COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL PROCESSES: A MODEL WITH APPLICATION TO AMERICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

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In this essay I want to develop a political perspective on the role of communication technology (or media) in the American political process. A political perspective has been suggested at the broadest level by Harold Lasswell over 30 years ago.[1] But the full implications of a political perspective have not been developed. In part this is because of the deficiencies in Lasswell's formulation, and the retarding influence of the "behavioral revolution" in the political and social sciences during the 1950's and the 1960's. And in part it is because of the tacit technological determinism of much of the literature on the interaction of technology and social organization. In developing this political perspective on communication, I want to focus (in the third section of this paper) on the process of election campaign communication. I will review some of the recent literature on the process of campaign communication, and provide some empirical background to illustrate and apply the political perspective on communication technology.

1. Communication Technology and Social Processes

There seems to be an emerging consensus among scholars from a variety of disciplines about the potential role for new communication/information technology in a new social-political complex variously called "post-industrial society"[2] or "transindustrial society".[3] We hear about the "effects" of new technology and the technological "causes" of social transformation. But behind these expressions lie many complex and unresolved historical and theoretical questions.

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The issues revolve around the question of how plausible it is to assign a causal force to technology. The literature on communication and development poses the question of whether growth of the mass media systems in the Third World *generates* development or *reflects* development or modernization".[4] And the literature on communication and politics asks about the effects of the mass media on politics[5] or the necessary policy *responses* to the development of communication technology.[6] There are a number of versions of cause and effect in the relations between technology and society. One of the symptons by which we can recognize such views is the tendency toward the extremes of optimism or pessimism in their assessments of technology.[7] Technology is seen either as the leading force in a movement toward a utopia,[8] or as a force for evil and distortion in social relations, with a life of its own.[9] It is my thesis and hope that the *limits* of these views are becoming more widely recognized. We *can* speak meaningfully of the effects of technology and of the causes of technological development. But such expressions must be placed within the framework of human knowledge and human purpose. We must constantly remind ourselves that technology is a kind of human knowledge[10] and that it is human purposes which provide the form and direction for social life. Edwin Parker sketches the basic idea with respect to communication technology:

> The communication system of any society, and the technology that makes that system possible, should not be thought of as either a cause or an effect of other aspects of the society. Rather, it should be thought of as an integral component of that social structure, without which the society itself would be quite different in a large number of respects.[11]

Let us trace briefly the convergence on this "interactionist" view in two areas of research on communication and politics. One of the most widely noted and elaborated theories of modernization was Daniel Lerner's 1958 volume, *The Passing of Traditional Society*.[12] Lerner's theory describes the process of modernization in terms of four interrelating influences: urbanization, literacy, mass media exposure, and participation (which includes both economic and socio-political participation). In its barest form the theory states: "increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media

exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)"[13] In giving a positive and independent role to media exposure in the causal complex leading to modernization, this approach seems to imply that the mass media inherently support modernization, and thus modernizing leaders in their political and economic tasks. Governmental policy to control the media (for these modernizing leaders) would be a technical task of implementing the widest possible expansion of the mass media.

It is now being recognized, however, that policy for communication technology is not a mere technical matter, because communication technology is not an independent "causal" factor in modernization. According to one scholar "we are learning. . . that all too frequently expansion of the mass media means ensconsing in power that portion of the traditional elite that understands the winds of change sufficiently to bend them to its own purposes."[14] As a case in point, Lerner himself cites Nasser's use of radio broadcasting in Egypt. In 1958 Lerner quoted Nasser as saying that radio had changed the political equation more quickly than a long term literacy program could:

> Today people in the most remote villages hear of what is happening everywhere and form their opinions. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world.

But Lerner now notes that Nasser's expectations for quickly transforming older patterns of leadership and governance were premature. "In very many villages, the community receiver was attached to the mosque and its operation was controlled by the imam."[15] The use of "modernizing" technology by traditional political forces is not limited to passive resistance, as the Iranian case shows. The audio cassette played an important and much publicized role in Khomeini's shaping of a mass base for the "revolution". Thus it seems difficult any longer to assign an independent causal role to communication technology in the process of modernization and support for modernizing leaders. Instead of saying that communication technology generates or reflects modernization directly as cause or determined consequence, we see that the technology and its uses reflect the political choices and tendencies in a political system.

Changes in the distribution of political power, then, are not a direct

consequence of the introduction of new communication technology. In a similar vein, we can note that it was several centuries after the development of the printing press before it became widely implicated in the social and political transformation of Europe. There was, first of all, a series of parallel technological changes which prepared the way for new uses of printing.[16] But new social and economic processes were in motion also, setting the conditions of purpose and resources which directed the modern development of newspapers. As Lerner notes:

> The fact is that all those centuries were needed to develop a new class of people who could use the technology . . . . Needed was a new class of lierate people who could read a daily newspaper. These literates then needed to have an extra penny to spend for a newspaper. They also needed to be motivated to want to spend their penny on information rather than on cakes and ale.[17]

Media magnify the voices of those with sufficient power to gain access to and control over the technology. But, as just noted, those voices are not communicating unless there is an audience - and this too depends on social, economic and, finally, political developments. This point leads us to consideration of the last several decades of behavioral research on mass media audience "effects".

Much of the research on the effects of mass media has been caught in the cycle of causal relations between media exposure and various behavioral and psychological effects. Research on political communication in the 1920's and 1930's developed out of a classical/rhetorical methodology, and was dominated by social/political concerns of the researchers. These early studies more clearly saw technology as a tool, subject to the benign or malignant purposes of its users. They were concerned about the use of the mass media by non-democratic forces, such as Fascists or demagogues like Father Coughlin. This early view "pictured political propaganda as having great persuasive impact, primarily because of wily tricks of the trade performed upon gullible audiences who were entirely captive and unable to defend themselves."[18]

During the 1940's and 1950's, however, sociologists, psychologists and political scientists began a line of research which created the "conventional wisdom" or dominant belief that the mass media have very limited

FIGURE 1

CONTIGUOUS EXAMINATION OF THE APPEARANCE OF SELECTED BENCHMARK ELECTION, VOTING, AND MASS MEDIA STUDIES WITH THE GROWTH OF THE POLITICAL USE OF TELEVISION



1 Parentheses: sample location; dashed line: year data was gathered; solid line: year of publication.

2 Pertinent to campaigns and elections only. Excluded are Army - McCarthy Hearings (1954); Kefauver Crime Hearings (1951); Presidential News Conferences (1953); Ervin Watergate Hearings (1973); etc.

3 Sources: Census data.

4 Median hours projected from Roper data; see, *An Extended View of Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media.* A Report by the Roper Organization, Inc., Television Information Office, New York, 1971.

effects in politics in general, and in election campaigns in particular. The most influential research was a series of election studies done by sociologists and political scientists, based on the elections of 1940-1960 (see Figure 1).[19] The sociologists where only indirectly interested in the media. Their primary concern was shaping a sociological explanation for voting behavior.[20] The outlines of the theory they developed is succinctly summarized by Swanson:

> The sociological account holds that voting choices are rooted in demographic circumstances of voters, group and ethnic identifications, and interpersonal networks of acquaintances, none of which can be effectively altered by a political campaign.[21]

Studies by political scientists added other concerns to the research, leading to a theory in which political attitudes and identifications (such as party preference) isolate the voter from campaign influences and provide the variables necessary for a causal theory of behavior.

> The attitudinal account suggests that voters' sociological features lead to an enduring identification with a political party. That identification, which cannot be reversed within one campaign period, provides the basis upon which short-term attitudes toward candidates and issues in particular campaigns are formed and, thereby, determines voting choice on election day.[22]

The conclusion with regard to the mass media was that it is typically "a contributory agent . . . in a process of reinforcing the existing conditions".[23] This conclusion, that mass media merely reinforce existing conditions was reassuring to those concerned about the short term potential of propaganda. But here we want to note that this research is framed in terms of the media as independent technologies or forces. The content of the messages, and the purposes of the senders, are pushed to the background.

The major new element in recent research has been the appearance of a number of studies which present a challenge to this dominant position.[24] These studies find some evidence of a more important role for short-term factors in the explanation of voting behavior. The implication for studies

of communication and politics seems to be that mass media *can* have an "effect" on voting behavior. The problem of adequately conceptualizing such effects, however, remains. In an influential review of the relevant literature Kraus and Davis suggest that research may converge on a "transactional" model of communication effects. This model begins with a different concept of the audience, reinstating the notion of purpose. The audience in this model is composed of "users" of communication media - for a purposive audience is consistent with an audience open to influence.

> In this model the flow of influence does not simply come down from sources of mass communication. The messages from these sources are only part of the process. Influence also is grounded in social situations. These situations teach individuals the value of carrying on certain transactions with the mass media and in some cases reward individuals for carrying on these transactions. Media influence can be created or destroyed from the 'top' or from the 'bottom'. [25]

In our review of research on mass media and politics, we can see that a common flaw in the models developed in the 1940's and 1950's follow from excising the notion of intention and purpose - the political purposes which are formed in the seeking and use of power in the Third World, and the purposes of audiences who enter into media transactions during election campaigns. This excision of purpose was consistent with the behaviorist model dominant at the time. Harold Lasswell offered a convenient model for describing the communication process with the question: "who says what, how, to whom, with what effect?" The bias in this question is the direction of attention away from purposes of communicators. The audience is not granted the active purposive role in the process which would be focused by the question "who *hears* (sees, etc.) what, how, from whom, with what effect". And attention is focused away from the social and political processes the communicators are implicated in. As Raymond Williams notes:

> Suppose we rephrase the question as 'who says what, how, to whom, with what effect and for what purpose?' This would at least direct our attention to the interests and agencies of communication, which the orthodox question excludes.[26]

The main purpose of this review has been to show the failings of a view which takes communication technology (mass media) out of a socio-political context and treats it as a determinant or (sometimes counter-acted) cause of behavioral or social consequences. The reinstatement of purpose noted above, however, is only the first step in developing a full political perspective on communication technology. It is necessary now to sketch the outlines of a view which allows us to speak of the causes and effects of communication technogy and mass media, while recognizing the role of human intentions and purposes in the social processes of communication.

2. A Model of the Political Economy of Communication Technology

A model of the role of communication technology in the political process must account for both large scale (macro) social processes and the (micro) social processes which are involved in the immediate situation of the users. The transactional model introduced above is based on a recognition that the audience of mass communications uses the media to satisfy certain needs and wants.[27] There is thus a reciprocal interaction between the demands of the audience and the demands of the communicators. The audience's wants and needs are shaped even as it uses the media; influence is an interactive process.

At the macro level, the purposes reflected in the mass media are those of the organizations which developed and which now control access to the technology. Williams concludes his discussion of the uses and effects of television technology as follows:

> How the technology develops from now on is then not only a matter of some autonomous process directed by remote engineers. It is a matter of social and cultural definition, according to the ends sought. . . . Most technical development is in the hands of corporations which express the contemporary interlock of military, political and commercial intentions. Most policy development is in the hands of the established broadcasting corporations and the political bureaucracies of a few powerful states.[28]

Others have chronicled the techniques[29] and stakes[30] in the political struggle to shape the uses of communication and information technology.

We must recognize here also that just as the audience is affected as it uses the media, so also are the communicators (the media organizations as well as the potential users of their technology) affected by their use of the technology. To give a political example, it is clear that the composition of political party organizations is affected by the extent and type of use of mass media. Political scientist Dwaine Marvick notes "the encroachment of public relations men as specialists in mass-communication's campaign problems into the campaign-planning circles of American party leadership at all levels . . . . "[31] This perspective is especially important in considering the role of communication technology in the political process. Communication is, first of all, central in the political processes of legitimation, social control and promotion of the public good. There is a need to control and direct the process of technological development in the public interest. But the technology of communication itself is at the center of the process of control. There is a reciprocal relationship between the control of technology and technology's effect on the very organization (the state) trying to control it.

In addition, we must add to our model a recognition that the policy process is a power process, a process of conflicting interests. The public good is not always equivalent to the interests of private groups; and there are general interests (such as safety and health) which transcend private interests of the economic sector. A number of scholars, however, are not optimistic about the ability of our governments to impose public criteria on the development and use of communication technology. According to R. J. Goldman and D. Wedemeyer,

> Up to this point, the advancement into this information era has been guided by actions primarily predicated upon the configurations and capabilities of technologies and the economic market place. But these forces are not sufficient to design or control a society's future. Societies are learning that technical and economic development are not synomymous with improvements in the quality of life. These traditional control mechanisms fail to consider many human needs and rights which do not lend themselves to analysis as marketable attributes. Protecting societal values, in this instance, becomes the responsibility of public policymakers.[32]

Looking to the future, J. Pelton is not optimistic:

> The likelihood remains that technology and the management techniques of multinational enterprises will continue to outstrip the abilities of governments and international organizations to control them.[33]

We must ask from where might a demand for assertion of public criteria in the control of communication technology come? And how does this relate to the demand for criteria attuned to the private processes of economic production?

This complex of factors in a model of the role of communication technology in the political process can be simplified in the diagram below(Figure 2). This diagram shows that there are sources of demand for the use and development of technology in both the polity and the economy. In the economy, first of all, demands are generated in the process of capital accumulation and production, which may or may not approximate the free market place which Goldman and Wedemeyer believe has generated the leading demand forces. Demands are also generated in the political processes of a society. The process of legitimation is at its basis a communication function which cuts across the governmental and non-governmental processes of politics.[34] Non-governmental political activities through which demand for the use and development of communication technology are generated include election campaigns, political party activities, and interest group activities. Governmental processes through which demand is generated include organizational maintenance (e. g. communication in Congress, and communication among and within the bureaucracies), social and economic regulation, social and economic subsidy (from paying the telephone bills of welfare recipients to maintenance of AT&T's monopoly), and military uses and development of communication technology. We should also recall that the core of the political process is revealed in the conflict of public and private criteria for technology use and development in the interaction between political and social-economic processes.

Once developed or used, the consequences of the technology become important. These consequences should be analyzed, as argued above, in terms of transactions between communicators and audiences, and in terms of the consequences of adoption of a technology for its users. And, again, as we have argued, these consequences should be interpreted against the

FIGURE 2



background of the purposes of communicators, audiences and those involved in generating effective demand for the technology. Finally, we should note that the consequences of using a technology, for communicators or audiences, are related to the generation of demand in political and economic processes. For example, the creation of party organization increasingly dominated by media experts has put a financial strain on the political parties relying on these expensive techniques. One response to this problem has been the development of new communication techniques in fund-raising, such as the direct-mail solicitation perfected by the conservative Richard Viguerie. Another was the limit on campaign spending imposed on those presidential candidates who accept public funds. The first response (or consequence) involved generation of demand from the political sector, and the second involved regulation of demand from the political sector.

3. Uses of Communication Technology in American Election Campaigns

In this section I will illustrate and apply this perspective with materials on American election campaigns. The treatment will not illustrate all aspects of the model. Although more time and resources are expended on elections in the U. S. than in any other country, this aspect of the political process has not been significantly involved in generating demand for the *development* of new communication technology. So our treatment will deal only with interpreting the demand for use of various communication technology, and its consequences for the political process.

The major studies which shaped the conventional wisdom on the political effects of the mass media were studies of the presidential elections, from 1940 to 1960. This focus is in part due to the central symbolic sig-

nificance of the presidential election in the process of political ligitimation. But it also is due to the simplicity of the behavioral variable (voting) and the concentration of communication resources on a single objective. Because the study of electoral communication has received such a large portion of the attention of researchers, and because the American electoral process attracts the attention, concern or amusement of a worldwide audience, the focus in the following sketch is on communication in election campaigns.

Newspapers and similar periodicals were an important communication tool in the establishment of the first political parties in Europe.[35] The transformation of the political party into an instrument for democratic political participation coincided with the spread of literacy in the 19th century. In the United States, this occurred well before the creation of electronic means of communication. Political parties in the U. S. have been decentralized, but their primary function has been to mobilize and integrate local populations into the larger patterns of cosmopolitan and national concerns.[36] The combination of party newsletter and organizational communication channels (committee meetings, caucuses, conventions, etc.) were shaped into a highly effective "machine" for controlling election outcomes in local areas and cueing the electorate to the concerns of the national elite.

> There is evidence that during the nineteenth century the parties were engaged in propaganda and political socialization activities on a scale which knows no parallel today. This intense activity seems to have been closely related to the quasi-monopoly which election campaigns and the partisan press of that period had on entertainment prior to the development of other mass media, and also to the relatively extreme frequency of elections and variability in election dates which existed prior to about 1880.[37]

Although mass membership parties of the European type never developed in the U. S., the parties acquired a national character, with the telegraph, telephone and radio transmitting messages from national and international arenas made smaller by the drastic improvements in transportation. In the twentieth century the party press has disappeared, and the political campaign is no longer the central form of entertainment.[38]

The broadcast media, now including television, have played an important role in the evolution of the campaign process. Personal organizations and finances have taken their place alongside the parties, and have displaced them in many aspects of campaign communication.[39] And both organizations have seen communication and public relations specialists acquire places of prominence and influence, along with pollsters specializing in feedback communication.[40]

According to Joseph Napolitan, a professional campaign consultant, there are two basic types of campaign plans: (a) the organizational type and (b) the electronic media type.[41] This may be true at the extremes; but in general, most campaigns for state and national office use a combination of organizational and media channels in a balance suited to the particular campaign plan. Communication channels vary in a number of respects that affect their usefulness in a campaign. They vary with regard to: (1) the sense affected; (2) the opportunity for feedback; (3) the degree of audience control over attention to the messages; (4) the manner of coding messages; (5) whether a message can be preserved or is transitory; and (6) how the media can be combined in networks of reinforcement.[42] None of the channels available today in the campaign political communication process is superior to others on all of these dimensions. So combinations of channels are designed for specific aspects of the campaign. We can get an overview of the use of the various channels from the following chart (Figure 3).[43] The chart shows the attentiveness of the electorate to various media in Presidential campaigns from 1952 to 1972.[44]

The performative basis for a candidate's campaign communication (and that of the campaign organization) is getting the candidate elected.[45] This fact leads many to view the election as a contest rather than an electoral decision. This model of a contest is sometimes idealized as a policy debate, with the campaign communication interpreted as rational persuasion of the electorate on policy issues. But the actual content of much of the news coverage of the campaign reports on the election much the way it reports on sports contests.

A better model for the total campaign would be a judicial model. The candidates are advocates who marshall evidence and arguments in order to persuade the jury - the electorate - to decide in their favor. But within

the campaign, candidates must deal with the process by which media institutions filter campaign communications and construct the news presented to the public. And these institutions find it difficult to present a campaign as an advocacy process or debate on substantial issues. Studies have repeatedly shown that both newspaper news coverage[46] and political advertisements[47] focus more on the candidate and his personal qualities than on issues. Other studies have found that in newsreporting for both newspapers and television, journalists tend to treat the election as a

FIGURE 3
Attentiveness to Campaign Media: Presidential
Election Years, 1952-1972.



*Numerical Summary:
A: Magazines (40%, 31%, 41%, 39%, 35%, 33%)
B: Newspapers (79%, 68%, 80%, 79%, 75%, 57%)
C: Radio (70%, 45%, 42%, 49%, 40%, 42%)
D: Television (51%, 74%, 87%, 89%, 89%, 88%)
E: Personal Contact (17%, 30%)

power contest between the candidates rather than a pre-decision argument on policy issues. In a study of the 1974 Congressional election weekday coverage of 3 national television networks, 3 national magazines and 3

national newspapers, John Carey states:

> Among all topics discussed in press coverage of he election campaign, references to strategic questions about the campaign itself had the highest news value. The press was concerned with evaluating how the campaign was going; what techniques and strategy a candidate was using; where he currently stood in the polls, and whether he had moved up or down since the last poll. Treatment of these topics was analogous to the color commentary in a professional football contest.[48]

A study of press coverage of the 1976 Presidential campaign found that half or more of the election news coverage dealt with the election as a game or contest.

> Winning and losing, strategy and logistics, appearance and hoopla were the dominant themes of election news. The election's substance, on the other hand, received only half as much coverage as was accorded the game.[49]

Let us begin our review of campaign communication practices with direct interpersonal contact. This is still considered the most effective type of communication. Most studies show a high correlation between interpersonal contact with a campaign representative and voter interest, knowledge and eventual turnout on election day. It seems that Americans consider such contact as a sign of a candidate's or party's respect for popular authority, for contact by a stranger at party headquarters is also effective in increasing interest and turnout.[50] The political rally is still a basic component in the campaign communication process. But its function has changed somewhat with the use of televison. Political rallies communicate several messages, in various ways. First, a rally in a state may show a presidential candidate's concern for a particular region, state or issue. In the 1980 election, for example, Reagan held large rallies or gave speeches to large conventions in the south (to show his interest in the region) and in the mid-western farm states (to focus on his opposition to Carter's grain-embargo). Second, a rally provides the visual effects that are important for getting access to free television newscoverage. The same speech given at a quiet dinner meeting would not get film footage on national television. Third, the rally helps to crystallize a candidate's

character and his ability to relate to the people in the minds of the electorate - both those present and those who read or hear about it or see it on television. We can conclude, then, that although interpersonal contact remains an important form of campaign communication, its extent, form and function have been altered as the size of constituencies have grown and various communication technologies interposed between candidates, parties and the electorate.

Turning to the electronic media, we can begin with an assessment of television.

> Television has spawned four major changes in traditional American politics: 1) It has altered the process of nominating candidates at party conventions; 2) It has altered campaigning; 3) It has helped to encourage questioning of the traditional ways of choosing and electing candidates, and as a consequence, will aid in ushering in the new politics of the future.[51]

The financial impact of television, noted above, can be seen in statistics on expenditures in presidential election campaigns. Expenditures on broadcasting (most of it for television) rose to over $28 million in the 1968 campaign. But after the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971. expenditures for broadcasting in the 1972 election were reduced to less than $20 million, with each candidate spending less than allowed by the law.[52] At lower levels, there is wide variation in the extent of use television. In the race for Governor of Virginia this year, Gov. Jay Rockefeller set national records for expenditure on broadcasting in a gubernatorial race. On the other hand, senatorial candidates have been shown to spend only 20 percent on broadcasting.[53] There are a large number of factors which affect the extent and type of use. An important one is beliefs about the effectiveness (persuasiveness and contribution to image construction) of particular presentations. It was believed, based partly on the research on communication effects, that attempts to persuade through campaign commercials were likely to be ineffective. So, much effort and attention has been devoted to getting coverage on news broadcasts. This emphasis has shaped a tense relationship between campaign officials and journalists. But recent research has begun to alter the balance in this assessment. Patterson and McClure[54] found that news broadcasts have a smaller

impact on information about an election than was supposed, while campaign commercials have a larger impact than was previously thought. If we consider the transaction involved, the reason becomes clearer. Candidate coverage on news broadcasts was thought to be effective because of the viewers' belief in the disinterested nature of news presentations. This framework of disinterest might be thought to have the effect of disarming the voter, lowering the resistances established in selective exposure and selective perception, and giving the voter visual images relevant to construction of the desired candidate image. Journalists, however, have attempted to curtail the manipulative aspects of this relationship by their ability to difine what sort of an event they are reporting. Instead of reporting the events of a campaign, as part of a process of persuasion preceeding the electoral decision, journalists have tended (as noted above) to treat the campaign as a horserace or sporting event. Thus, because of the risks of involving the audience as (vicarious) *participants* in the campaign events they depict, the journalists mediate a relationship as announcers of a sporting event providing descriptive commentary for the *spectators*. This sort of mediation reduces the impact of newsbroadcasts. Campaign specialists have been sensitive to the dynamics described here, it seems, for they are reported to develop "meta-campaigns" to take advantage of these tendencies among journalists. If journalists report on the "inside" strategies used in the contest, campaign personnel take the journalists "behind the scenes", revealing enough information to persuade journalists (and through them, the electorate) that their candidate has a sound strategy and is thus an effective campaigner.[55]

We have noted earlier that radio has declined in terms of the percentage of the public who use it. (See Figure 3) Kraus and Davis go so far as to say that "radio is no longer a medium which affects voting behavior to a significant degree."[56] There is still a strong demand among campaigners for radio time, however. A practitioner, Tony Schwartz, gives a number of reasons.[57] On the average, Americans still listen to radio 21 hours per week. Radio is also less expensive than television. But there is one feature of the development of radio technology, and the patterns of use, which give the medium unique advantages in broadcasting. Because the capital cost of establishing a station is relatively small, and the spectrum is carefully restricted and protected, many radio stations are avail-

able in most regions. Many of these stations have established specialized audiences in their attempts to maintain a faithful listening audience. Because of these tendencies, candidates can tailor their messages more carefully to particular audiences. For example, it is said that in the 1976 Florida primary election, Jimmy Carter broadcast special messages on stations broadcasting spirituals and soul music (appealing primarily to a black audience), attempting to appeal to the black audience without alienating whites. Thus, the role of radio technology can be understood in the context of the particular purposes of the candidates, as they interact with the purposes of those who have shaped the development of the technology, and those who have shaped its use in the economic processes.

We have seen here that the use of communications technology has significant consequences for the organization and methods of campaigning. And the interactions among the purposes and resources of campaign participants (candidates, organizations, journalists and audiences) create a complex pattern of use for each medium. The task of charting the political role of communications technology has just begun. Most attention has been devoted to prospective social changes which might be facilitated by new technology. The new technology has inspired much fear as well as much utopian speculation. We have only begun to understand how various techniques and technologies are suited to particular political functions, and how their use may transform the political process, even as we intend to use it to reinforce existing processes. I have tried to move a step forward here. Specifically, I have attempted to illustrate *demand* processes by showing that the way radio and television technology are used in the American socio-economic process has shaped the particular type of demand for their use in the political process. And I have tried to illustrate the *consequences* of the development and use of communication technology by showing the interaction of the technology and political party organization.

(January 14, 1981)

NOTES

1. "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in Lyman Bryson (ed.),

The Communication of Ideas (N. Y.: Cooper Squire, 1948), pp. 37–51.

2. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (N. Y.: Basic Books, 1973).
3. Willis W. Harman, *An Incomplete Guide to the Future* (San Francisco, Calif: San Francisco Book Co., 1976).
4. Fredrick Frey, "Communication and Development,"in Ithiel De Sola Pool, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Communication* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 337–461.
5. Sidney Kraus and Dennis Davis, *The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976).
6. Glen O. Robinson (ed.), *Communication for Tomorrow: Policy Perspectives for the 1980's* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1978).
7. See Bernard Gendron's discussion of "Utopian" and "Dystopian" views on the interaction of technology and social forms in *Technology and the Human Condition* (N. Y.: St. Martins Press, 1977).
8. In addition to Bell, op. cit., see R. Buckminster Fuller, *Utopia or Oblivion* (N. Y.: Bantam Books, 1969), Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964), and Arthur Clarke, "Communications in the Future," in Jib Fowles (ed.), *Handbook of Future Research* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 637–52.
9. Gendron classifies thinkers as diverse as Jaques Ellul (*The Technological Society*), George Orwell, Herbert Marcuse (*One Dimensional Man*), and Theodore Roszak as "dystopian". Op. cit.
10. Gendron defines technology as "any systematized practical knowledge based on experimentation and/or scientific theory, which enhances the capacity of society to produce goods and services, and which is embodied in productive skills, organization, or machinery." *Technology and the Human Condition*, p. 22.
11. "Technological Change and the Mass Media," in *Handbook of Communication*, p. 619.
12. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press).
13. Ibid., p. 46.
14. Richard L. Merritt, "Political Science: An Approach to Human Communication," in Richard W. Budd and Brent D. Ruben (eds.), *Approaches to Human Communication* (N, Y.: Spartan Books, 1972), p. 328.
15. Both quotations are from Lerner, "Technology, Communication and Change,"in Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *Communication and Change* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 293.
16. See Morse Peckham, *Beyond the Tragic Vision* (N. Y.: George Braziller, 1962), pp. 25–27, and the discussion by Alvin Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (N. Y: Seabury, 1976), ch. 4.
17. "Technology, Communication and Change," p. 288.
18. David O. Sears and Richard E. Whitney, "Political Persuasion," in *Handbook of Com-*

munication, p. 254.

19. Taken from S. Kraus and D. Davis, *The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior*, p. 49.

20. This is emphasized by Lee B. Becker, Maxwell E. McCombs and Jack M. McLeod in "The Development of Political Cognitions," in Steven Chaffee (ed.), *Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), pp. 21-63.

21. "Political Communication: A Revisionist View Emerges," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 64 (1978), p. 211.

22, Ibid., pp. 211-12.

23. Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 8. For a review of this "reinforcement" theory see Dan Nimmo, *The Political Persuaders* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 167-79.

24. For a review of several of these studies, see Swanson, op. cit.

25. Kraus and Davis, *The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior*, p. 143.

26. *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (N. Y.: Schocken, 1974), p. 120.

27. Research developing this line of thought is referred to as "uses and gratifications" research. See J. Blumler and E. Katz (eds.), *The Uses and Gratifications Approach to Mass Communication Research* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1974).

28. *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*, p. 134.

29. For example, Herbert Schiller's, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (N. Y.: Kelley, 1969), *The Mind Managers* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), and *Communication and Cultural Domination* (White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976).

30. For example, Anthony Smith, *The Politics of Information* (London: Macmillan, 1978), and *The Geopolitics of Information* (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1980).

31. "Communication in Political Parties," in *Handbook of Communication*, p. 741.

32. "Identifying Potential Communication Issues in an Information Society," in Alex S. Edelstein, et al. (eds.), *Information Societies: Comparing the Japanese and American Experiences* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1978), p. 175.

33. "Probing the Information Societies: What the U. S. and Japan Can Tell Us About the Future," in *Information Societies*, p. 44.

34. German social philosopher Juergen Habermas has made the process of legitimation the core of his critical theory of politics. See *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

35. Hans Daelder, "Parties, Elites and Political Developments in Western Europe," in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Prin-

ceton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 43-78.

36. Samuel P. Hays, "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum," in W. N. Chambers and W. D. Burnham (eds.), *The American Party System* (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 152-181.

37. W. D. Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," in W. N. Chambers and W. D. Burnham (eds.), *The American Party System*, p. 279.

38. Dwaine Marvick, "Communication in Political Parties,"p. 735.

39. The increasing use of primaries for candidate selection at all levels of government is also important in this development.

40. Ibid., p. 741. See quote above, pp. 13-14.

41. *The Election Game and How to Win It* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1972).

42. Dan Nimmo, *Political Communication and Public Opinion in America* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear Pub. Co., 1978), p. 163.

43. Compiled from charts and data in Norman Nie, et al., *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), ch. 15; and Dan Nimmo and Robert Savage, *Candidates and Their Images* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear, 1976), ch. 6.

44. The figures for personal contact are a composite of personal conversations and contact by telephone. It seems probable that most of the increase is accounted for by more extensive use of telephones.

45. By performative basis, I mean the assumption which tells us what the communicator is *doing*. Whatever might be said, we assume that it is oriented from the candidate's perception of how to get him/herself elected.

46. Doris Graber, "Personal Qualities in Presidential Images: The Contribution of the Press," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 16 (1972), pp. 46-76.

47. R. G. Humke, et al., "Candidates, Issues and Party in Newspaper Political Advertisements," *Journalism Quarterly* 52 ((Autumn, 1975) 499-504.

48. John Carey, "How Media Shape Campaigns,"*Journal of Communication* (Spring, 1976), p. 52. An index of news value was constructed from measures of attention and emphasis. The topic with the highest news value index for all media (TV, newspapers and magazines) was labeled "Evaluative statement about how campaign is going". Second in rank for the "all media" index was "Campaign strategy/techniques".

49. Thomas Patterson, "The Miscast Instution: The Press in Presidential Politics," *Public Opinion* (June/July, 1980), p. 47. A complete treatment of this extensive study will be found in Patterson's *The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose a President* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1980).

50. In Japan, by way of contrast, it appears that interpersonal contact is through known intermediaries. And face-to-face contact is curtailed by the prohibition on door-to-door canvassing.

51. Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, *Polls, Television and the New Politics* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1970). On presidential nominations and the mass media, see James D. Barber (ed.), *Race for the Presidency: Mass Media in the Nominating Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978).

52. Nimmo, *Political Communication and Public Opinion*, p. 167.

53. See Edwin Diamond, *The Tin Kazoo* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), for a report of this study by Richard Cole.

54. *The Unseeing Eye: The Myth of Television Power in National Politics* (N. Y.: Putnam, 1976).

55. See James Carey, "How the Media Shape Campaigns", op. cit.

56. *The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behavior*, p. 70.

57. *The Responsive Chord* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974).