview of Wunderlich; Interview of Trainor: 6–7; *Trainor's Memoir*: 24, 297–308.

<sup>46</sup> Hall Papers.

<sup>47</sup> Personal correspondence from Bunce, 20 Aug. 1986.

<sup>48</sup> Harkness later became Textbook Advisor in the Education Division.

<sup>49</sup> Bunce was ranked in group two and Crofts in group three; this was certainly high praise, considering the outstanding people who had participated in planning at CASA.

<sup>50</sup> Hall papers; Hall, *EFNJ*: 179, 312, 390; Trainor Papers, Box 34/Reel/30/2.

Correspondence from Kenneth Harkness to Katagami Sōji, 24 May 1980.

<sup>51</sup> Hall Papers; correspondence with Bunce, 20 Aug. 1986; interview of Hall: 8.

<sup>52</sup> Takemae, *Shogen*: 10–11.

<sup>53</sup> Oral History of Harold G. Henderson, Special Collections, Columbia University, Part 2, 1962: 22–23.

<sup>54</sup> *Trainor's Memoir*: 10–11, 15–16; Mayo: 71–83; Orr, “Education Reform”: 77–102; Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*: 102–106.

<sup>55</sup> Orr, “Education Reform”; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 3: 13.

<sup>56</sup> Takemae, *Sengo kyōiku*: 156. Not only did preparation take a long time. Takemae discovered that SWNCC 108/21 was amended twice more before being sent to the FEC; *Ibid.* p. 51.

<sup>57</sup> Orr, “Education Reform”: 72–73, 171, 232–33; Trainor papers, Box 51/Reel 43/2; *Trainor's Memoir*: 23. Trainor underscores Orr's remark by writing of the FEC directive, “By that time so much had been accomplished by Japanese educators with the assistance and guidance of headquarters officers that no new policy or new specific action was contained in the directive”; Kubo, *Tainichi sengo kyōiku kaikaku*: 180, 182–83.

<sup>58</sup> Mayo: 55–57, 77–80; Takemae, *GHQ*: 70–86; Kubo: 87–107; Suzuki, *Nihon kyōiku kaikaku*: 11–31; Reischauer: 104–05; Gordon Bowles, “Comments on Papers Presented at the Fourth Symposium on the Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform,” in Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan*: 515–22.

<sup>59</sup> Suzuki, *Nihon kyōiku kaikaku*: 20–22.

<sup>60</sup> Takemae, *GHQ*: 70–71; Perry: 45–46. Many attribute delays over policy planning on the basis of this State Department division between old Japan hands and old China hands, but it is a much more complicated issue. First, the division did not become very strong until mid-1945 when Hornbeck was joined by more pro-China hands. Second, Acheson, Archibald MacLeish, Edward Stettinius were not old China hands. Third, persons such as Herbert Feis, Henry Morgenthau, and others from the Navy, War, and Treasury Departments who had influence on policy planning were not old China hands.

<sup>61</sup> Reischauer: 106; Reminiscences of Dooman; Takemae, *GHQ*: 76–78; Mayo: 77–83. Professor Takahashi Shirō's research on the Shinto directive of 15 Dec. 1945, led him to conclude that some Washington policy planning never reached SCAP and that this SCAP directive not only reflected SCAP initiative, but also contradicted some Washington planning. Takahashi Shirō and Harry Wray, *Senryōka no kyōiku kaikaku to kenetsu* [Educational reform and censorship in occupied Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon kyōiku shimbunsha, 1987): 2–32.

<sup>62</sup> Mayo: 115, n. 78.

<sup>63</sup> Bowles, “Comments”: 2; Interview of Gordon Bowles, 20 Aug. 1980: 6.

<sup>64</sup> Reminiscences of Dooman, p. 139.

<sup>65</sup> Personal correspondence from Reischauer, 9 Oct. 1985; Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*: 104–06; James: 18–24, 107; Perry: 47, 65–69; Orr, “Education Reform”: 101–03.

<sup>66</sup> Trainor Papers, Box 49/Reel 38.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, Boxes 19–20/Reel 19.

<sup>68</sup> Mayo: 124, n. 106.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Harry Wray, “CI&E, Mombushō, kyōiku sasshin iinkai,” (The CI&E, Mombusho and the Japan Education Reform Committee) in Ray Moore, ed., *Tennō ga baiburu o*

*yonda hi* (The day that the emperor read the Bible) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982).

<sup>71</sup> *Kokutai no hongī* (Cardinal principles of the national entity of Japan), translated by John Owen Gauntlett and edited with an introduction by Robert King Hall (Newton, Mass.: Crofton, 1974): 42–44. See Hall's introduction for this view.

<sup>72</sup> John Monniger Nelson, "The Adult-Education Program in Occupied Japan, 1946–1950," Ed.D. dissertation, University of Kansas: 1, 67.

<sup>73</sup> Frank J. Sackton, "Education and Social Reform in Japan," in Burkman, ed., *The Occupation of Japan*: 5.

<sup>74</sup> Hall, *EFNJ*: 70.

<sup>75</sup> In a comment that reflected his prejudiced view against career military officers, Hall noted that the first educational directive of 22 Oct. 1945 was a deliberate attempt by reserve military officers favoring a lenient, constructive Occupation to prevent career military officers from imposing the harsher measures they favored; *ibid.*: 187.

<sup>76</sup> Interview of Wunderlich: 51–51; personal correspondence from Wunderlich, 1 Feb. 1981; Wunderlich, "Omoide": 43, 51.

<sup>77</sup> Harry Wray, "1946 nen zantei rekishi kyōkasho: kumon no tanjō sono ichi" [The agonizing birth of the 1946 stop-gap history textbooks, part one] *Senryō kyōikushi kenkyū kiyō* [Research bulletin of educational history of the allied occupation of Japan], 1, Meisei Daigaku, Senryo Kyōikushi Kenkyū Senta, July 1984: 1–30.

<sup>78</sup> Personal interview of Monta Osborne, 13 Aug. 1985.

<sup>79</sup> Personal correspondence from Osborne, 21 Jul. 1987.

<sup>80</sup> Harry Wray, "Shūsengo chōkugo no nihon ni okeru, 'shakaika' sōsetsu no haikai," (The background to the establishment of social studies in the immediate postwar occupation of Japan," *Shakaika kyōiku kenkyū* [Research on social studies education], 52, (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1984): 27–43.

<sup>81</sup> Takahashi and Wray: 107–196; Wray, "CI&E, Mombushō, kyōiku sasshin iinkai," *op.cit.*; Harry Wray, "The American Occupation of Japan and the Establishment of a 6–3–3–4 Educational Ladder System: A Case Study in How Much Force the Americans Applied and How Willingly the Japanese People and Government Accepted the Reform," Asian Studies Pacific Area Conference, 24–27 Jun. 1982, Santa Cruz, CA.

<sup>82</sup> Hall, *EFNJ*: 70.

<sup>83</sup> Harry Wray and Katsuoka Kanji, "Senryogun no nihongo seisaku ni tsuite, sono 1," (Postwar Occupation Forces policy for Japanese language, part 1) *Sengo kyōikushi kenkyū*, 4, 1986: 73–81.

<sup>84</sup> NRC 331/Boxes 5041, 5377; personal interview of Donovan; personal interview of Orr, 12 Jan. 1980: 6, 15–16; personal interview of Wunderlich: 6; personal interview of Trainor: 35.