

Battles over Memory in “Culture Wars”: A Trans-Pacific Perspective

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My paper concerns the struggles over the remembering and forgetting of a nation’s pasts. It observes the battles over the questions concerning what, in what ways, from whose standpoint, and ultimately for what purposes, national pasts ought to be remembered as the proper and authentic National History. The purpose of this paper is to consider the struggle over historical memories within the post-Cold War context of the global “culture wars.”

In concrete, I observe two instances of the turn-of-the-new-century *Historikerstreit*, or history wars, in Asia and the Pacific: the Smithsonian “Enola Gay” controversy in the United States and the history textbook reform activism promoted by the Japanese revisionist historians, far-right critics and politicians. Through exploring the discourse that organizes the public debates evolving around the two sites, I will ask the following questions. How has the National History in both countries been shaped by the Cold War epistemologies, and to what extent does the debate over history remain an integral part of, or has the potential to critically interrogate, the notion of a pure and unitary national self and the shared uniformity of its history? In what ways are the intense, sometimes even violent dissensions over the nation’s past related to what we have come to know as “culture wars”?

While the two sites of battles over memories have been unfolding in separate national contexts, one in the United States and the other in Japan, and despite the fact that the two countries are almost always represented as culturally and socially antipodal to each other, there are remarkable parallels. In the following discussion, I hope to demonstrate that the commonality of the struggles over history and memory in the United States and Japan needs to be understood as a mutually constitutive trans-Pacific formation.

I. “Culture Wars” in Global Perspectives

What is “culture war”? Why is it called a “war”? And what does “culture” have to do with it? Is “culture war” a debate limited within the boundary of a single country or nation? Translated as “*bunka sensō*,” the term has gained increasing currency in Japan since the critical cultural studies journal, *Impaction*, published a special issue on “Culture Wars in Japan,” guest-edited by sociologist

Kimio Ito.¹ In it, Ito first introduced to the Japanese readers the United States' context in which the term was born. He then explained why and how some of the issues hotly debated in Japan since the 1990s can also be viewed as constituting a "culture war." The special issue also included an interview piece with the well-known Japanese journalist, Saito Takao, who extensively explored some of the burning "culture war" issues of contemporary Japan. Why do we find, as we do in such an example, so many similarities between Japan and the United States? Is "culture war" identical with "wars between different cultures"? Is it similar to a "clash of civilizations," the phrase famously coined by Samuel Huntington? To put differently, does "culture war" refer to the conflicts between, for example, the Western and non-Western cultures, or does it rely on a very different concept of "culture"? What are the actual discords, disagreements, and disputes that constitute the phenomenon known as "culture war"?

The concept of "culture war" is commonly known to have stemmed originally from "*Kulturkampf*," a German term that referred to the nineteenth century struggle initiated by the Prussian Chancellor Otto Bismarck to curtail the influence of the Catholic Church over the German national cultural spheres. James Davison Hunter, a sociologist who has written extensive overviews of the U.S. culture wars since the nineties, offers the following observation about the difference between the nineteenth and late twentieth century culture wars. Hunter prefaces his book, titled, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, with the following observation:

[T]he contemporary culture war touches virtually all Americans...The term ["culture war"] has of late become a topic of conversation in certain circles. The idea has come into circulation as people have reflected on the similarities and dissimilarities between our own time and circumstances and that of the German *kulturkampf* of the last decades of the nineteenth century. At that time the term described the political fallout from Bismarck's efforts to unify the disparate German principalities into a unified nation-state. On the surface, the dispute pitted Protestants against Catholics over the religious content and character of public education. Such an issue seems innocuous enough from the vantage point of the late twentieth century. But... [e]ducation was a symbol of German unity and national identity. German Protestants and Catholics were battling over *the moral character of the nation*--as it would be passed on to future generation in the schools.

The culture war in America today is of a fundamentally different cast. Education is just one of the areas of cultural cleavage and is probably not the most divisive. The antagonisms no longer arise between Protestant and Catholics but, as we will see, among a very different and historically unlikely configuration of cultural players. Yet like the *kulturkampf* a century ago, the specific issues being debated today, while important on their own, are really about *something deeper and more significant*. [My emphasis.]²

As the following discussion will make clear, Hunter's assessment of the debates over the "content and character of public education," as "innocuous," no longer holds true once we begin to grasp the ways in which the pedagogical issues

not only in history education, but also gender and art, among others, have been central to the culture wars in the United States. Still, it is worthwhile to note his observation about the deep structure of the political unconsciousness underlying the contemporary culture wars.

Today the term “culture war” is perhaps most commonly associated with Patrick Buchanan, a journalist and Republican Party member. In 1990s, Buchanan began to speak publicly about the need to wage a “war” to defend against the challenges to the American people’s soul, tradition, and what he saw as the “core” values.³ Specifically, Buchanan’s declaration of “cultural war” was aimed at the policies advocated by the then President Bill Clinton and others. The Clinton regime promoted, for example, women’s reproductive rights, environmental protection, gay and lesbian rights, and women’s military enlistment as combatants. Buchanan not only opposed to these policies. Ideas about society and history underpinning Buchanan’s speech also recapitulated wider conservative reactions against the changes related to the end of the Cold War and the accelerating globalization since the late eighties. These changes included, for instance, the increasingly open borders for migration necessary for sustaining the U.S. economic life, the enforcement of the Constitutional separation of Church and State in public spheres, the administrative policy known as affirmative action that aimed to promote racial and other diversity, and the shifting organizations of gender, sexuality and family.

Put differently, the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century “culture war” in the United States has come about as backlash against the multicultural and multiracial diversification of the notions about what constitutes “America.” More fundamentally, it is a backlash against diversification and destabilization of such salient categories of personhood and identity as family, race, gender, sexuality, and more. Especially in the U.S. context, it has become increasingly clear that the reality of American families has departed from the Cold War era’s heteronormative ideal of white, middle class, patriarchal, and nuclear families consisting of a stable and heterosexual conjugal bond. “Culture war” has thus emerged as a battle over the nation’s normative values as well as the habitually assumed authenticity of its membership, culture, and ways of life. As I will come back to discuss later in more detail, the contestations over the National History --that is, the dominant ways in which history is narrated and remembered as a uniform experience shared by a national collectivity--have also been integral to “culture wars.”

“Culture wars” are not limited to the contemporary United States but have gained global intensity, especially since the end of the Cold War. “Culture wars”, or phenomena similar to them, have been witnessed in other liberal and highly industrialized nations, including Japan, France and Australia.

Since the mid-nineties, the prohibition of wearing a veil, or hijab, in French public schools, has constituted “culture war” over the traditional *laïcité* policy of the French Republic. The *Laïcité* policy has stipulated the removal of any

religious symbols from public offices and legislative affairs. The 2003 extension of the *laïcité* policy to the wider arena of public education generated heated debates among the various national constituencies. They included, for instance, the non-religious, mainstream French community, the majority of whom supported the application of the policy into secondary education, the liberal feminists, who saw the veiling practice exclusively as a sign of female subordination, and the Muslim community that regarded veiling as a way to defend its power and perform religious identity against the constant threat of its diminution within the dominant French society.⁴ What is ironic is that *laïcité* policy has originated in the nineteenth century liberal efforts to contain the influence of the church over the state affairs as well as to oppose the conservatives who had advocated Catholicism to become the France's state religion. Yet, against the backdrops of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century reconfiguration of the French nation, the insistence on upholding the universalist liberalism, as part of the country's authentic national tradition, has taken on an exclusionary meaning against people of particular religion (Muslim), race (non-white), and geographical origins (North Africa). This speaks to the same problem Etienne Balibar and others saw in the rise of new form of racism, namely, a mechanism of discrimination and exclusion in which the practices that appeal to the seemingly universal and common values tend to be regarded as morally superior, hence upheld as normative, especially in contrast to those concerns that are perceived to be particularistic.⁵

Likewise, we find in Australia a straightforward Buchan-like manifestation of "culture wars" waged against immigration and globalization. Former politician Pauline Hanson's 1996 speech at the House of Representatives has inaugurated a "culture war, the Australian version," so to speak. In her speech, Hanson reportedly spoke as follows:

I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians.... They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate.... [I]f I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country.⁶

Here, too, "culture war" has emerged as a backlash against the multicultural and multiracial diversifications of the ideas about the "proper way" of the Australian nation. It has emerged as battles over what is believed to be the nation's cultural authenticity and norms. Not unlike Buchannan and Hanson, Japanese politician Ishihara Shintaro, too, has gained popularity by capturing the general angst of the megalopolis and through fanning the urbanite's fear and apprehension about the nations' uncertain future as well as their precarious day-to-day existence.⁷

It would be misleading, therefore, to approach "culture wars" according to the Huntington-like notion of "clash of civilization." According to this view, cultures or civilizations must exist as mutually exclusive, internally coherent and

unified entities. Rather, what we find in the contemporary culture wars is the frustrations and anxiety of those who are newly disfranchised by neo-liberal political economy, as well as the displaced projection of such sentiments onto those elements that are perceived alien and transgressive. It is worthwhile noting that the scholars of colonial and postcolonial studies have invariably pointed out that the similarly compartmentalized notion of “culture” has served to facilitate the imperial technology of power and management of the colonies and the occupied people. In the contexts of American, British, French, Japanese and other colonialism and imperialism, such notion of “culture” was deployed to characterize and explain the ethnic, racial, and national categories of the governed as discreetly distinguishable and manageable.⁸

II. The “Enola Gay” Controversy and the U.S. “Culture Wars”

Despite their manifestations as intra-national controversies, it is important that we first recognize that “culture wars” in different national public spheres are in fact constituted through global and transnational forces. Debates over the National History, and the heated public debates around the memories of the nation’s past wars and atrocities in particular, do not only reveal how historical memories are integral to the “culture wars.” They also demonstrate how the struggles over the nation’s memories are always already constituted trans-nationally.

The American public debate, known as the “Enola Gay” controversy, over the commemorative exhibit the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum designed for the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the World War Two exemplifies the trans-national and trans-Pacific composition of what appeared a debate within a single national public sphere.⁹ Enola Gay is the name of the bomber that was used in the nuclear attack against the city of Hiroshima at the end of the war. When the blueprint of the commemorative exhibit plan put together by the Smithsonian Museum curators and staff was reported to the public, controversy broke out. In order to place the significance of the world’s first strategic use of the nuclear weapon in broader contexts, the exhibit plan in its early stage also included the longer historical context in which it happened--i.e. the military pre-history and aftermaths of Hiroshima bombing. For instance, the early exhibit plan contained references including the fifteen years of armed conflict since Japan’s invasion of China in 1930s, the fierce battles in Asia and the Pacific that ensued after the Japanese attack on Hawaii (which was the U.S. colony at the time) and the United States’ entry into the war against Japan, the bomb’s effects on the “ground level” in the immediate aftermath, the long-term aftereffects of radiation, and the nuclear arms race that ensued the so-called atomic age that the Enola Gay’s Hiroshima mission ultimately inaugurated. After over a year-long of debates, the controversy concluded in departing significantly from this comprehensive historical exhibit that the Museum had originally planned. In the end, all of the

following contents were eliminated: the details of debates among political leaders, scholars and military commanders over the decision to use the atom bombs, a large collection of photographs and descriptions of Japan's military invasions and Japanese atrocities committed in Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, the images showing physical and human damages in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the general observations about the subsequent development of the nuclear weapons proliferation.

The "Enola Gay" controversy was often represented and perceived as a clash between the "American" and "Japanese" historical memories. For the offended veterans and others in the United States, to hold compassionate sentiments toward the groundlevel suffering caused by the plane's military mission was understood as a position tainted by the "Japanese viewpoint." Likewise, in Japan, expressions such as "the gaps in atom bomb perceptions between the Japanese and the Americans" suggested that the clash of opinions was a national one. According to such nationalized narratives, the American people were uniformly represented as celebrating the use of nuclear weapon against Hiroshima as the nation's historical feat, while the Japanese were to condemn it as an atrocity committed against civilians.

It is tempting to reduce the disparity in how we interpret the meaning of historical events as indicating the difference in the national attitudes and perceptions--e.g. "the American way" versus "the Japanese mind." However, even a briefest glance at the history of anti-nuclear efforts would reveal that such nationalized explanation and understanding do not necessarily hold true. Some of the world's most vocal criticisms of the use of nuclear weapon against civilians come out of the United States, despite the fact that the dominant and official views may still hold it as a major achievement in history. Likewise, while the survivors and other citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have publicly condemned the United States for the use of nuclear weapons for many decades, the Japanese government has never officially voiced such criticism in international arena. Moreover, one fourth of the populations that perished in the immediate aftermath of the bombing in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of Korean descent. In other words, what appears a monolith of a nation's collective experience, historical outlook, and the sentiments it shares, are in fact always necessarily internally heterogeneous, contradictory, and transnationally constituted.¹⁰

More than anything, the Enola Gay controversy revealed the reality in which National History and memory are necessarily shaped by the movements of various factors across the national borders. During the Enola Gay debate, in order to make their position credible to the national audience, even those who criticized the museum staffs for having been compromised by the "Japanese" viewpoints, were obliged to make a trans-Pacific reference to the debates that were taking place in Japan.¹¹ They argued that, in order for the Japanese to apologize to other Asian countries for the invasion and wartime atrocities, the Americans need to remember their own national past correctly. Former Major General Charles W.

Sweeney’s testimony at the Senate public hearings emblemizes such trans-Pacific nature of the “Enola Gay” controversy. Citing Japan’s history wars concerning the so-called “comfort women” issue and human experiments on Allied POWs, he concluded: “In a perverse inversion, by forgetting our own history, we contribute to the Japanese amnesia, to the detriment of both our nations.”¹² Put differently, even the call for a pure, unadulterated and authentic memory of the nation’s past was already infiltrated by factors outside the national boundaries. It may be also worthwhile noting that the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was made possible by the initiative of the U.S. and other occupation authorities of the Allied Powers in the early fifties.

Rather than reducing the controversy into to a false binary of clash between two discrete national memories and cultures--i.e. the “Japanese” versus the “American”--what, then, might be a more adequate and productively critical way to approach this debate? The key to this question lies in the words of Dr. Martin Harwit, the former director of the Museum, who was forced to resign as a result of the controversy. At one point during the debate, Harwit portrayed the museum’s historical perspective as “more analytical, critical in its acceptance of facts and concerned with historical context.”¹³ The original exhibit plan tried to put the history of Enola Gay in a larger historical context before and after WWII. It attempted to render the historical object multivalent moral and historical meanings. And it was precisely this diversification and complication in the interpretations of history that some found too disturbing. In the official narrative of the U.S. National History, the nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been given a single, stable, and one-dimensional meaning: that is, the successful military accomplishment that ended the war quickly and saved millions of American and other lives. On the one hand, veterans and members of the Air Force Association, conservative politicians, and intellectuals desired to commemorate the important mission that led America to victory. They wished to memorialize the martyrs of their sacred war and to remember the atomic bombings through the mediation of the Cold War paradigm, which has justified the nuclear buildup to achieve and maintain the U.S. dominance. On the other hand, the original museum exhibit plan had aspired to remember the millions of victims of the war, including those killed before and by Enola Gay’s mission, those who have continued to suffer from radiation effects, and those who might in the future become victimized by yet another nuclear catastrophe. In other words, the “Enola Gay controversy” was a battle over the meanings of history. Those who resisted and made controversies out of the museum’s original exhibit plan had feared the changes posed to the established way of what, how, from which standpoint, and for what purpose the nation’s past is remembered.

The controversy revealed, among others, that the anxiety over the changing interpretations about the nation’s past was also intermeshed with fears against the innegligible and increasing presence of the new, alien and unfamiliar. Sweeney expressed this view as follows: to remember the Japanese as victims of the U.S.

atomic bombing is an “assault on our language and history by the elimination of accurate and descriptive words.... [fifty years ago,] the threat was clear, the enemy well defined.”¹⁴ The anxiety over the shift in the historical understanding was inseparably related to the changing image of the nation itself and the blurring of clear distinction between Self and the Other, us and them, the nation and its enemy. This also explains why those who opposed to commemorating Hiroshima attack not as a military glory but as an atrocity also made up a good part of the political constituency that has zealously promoted over the past ten years the anti-immigration policies, the abolishment of affirmative action, and the prohibition of same sex marriage. The fear and anxiety over the new and complex interpretations of history were inextricably tied to the resistance against the changing notions about family, gender, sexuality, as well as the race and boundary of citizenship that were increasingly becoming more complex, more diverse, less one-dimensional and less exclusionary.

The concerted attack on the museum’s originally planned exhibit had undermined and ultimately foreclosed the opportunity for critical thinking the exhibit might have fostered in its interrogation of assumptions about America’s national past and other accepted categories of social identities. It is in this sense that the Smithsonian controversy was more than a simple clash between the two nationalized memories but rather constituted an integral part of the U.S. “culture wars.”

III. Japan’s Battle over Memories

In Japan, similar debates about National History have become intermeshed with the discussions about gender and sexuality. I would like to focus particularly on the writings of Japanese revisionist historians, critics and politicians who have actively sought to whitewash Japan’s military and colonial violence. The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (*Atarashii Kyokasho o Tsukuru Kai*), or the Society hereafter, and its activities are particularly noteworthy in that they exemplify the way in which debates over historical justice have been linked to the backlashes against queer feminist politics and thus have come to shape the forefront of current culture wars.

The campaign led by the Society and its sympathizers, such as the Society of Concerned Junior Diet Members for Japan’s Future and History Education (*Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōkasho o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai*) is known for its vocal opposition to the representations of Japanese wartime atrocities in history textbooks.¹⁵ While threatening to whitewash Japan’s colonial and military histories, their members are also known internationally for their strident attack on queer feminist politics as well as the anti-feminist militancy against the transnational efforts for the Japanese government’s official apologies and state compensation for the so-called “comfort women,” or the survivors of the Japanese military comfort station system. Most recently, some of the diet members

involved in the campaign left the Liberal Democratic Party and created a new Party called, Tachiagare Nihon, literally translatable as “Get It Up, Japan.” Their campaign, for example, resulted in the censorship incident of an NHK program on the 2000 Women’s International Tribunal in Tokyo, a people’s international court that adjudicated Japan’s wartime military sex slavery. Through the subsequent investigations and lawsuits filed by the organizer of the Tribunal, the VAWW (Violence Against Women in War)-net Japan, it became clear that the supporters of the Society, as well as some members of the Society of Concerned Junior Diet Members--e.g. the two former Prime Ministers, Abe Shintaro and Aso Taro, and the late Foreign Minister Nakagawa Shoichi, among others--were involved in pressuring the NHK high administrators into changing the program’s original content. The detailed accounts and analysis can be found in the following edited volume: *Bangumi wa naze kaizan sareta ka*, or “Why was the program censored?” Edited by a group of concerned scholars and citizens, the volume has more than a dozen contributors and divided into three parts: the witness accounts of what actually happened to the program, analysis of broader structural condition that invites such a censorship, and commentaries on what can be learned from this specific incident, and what it means to contemporary Japan. I was personally involved in this NHK program and contributed two articles to this volume.¹⁶

Notably, the Society’s campaign has included the vocal opposition to the following gender-related measures that have gained increasing visibility in recent years: the administrative affirmative action that aims to promote the Japanese women’s equal participation and treatment in the public spheres; the so-called “gender free” curriculum that pedagogically intervenes to correct the damages and trauma caused by the impositions of normative gender ideals; and the “sex education” curriculum which aims to prevent sexually transmitted disease, unwanted pregnancy, and sexual violence. The members and supporters of the Society do not necessarily pay attention to the significant differences among the three measures or their ultimate objectives. Instead, they categorically condemn these administrative policies pertaining to gender and sexuality as serving to compromise patriotism and contributing to the Japanese loss of national pride. The Society thus links the issues of National History to the gender and sexuality issues in contemporary Japan.

From the Society’s perspective, there is little doubt that history textbooks that teach Japanese military atrocities and colonialism and the curriculum on gender and sexuality work in tandem to produce an abject national identity and prevents the Japanese from feeling “proud” about their nation. Yet, how could such two seemingly unrelated issues so inextricably be linked at least from the viewpoints of the Society’s members and its supporters? What is the logic that connects the two so seamlessly in their relation to the image of the nation, self, and identity? Elsewhere, I have discussed at length the psycho-historical complex that produced the connection among nationalism, misogyny, and racism.¹⁷ The Society’s patriarchal nationalism and misogyny can be located in the genealogy of the

racialized trauma of emasculation that resulted from the defeat in war and the American military occupation. These two experiences of psychological castration, so to speak, are also seen as symbolically summarized by the postwar Japanese Constitution that renounces use of military force to resolve international conflicts. The Society's anti-feminist discourse is thus an effect of the displacement of anxiety about deviance from normative manhood that resulted from such recent history of Japanese demilitarization. Yet, this is only one side of the story; it is too simple to reduce the Society's misogyny to gynophobia or hatred against all women. In fact, the Society and its supporters do not necessarily denigrate or exclude any and all women. Rather, what they fear and repudiate are women--and men for that matter--who do not subscribe to the gender identity and purity.

The cultural logic with which the Society attacks the self-reflective, self-critical history, while simultaneously assaulting the Japanese queer feminist politics, can be understood as identitarianism, an idea or attitude that assumes that cultural categories--such as gender, race, the nation, history, personhood, and indeed the notion of "culture" itself--ought to be viewed as pure, internally coherent, homogeneous, and discrete. The Society and its sympathizers chastise women and men who do not follow the identitarian logic of gender. Indeed, they criticize as vehemently those women who refuse to be mothers or wives as they attack men who do not willingly participate in the male-bonding predicated on male identity and its homosociality. Their violent reaction, therefore, is aimed at not so much the diminution of the ideal Japanese womanhood or femininity *per se* as those elements that challenge the stable category and identity of gender, as well as those critical thinking that might lead to further transgression of the gender and national norms.

Not unlike its American counterpart that lashed against the critical thinking promoted by the Smithsonian Museum's original script, the Society and its supporters oppose those elements that might threaten the purity and homogeneity of the nation and its history. Nishio Kanji, one of the core members of the Society, once criticized the efforts of historians in Korea, China and Japan who tried to work together to forge a multi-perspectival East Asian history that would be sensitive to different locations and experiences. Nishio opposed such effort, arguing that "there can be no easy sharing of historical awareness with other nations."¹⁸ Much like the opponents of the planned exhibit at the Smithsonian who attacked the museum curators' collaboration with citizens and historians in Hiroshima, Nishio advocates that Japan's National History and its memory should be narrated from a pure, homogeneous and one-dimensional perspective.

IV. Concluding Thoughts

Klaus Theweleit, a scholar known for his massive work, *Male Fantasies*, analyzed the cultural imaginations that supported anti-Communist fascism and totalitarian militarism in the early twentieth century Germany.¹⁹ Theweleit

observed that, under the process of generating ideal masculinity and femininity under the National Socialism, those elements that suggested ambiguity, fluidity, flexibility, chaos, hybridity, and suppleness, were methodically repudiated and turned into the target of condemnation, expulsion, and extermination. Such attributes were also elements of the racially marked differences of European Jewish men and women. At the same time, the fear against ambiguity and flexibility was not only projected onto those that stood for the society’ external others; it was also directed internally, to repudiate the alien, strange, and diverse elements that were constitutive of one’s self and identity.

It is on this point that I would like to close my paper by recalling what Hunter observed as “something deeper and more significant” underlying the contemporary culture wars. I hope the above argument made it clear that “culture wars” is *not* a Huntington-like clash between two or more discretely separate and mutually exclusive socio-cultural entities. Rather, “culture wars” can be most productively understood as emerging out of the tension between attitudes that advocate pure and one-dimensional images of self, society, and the nation, and those that aspire to the coexistence and intermingling of multiple and diverse composition of social identities.

As Theweleit’s study has eloquently demonstrated, the desire to eradicate ambiguity, transgression, chaos, and complexity is conducive to totalitarianism, self-hatred, repression, xenophobia, and genocidal impulse. Rather than assuming culture and history as pure, contained, and closed, we would be much better positioned if we were to view them as porous and flexible terrains of dialogues and negotiations. It is imperative that each and every one of us who engages in the study of culture and society join in that “culture war,” armored with the theoretical munitions that enable us to conceptualize culture, self, identity, and history as less contained, less static, less shielded, but instead, overlapping, transgressive, ever-shifting, and transnational.

Notes

1. “Tokushū gendai Nihon ni okeru bunka sensō,” *Impaction*, no. 147 (2005).
2. James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (Basic Books, 1992), pp. xi-xii.
3. For Buchanan’s famous 1992 Republican Convention Speech, see for instance, Roger Chapman, *Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Voices, and Viewpoints* (M. E. Sharpe, 2009), pp. 56-57.
4. For a succinct overview of the hijab controversy in the French liberal public spheres, see for example, Bronwyn Winter, *Hijab & The Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate* (Syracuse University Press, 2008).
5. Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” In Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. Chris Turner, trans. (Verso, 1991).

6. For Pauline Hanson's 10 September 2010 speech, see the following URL: http://www.australian-news.com.au/maiden_speech.htm (last accessed, September 1, 2010). Ien Ang's *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West* (Routledge, 2001) offers a succinct critique of the Hanson phenomena in Australia's official multicultural policy.
7. See, for instance, the aforementioned special issue of *Impaction*.
8. On colonialism and the notion of "culture," see especially Nicholas Dirks, "Introduction: Colonialism and Culture" in Nicholas Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (University of Michigan Press, 1992); for the U.S. transnational context, see Lisa Yoneyama, "Habits of Knowing Cultural Differences: *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* in the U.S. Liberal Multiculturalism." *Topoi* 18 (1999): 71-80.
9. For an in-depth examination of the controversy's transnational composition, see my "Critical Warps: Facticity, Transformative Knowledge, and Postnationalist Criticism in the Smithsonian Enola Gay Controversy." *positions: east asia cultures critiques* 5: 3 (Winter 1997): 779-809.
10. On transnationality of commemorative practices, Geoffrey M. White, "Remembering Guadalcanal: National Identity and Transnational Memory-Making." *Public Culture* vol. 7, no. 3 (1995): 529-555; and most recently, Christina Schwenkel, *The American War in Contemporary Vietnam: Transnational Remembering and Representation* "Indiana University Press, 2009."
11. See, for example, U.S. Committee on Rules and Administration, *Hearing: The Smithsonian Institution Management Guidelines for the Future*, 104th Cong., 1st sess, 11 and 18 may 1995, pp. 20-27.
12. U.S. Committee on Rules and Administration, *Hearing: The Smithsonian Institution Management Guidelines for the Future*, 104th Cong., 1st sess, 11 and 18 may 1995, p. 11.
13. Martin Harwit, "The Enola Gay: A Nation's and a Museum's Dilemma," *Washington Post*, 7 August 1994.
14. U.S. Committee on Rules and Administration, *Hearing: The Smithsonian Institution Management Guidelines for the Future*, 104th Cong., 1st sess, 11 and 18 may 1995, p. 12.
15. Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōkasho o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai, ed., *Rekishi kyōkasho e no gimon: wakate kokkai giin ni yoru rekishi kyōkasho mondai no sōkatsu*, Tentensha, 1997.
16. Media no Kiki o Uttaeru Shimin Nettowāku, ed., *Bangumi wa naze kaizan sareta ka: "NHK/ETV jiken" no shinsō*, Ichiyōsha, 2006.
17. "Sensō no katari to posuto-reisen no masukyuriniti" [Renarration of the War and Post-Cold War Masculinities]. In Tessa Morris-Suzuki, et. al., eds., *Iwanami kōza: Ajia/Taiheiyō sensō* [Iwanami Lecture Series: The Asia-Pacific War], vol. 1, "Naze, ima, Ajia/Taiheiyō sensō ka" [The Asia-Pacific War, Why Now?]. Iwanami Shoten, 2005, pp. 317-356.
18. See the following URL: http://www.tsukurukai.com/02_about_us/01_opinion.html (last accessed August 2005).
19. Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*. Vol. 2 *Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror*. Erica Carter and Chris Turner, trans. (University of Minnesota Press, 1989).