

The Silver-Tongued Clarion Sunbeam from Coconino County

Henry F. Ashurst and the Leagues of Nations

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HENRY F. ASHURST (1874–1962), United States senator from 1912 to 1941, and one of the most colorful figures in his state's history, supported United States participation in the League of Nations. He was one of President Woodrow Wilson's Democratic allies in the great struggle to redefine for America its place in post-World War I foreign affairs. In this endeavor, Ashurst, one of Arizona's first two senators, was far more practical in 1919 and 1920 than the president in predicting the obstacles to securing Senate ratification of the peace treaty without clarifying reservations. Ashurst's role in that debate constituted an important phase in his political career.

In Ashurst, Wilson had a capable and intelligent representative in the Senate. Born in a covered wagon on a Nevada sheep ranch, Ashurst worked as a lumberjack, cowboy, newspaper reporter, lawyer, justice of the peace, and district attorney before advancing to the Arizona territorial legislature and ultimately to the Senate. He usually dressed in a black-braided cut-away coat, striped trousers, winged collar, and silk-ribboned, corded eyeglasses.¹ Known for his inconsistency in changing positions on certain issues, Ashurst gained a solid reputation for his florid eloquence and sense of humor. He knew by memory hundreds of quotations, literary expressions, and passages from the classics, often bellowing his remarks while riding the range or running to expand his lung capacity. His public speeches were models of polysyllabic splendor, demonstrating a masterful command of etymology. Sprinkled with frontier humor, flowery phrases, and erudition, Ashurst's speeches, including those on the League of Nations, testified to his command of English and his lifelong passion for words. The senator appreciated the power of language, and Washington loved his high-flown oratory.²

Ashurst's early reputation for oratorical skills and common sense had

been achieved by the time President Wilson sailed for Europe in December 1918 to participate in the peace conference. Republicans not only criticized his decision to attend the meeting but also condemned his judgment in excluding senators and prominent Republicans from the American peace commission.³ Ashurst concurred with this assessment. "President Wilson might have saved his Treaty had he taken with him to Versailles [France] men of tested statesmanship," the senator confided to his ever faithful diary.⁴

Attached to the treaty at Wilson's insistence was the Covenant of the League of Nations. The president's greatest diplomatic coup in making the League an indissoluble part of the Treaty of Versailles turned out to be his most costly political mistake.

The Senate, having a constitutional obligation to approve or reject treaties, divided into four groups on the League issue in 1919 and 1920. First, the pro-League senators and supporters of Wilson, headed by Senate minority leader Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, favored United States participation in the League. Ashurst ultimately joined this group. Second, the mild reservationists, such as Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, were willing to accept the treaty with minor alterations and clarifications. Third, the strong reservationists would approve the treaty only with major amendments to protect American interests and traditional policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine, thereby proposing certain nullifications. Their leader was Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Fourth, the sixteen senators who advocated complete rejection of the covenant were known as the irreconcilables, among whom were William E. Borah of Idaho, Hiram W. Johnson of California, and Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin.

By May 1919 President Wilson was still in Europe, but the battle lines were forming at home. Ashurst, keeping abreast of overseas developments, freely offered his opinions. "The League of Nations covenant, drafted as at present, may not be proof against all wars, but it will prevent some wars," he said. "I believe the peace terms as outlined at the conference in Paris," Ashurst continued, "will be ratified by the United States Senate."⁵ Later that month, growing more pessimistic, Ashurst noticed that Lodge was trying to heal the breach between Republican "stand pat- ters" and "progressives," both of which factions disliked Wilson's foreign policy. "I do not perceive how he [Wilson] can obtain ratification of his League Treaty when there are forty-nine Republicans in the Senate and forty-eight of them, or all but Senator [Porter] McCumber of North Dakota, are opposed to the League," Ashurst observed, "whilst Senators

[James] Reed [of Missouri] and [Thomas] Gore [of Oklahoma], Democrats, will also vote against it."⁶

Ashurst's speeches on the League were reasoned analyses of the international scene as well as the political situation within the United States and the Senate. Perhaps his most important address on the subject occurred on June 20, 1919. After Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman of Illinois, an avid irreconcilable, had spoken for three hours denouncing the covenant, Ashurst, upset with the tone and content of the speech, replied to the Republican legislator. "I listened with all my faculties to the Senator's speech," Ashurst informed his Senate colleagues, "but was unable to tell precisely what he [Sherman] was talking about, but he furnished to the Senate and to the American people the remarkable phenomena of a man being foggy and windy at one and the same time.... It is amusing to see the opponents of the league changing their ground and racing about like a tortured animal on a hot surface." Complaining about the "coruscating language and rhetoric," "the spell of bewitching oratory," and the "puerile statements" of the opposition, whose statements flowed like "a red and fiery comet," Ashurst noted that he had heard "appeals to partisan politics, appeals to prejudice, appeals not to reason but appeals to prejudice, special pleadings."⁷ He urged the senators to permit the discussion of the League to be "a Homeric contest" in which patriotism, statesmanship, logic, and the power of thought would predominate rather than political or religious prejudice or caustic remarks that disintegrate to the "very bottom of a deep pit of destitution of argument." According to Ashurst, this was the only way that different views could be placed on "the great high plane of elevated thought that must solve this question." He added:

The time has arrived not for vitriol but for vigor.... In the life of a Government, as in the life of a man, sometimes there comes a crisis so deep and so terrible that in any attempt to visualize it words seem weak, if not contemptible, and we have now reached that exact point in the proposal to form a league of nations. I impugn the motive of no Senator. I question the vote of no Senator. He is responsible to the American people for his vote on this all-important question. More than that, he is answerable to that grim monitor called conscience, a monitor within his breast which slumbers not nor sleeps, but which with persistent and uncanny vitality gives no peace nor rest to him who disregards her unmistakable and infallible warnings. It is utterly stupid to apply the epithet "traitor" or other opprobrious terms to those who are in favor of a league of nations.⁸

Ashurst also developed other themes in his June 20 address. For one thing, he expanded to some extent the thesis advanced earlier by Senator Morris Sheppard, a Texas Democrat, that the League was the most effective instrument for the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war. "Whether we like it or not, we must either face a league of nations or face constant warfare," exclaimed Ashurst. In the second place, while directly addressing the phobias of Senators Sherman, Reed, and Borah, Ashurst emphatically denied that the Vatican, Great Britain, Bolshevism, or non-white races would dominate the League. Nor would it become "a deadly instrument of oppression." Moreover, Ashurst defended Wilson's conduct of foreign policy. He pointed out that the president's enemies "shifted their tongues" and "with gestures like undertakers signaling to pallbearers filled the circumambient atmosphere with gloomy predictions that Wilson would soon be enmeshed and entangled in the web which the scheming politicians and exquisite diplomatists of Europe would adroitly weave about him." Instead, Wilson turned out to be "the delegate of distinction" who confronted "that polylingual assemblage" with ability and authority. Along these same lines, the Arizona senator also approved the harsh peace terms imposed on Germany as a matter of "retribution and justice." In his mind, Germany should be arraigned before "the bar of civilization" to pronounce judgment on "the wickedness of Prussian militarism." Finally, Ashurst restated the reasons for United States involvement in the war: "to protect, vindicate, and uphold certain vital American rights" and "to assist civilization in its volcanic contest to survive" the desperate German assault. Failure to sustain the League, argued Ashurst, would be tantamount to abandoning the causes for which Americans died. The result of the conflict was not to end with a "temporary armed truce" but instead with the employment of "international justice and moral courage" to prevent unnecessary wars. "Shall we transmit to posterity safety or peril," he queried.⁹

During his Senate speech, Ashurst contended with interruptions from Senator Reed, and the two men engaged in verbal duels on the floor of the upper chamber. Reed harbored beliefs that the United States would have to police Europe. Ashurst countered by reminding his distinguished friend that people fight for other people in the name of liberty, citing examples of illustrious heroes, such as Lafayette and other Europeans, who fought with the colonists during the American Revolutionary War. "We do not erect statues to men who fight for themselves," Ashurst told Reed, emphasizing that it was America's duty to "enlighten the world."¹⁰ The Ashurst-Reed colloquy pitted two able men holding divergent views on the League, but Ashurst clearly emerged the winner in terms of sound

reasoning, historical fact, and the power of expression. Claiming that he was "in the attitude of the man who was pardoned out of the Arizona penitentiary," Ashurst correctly predicted that another world conflagration would erupt in the future because of Germany's irredentist and unrepentant attitude and "desperate thirst for revenge." He warned Reed and the next generation to be suspicious of both "German efficiency" and "Russian mystery."¹¹ "Shall civilization make the shameful admission that it is so destitute of genius, originality, and initiative that it can construct nothing to prevent the spread of another world war," he questioned.¹²

Ashurst found particularly appalling the argument of the irreconcilables that the concept of the League of Nations ran counter to the teachings of the Founding Fathers to avoid permanent and entangling alliances. Fearful of any profound change of direction in American diplomacy and reluctant even to experiment with different approaches to foreign policy, the irreconcilables discouraged Americans from accepting their new position in the world, cautioned the people against foreign expeditions, and urged a return to less adventurous attitudes. They failed to realize that the nation they envisioned was still following the course George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had charted when the United States was a young and struggling country. Unlike Ashurst, who outlined his thoughts on the new realities in American foreign policy and offered a blueprint for a future direction, the irreconcilables chose to repeat the words of a former generation. This irked Ashurst, who wondered what Washington would have thought of the railroad, telegraph, electric light, telephone, and airplane.

Ashurst next proceeded to give the irreconcilables a lesson in American history and the wonders of change. He contended that statesmanship was a "progressive science" that must keep pace with the times. The senator scolded his opponents for preferring "statesmanship that remains in a procrustean bed of fixity," for that type of statesmanship "will not build states or secure their liberties after they are built." Noting the obvious differences between Washington's time and that of Wilson, Ashurst confessed that Washington's foreign policy advice was appropriate for that period. But Ashurst keenly recognized that the advice Washington offered in his farewell address was not a permanent admonition against intervention; rather, he counseled neutrality only for a temporary time to allow the nation to grow strong and large enough to defend itself. By 1919, American maturity had reached that plateau, and the course proposed by Washington was no longer defensible. "The league of nations," Ashurst concluded, "is the very thing that is going to give us a chart by which we can sail and avoid entangling alliances. It will again bring for-

ward and galvanize into life international law so that we shall have a chart by which to steer and a rudder that will send us in the right direction.... I have no disposition to quarrel with those persons who are opposed to a league of nations. I respect them, but I am not of them. They think that when the armistice was signed Mars fell silent, but let me remind them that Mars is red instead of dead. They think now that Germany has been defeated, this earth will henceforth be a beautiful temple within which are walled peace, contentment, and plenty.... They are, I am sorry to say, sadly mistaken. I wish they were not mistaken, but practical men know that evil things will continually assail man on this mundane sphere—that envy, deceit, cruelty, foaming revenge, land hunger, bigotry, cupidity, greed, lust for world power, and kindred evil passions inveterately attack the human race and must be combated, not surrendered to.”¹³

Upon the adjournment that day of the Senate’s session, Ashurst returned home to record thoughts in his diary about his speech. He took a few important passages from his address to place in his diary. “We are now required,” he wrote, “to assist in the liquidation of the war. In taking part in the war we gave reasons so noble that we made a high place for America, and we are now in that posture which confronts many a man where he must either lower the tone of his preaching or live a nobler life.... Is the world to drop back into its former attitude of *laissez faire* and let matters drift haphazardly along? Must those nations that wish to live orderly, useful, and noble lives be forever imperiled and harassed by a sword of Damocles suspended over them?”¹⁴

Nearly a month after his June 20 address, Ashurst listened to President Wilson’s presentation of the treaty before the Senate. The Arizonian expected the chief executive to explain obscure features of the covenant, including procedures for United States withdrawal and the safeguarding of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of tackling these vital questions, Wilson ignored them and adamantly refused to accept reservations, which he considered to be nullifications. Ashurst “was petrified with surprise” over Wilson’s failure on July 11 to deliver an impassioned defense of the imperiled treaty. “Wilson was called upon to render an accounting of the most momentous cause ever entrusted to an individual,” bemoaned Ashurst. “His audience wanted raw meat, he fed them cold turnips.”¹⁵ Six days later, Ashurst’s hopes accelerated when Wilson began discussing the treaty with senators and answering the interrogatories. “W. W. has at last taken steps-belated steps—toward mollifying the Senate,” exclaimed Ashurst.¹⁶

Events for Ashurst and the League moved swiftly in September. Convinced that sentiment was overwhelmingly against the treaty without reservations, Ashurst professed that Wilson would have to look to the

future for his vindication.¹⁷ By September 12, a discouraged Ashurst realized that Wilson's popularity was declining and that opposition to the treaty was increasing. He admitted that he did not know how this could be checked, but he feared "the heat of popular resentment will consume the Treaty, root and branch."¹⁸ Ashurst also notified Wilson that he was "disturbed over some of the provisions of the League Covenant."¹⁹

After hearing irreconcilables inveigh against the treaty and after studying the Lodge reservations, Ashurst, on September 25, 1919, officially went on record in favor of the treaty without reservations. He telegraphed his decision to President Wilson: "Although I have had...doubts and misgivings as to some parts of the League Covenant, I am nevertheless convinced that Germany would obtain a material advantage and would come out of the war practically a victor were the Treaty amended or were any reservations adopted. To my mind, it is this Treaty or no treaty, and I for one am not willing to assume the frightful responsibility of precipitating chaos upon the world by some hazardous amendment or reservation. I have studied this tremendous question from every angle and am sure that at this juncture I can render my country, indeed the entire civilized world—a great service by voting for the Treaty without amendments or reservations."²⁰

On November 19, 1919, the day of the Senate vote on the treaty, Ashurst breakfasted early before driving to the Capitol. "The breeze from my motor car stirred the dead leaves strewn about," recalled the Arizona Democrat, "and I knew that President Wilson's Treaty would soon be as dead as those leaves."²¹ Once again Ashurst had correctly gauged the situation. Weary of the prolonged debate, he objected to additional procrastination on the matter. Because the senators had already formed their opinions, further loquacity amounted to "making mud pies." "For God's sake," Ashurst cried, "let us all keep our mouths shut and vote, vote, and only vote."²² Others quickly concurred that the moment had come at long last. The Senate rejected the treaty in three tests that day. First, on the question of ratification with reservations, the senators voted 39 in favor to 55 against. Next, a second vote occurred on the same question, revived by a motion to reconsider. This time the result was 41 to 50. Third, on the question of ratification without reservations, the outcome was 38 to 53, falling far short of the two-thirds vote necessary to approve treaties.²³ The Anti-Leaguers had scored an overwhelming triumph over the Pro-Leaguers. Ashurst immediately heard from William Jennings Bryan, former secretary of state and presidential nominee, who pleaded with the Arizona senator to work with McCumber and other moderates to fashion a compromise for ultimate acceptance on the fourth vote.²⁴ In another let-

ter, dated March 6, 1920, Bryan reiterated his support of reservations, warning of the fatal consequences for Democrats on this issue in the presidential campaign that year.²⁵

On March 11, five days after Bryan sent his letter, Ashurst once again addressed the Senate on the League of Nations and the peace treaty. True to his spirit and conscience, Ashurst, torn between loyalty to party and loyalty to country, chose the greater good. In his usual outspoken manner, he vigorously exhorted the Senate to ratify the treaty and boldly demanded that the politicians screening themselves behind the treaty come forth at once. Ashurst insisted that the Senate perform its duty either by taking the treaty in a pair of tongs and dropping it into the Potomac River in an act of supreme infanticide or by ratifying it without more delays. "On behalf of the American people, I ask for action," he shouted in a piercing tone. "Why is there no vote upon this treaty" he asked. Then in a clear and unmistakable voice, Ashurst spoke his most famous remarks that day: "I am just as much opposed to a White House irreconcilable as I am to a Lodge irreconcilable.... As a friend of the President, as one who has loyally followed him, I solemnly declare to him this morning: If you want to kill your own child because the Senate straightened out its crooked limbs, you must take the responsibility and accept the verdict of history."²⁶

The fourth and final vote on the treaty took place on March 19, 1920. A substantial majority favored approval with reservations, but they fell seven votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority needed for ratification. By a vote of 49 to 35, the Senate defeated the treaty, meaning that the United States would not enter the League and that technically it was still at war with Germany. Ironically, a combination of Wilsonians and irreconcilables found themselves on the same side as they voted against the covenant with reservations. Had those Democrats endorsed the League with reservations, the treaty would have carried the Senate.²⁷

Wilson hoped that the presidential election of 1920 would be a solemn referendum on the League. James M. Cox, the Democratic nominee from Ohio, favored American membership in the League. The Republican presidential candidate, Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio, talked vaguely of an international association of nations to prevent war. As early as January 9, 1920, Ashurst had predicted the outcome of the contest when he confidentially entered his thoughts in his diary: "Thus W. W. makes the Versailles Treaty the issue in the campaign. This gives the campaign of 1920 an unusual feature, to wit, we know now in advance what will be the result."²⁸ During the presidential canvass that autumn, Ashurst shrewdly observed the events and duly recorded his impressions. "Governor Cox...

faces defeat. The issue in this campaign is Woodrow Wilson, and the reaction against Wilson is strong," he committed to his diary on October 11.²⁹

Harding's landslide victory on November 2, 1920 reinstated the Republicans in the White House. The new president promptly abandoned all endeavors to have the United States enter the League, stating his personal view that nothing could be stamped with more finality than American nonparticipation in the world body.³⁰ World War I had ended the progressive movement at home and led to a conservative restoration in the 1920s, a decade fundamentally different from the American society of the previous ten years. Senator Hiram Johnson of California lamented that "war and those things that go with war" had extinguished the spirit of progressivism.³¹ William Allen White, a prominent Kansas editor, concluded that war was "the Devil's answer to progress."³²

Ashurst expressed no surprise over Cox's enormous defeat. He had been proclaiming for a year that the League would be fatal to the Democratic party. Shortly after the election, Ashurst consoled himself with his belief that the electorate had not repudiated America's entry into World War I; rather, the voters had overwhelmingly rejected Wilson's administration in a wrathful determination "to rid themselves of the old and to usher in the new.... Any administration conducting so colossal an enterprise (world war) would have met the same fate. The nation is tired of ideals, altruism, and high endeavors.... The composite voter in this election may be visualized as a person schooled by high prudence to curb his emotions, who grimly waited for the day when he could 'turn out Wilson and his works.'"³³

Ashurst was not immune from the postwar disillusionment that swept the nation. He noticed the cynical attitude of Americans toward life and their interest in materialism and pleasure. The Arizona politician detected that religious teachings had become too remote in an era, later called the "roaring twenties," characterized by automobiles, amusements, rich foods, luxuries, and comfort. "Sanity is a relative thing," he commented. "During the past five years the pressure has been more than the normal human being could withstand, hence an abnormal mind akin to madness pervades. Everybody is uneasy; the philosopher is rare. Pessimists are multiplying.... The nerves of the world are frayed.... The present condition is the natural reaction to the Great War.... A crime wave, the backwash of war, is sweeping the land."³⁴

Ashurst and Wilson emerged in 1919 and 1920 as two prominent Democratic politicians caught in the panorama of a great transformation in the nation. Wilson failed to translate his ideals for American involvement in international affairs into reality. From his perspective, the League

promised to extend American influence throughout the world at a minimal cost. Convinced that other nations depended on the United States, he expected to reconcile the ostensible universalism of American ideals and practices with the unilateralism of American decision making. Wilson's failure resulted from his endeavor to combine incompatible goals of international interdependence and American unilateralism. The president suffered defeat not only because of Republican opposition, but also because of his misunderstanding of the modern world. He tried to internationalize Americans too rapidly. Moreover, Wilson's impracticality and intransigence only compounded the dilemma for himself, his party, and the nation. In the end, he planted the seeds for World War II by his stubborn refusal to compromise. Because of his paralytic stroke and poor health by late 1919 and early 1920, Wilson might have better served the nation and his cause had he resigned the presidency and turned the responsibility over to Vice President Thomas R. Marshall.

Distracted by fantasies about making a peaceable kingdom from a violent and divisive postwar world, Wilson experienced great difficulty reconciling his visionary altruistic instincts with the realities of human hatred and brutality. There existed within the chief executive a tug of war between altruism and pragmatism, but Ashurst displayed a better balance of pragmatic realism in the distended society of 1919 and 1920. Moreover, unlike strong reservationists who favored partial internationalism to arrange the retirement of Europe from world politics while avoiding direct permanent United States entanglement, Ashurst was willing to commit the nation to a place of world leadership to restore order and preserve the peace. Wilson might have been more successful had he listened to men like Ashurst and had he entrusted to those League Democrats in the Senate the flexibility to add clarifying qualifications that would have satisfied noninterventionists but would not have destroyed the concept or purpose of the League. Ashurst felt frustrated at times by Wilson's irreconcilable behavior and expressed dissatisfaction with the whirlwind of despair that engulfed the nation and gripped the Democratic party. Helpless to change the president's policies, Ashurst sought solace in various ways. He disagreed with some of the provisions of the peace treaty relating to other nations, and he would have surely preferred attaching some clarifications to the League charter to guarantee certain American interests and safeguard the Constitution from any overseas misconception. The role that Senator Ashurst played in the debate on the League of Nations was one significant part in his long political career representing the people of Arizona.

Ashurst easily made friends on both sides of the aisle while he served in

the Senate and with people of both parties in Arizona during his retirement. Certainly one of his ardent admirers was Senator Barry M. Goldwater, the 1964 Republican presidential nominee. The former senator described Ashurst quite well when he wrote: "I knew him when I was a boy, he was pretty much of a legend. He learned his poetry, his songs, the English language as beautifully as he did, riding horseback, as a cattleman, up in Northern Arizona. I had long conversations with him. I cherished his friendship. He was a wonderful, remarkable man.... He had one little habit that maybe you don't know, and that was, in his later years at 5:00 every afternoon, he would show up at the Sheraton Hotel in Washington, dressed in his cutaway coat, striped pants, and a red carnation, to meet with a group of women. He would announce to them, 'What would you like to hear?' They usually wanted to hear something from Shakespeare, and I think I'm right in telling you that he knew every word of Shakespeare by heart, and used those words better than anyone I've ever known."³⁵ Ashurst was indeed a fascinating figure of the American West.

Notes

¹ In addition to standard reference sources, biographical information on Ashurst can be obtained from George Fray Sparks, "The Speaking of Henry Fountain Ashurst" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1952); Robert E. Cogmac, "The Senatorial Career of Henry Fountain Ashurst" (M.A. thesis, Arizona State University, 1953); Jay J. Wagoner, *Arizona Territory, 1863-1912: A Political History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), pp. 450-91; Lawrence Clark Powell, *Arizona: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1976), pp. 62-64; and obituary material in *The New York Times*, June 1, 1962; *Los Angeles Times*, June 1, 1962; *New York Herald Tribune*, June 1, 1962; *Arizona Daily Star*, June 1, 1962; *Phoenix Gazette*, May 31, 1962; *Arizona Republic*, June 10, 1962; *Tucson Daily Citizen*, May 31, 1962; and *Time*, June 8, 1962, p. 26. Ashurst papers are in the Special Collections Division of the University of Arizona Library at Tucson and at the Arizona Historical Society at Tucson. A recent publication dealing with Arizona in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is David R. Berman, *Reformers, Corporations, and the Electorate: An Analysis of Arizona's Age of Reform* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1992)

² Barry M. Goldwater collected and published some of Ashurst's speeches. See Barry M Goldwater (ed.), *Speeches of Henry Fountain Ashurst of Arizona* (Phoenix: Arizona-Messenger Printing Company, 1953). In his farewell address to the Senate on September 11, 1940, Ashurst said: "No man is fit to be a Senator and no man should presume to serve here unless he is willing at any time to surrender his political life for a great principle, for a vital thing in American liberty and stability." See *ibid.*, p. 71.

³ For additional information on Wilson and the League of Nations, see Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Kendrick A. Clements, *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964); Ralph Stone, *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970); William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925); Denna Frank Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932); Herbert F. Margulies, *The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989); and Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I: 1917-1921* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).

⁴ George F. Sparks (ed.), *A Many-Colored Toga: The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1962), p. 101. Date of entry: August 20, 1919. Hereafter cited as Ashurst, *Diary*.

⁵ *The New York Times*, May 3, 1919.

⁶ Ashurst, *Diary*, May 23, May 29, 1919, p. 96.

⁷ U. S., *Congressional Record*, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., June 20, 1919, LVIII, Part 2, p. 1444.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1445.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1446.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1447.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1448.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1449.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1450.

¹⁴ Ashurst, *Diary*, June 20, 1919, p. 96.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, July 11, 1919, pp. 98-99.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, July 17, 1919, p. 100.

¹⁷ *New York Tribune*, September 7, 8, 1919.22

¹⁸ Ashurst, *Diary*, September 12, 1919, p. 105.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1919, p. 107. Some of Ashurst's statements on the League of Nations are in the Woodrow Wilson Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, September 26, 1919. Also, Ashurst, *Diary*, September 25, 1919, pp. 107-08.

²¹ *Ibid.*, November 19, 1919, p. 114.

²² Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963; first published in 1945 by the Macmillan Company in New York), p. 187.

²³ *The New York Times*, November 20, 1919.

²⁴ William Jennings Bryan to Henry F. Ashurst, November 23, 1919, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress. See also William H. Taft to Gilbert M. Hitchcock, July 21, 1919, Gilbert M. Hitchcock Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; Porter J. McCumber to Taft, July 31, 1919, William Howard Taft Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress; and Frank B. Brandegee to Henry Cabot Lodge, November 27, 1919, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

²⁵ Bryan to Ashurst, March 6, 1920, Bryan Papers.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, March 12, 1920.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, March 20, 1920. Ashurst was one of 21 Democrats who voted to accept the treaty with the Lodge reservations.

²⁸ Ashurst, *Diary*, January 9, 1920, p. 121.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, October 11, 1920, p. 131.

³⁰ Warren G. Harding to Cornelius Cole, August 12, 1919; Harding to Frederick Gillett, August 4, 30, 1920, Warren G. Harding Papers, Ohio Historical Society Library, Columbus.

³¹ Hiram Johnson to Bryan, September 14, 1920, Bryan Papers.

³² William Allen White to Ray Stannard Baker, December 28, 1920, William Allen White Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

³³ Ashurst, *Diary*, November 5, 1920, p. 132.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, August 27, 1919, p. 103; January 1, 1920, p. 119. See Stuart I. Rochester, *American Liberal Disillusionment in the Wake of World War I* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), and William K. Klingaman, *1919: The Year Our World Began* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

³⁵ Barry M. Goldwater to Leonard Schlup, September 3, 1993. This letter is in the author's private possession.