

U. S. FOREIGN & DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1970s: IMPROVED TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA

YOSHIMITSU MIYAKAWA
Nanzan University

I. Introduction

Some of logical consequences of the new defense strategy and the Nixon Doctrine which were both formulated during the first year of the Nixon Administration are as follows: the full normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China [PRC] (January 1, 1979); the subsequent termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (the end of 1979); the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (August 12, 1978); the withdrawal of American ground combat forces from South Korea, which was announced to be held in abeyance on July 29, 1979 by President Carter; and Japan's deepened defense cooperation with the United States.

This essay is to give a brief description of the origins and the nature of the Nixon Doctrine and the new defense strategy — the “one-and-one-half-war” strategy—and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and its meanings for Japan.

II. A New Era of U. S. Foreign and Defense Policy

When President Nixon took office in 1969, the foreign policy subscribed to by America since the end of World War II was on the wane. “A New Era” of American foreign policy and defense strategy was now being drafted. What required the United States to re-define its foreign and defense policy for a new era?¹⁾

First, the European nations and Japan were emerging in the arena of international politics as major economic powers and very potent competitors of the United States, with political vitality and national self-confidence, so that they were strong enough, on the one hand, to run

counter to American interest and, on the other, to begin to share responsibilities for the international political situation.

Second, the once monolithic Communist world was shattered, resulting in the growth of power of individual Communist nations with two centers—one in Peking and the other in Moscow.

Third, the Third World powers were emerging. There was a marked disparity in power among them. They represented a new surge of nationalism and increasing independence and self-confidence to the world political scene.

Fourth, once the United States had enjoyed a superpower status with a monopoly and overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons by possessing two military capabilities: (1) effectiveness and credibility of second strike capability against nuclear attack by another country; and (2) the intervention capability of deploying its military forces for combat almost anywhere in the world.²⁾ The United States had been the only nation which possessed these two capabilities. However, the Soviet Union also came to possess second strike capability and was then moving forward in developing its intervention capability. Furthermore, the People's Republic of China acquired nuclear weapons.

Fifth, the "isms" lost their vitality in the world of politics toward the end of the 1960s.³⁾ That is to say, the era of ideology seemed to be dying away.

Sixth, many Americans were not unified; their morale was not very high; they lost confidence in what their Government had been pursuing since the end of World War II. Particularly, the Vietnam War caused very deep and serious division at home, and many domestic problems, such as poverty, violence, racial prejudice, and urbanization, were waiting to be solved. There was an increasingly growing, fully understandable feeling among Americans that they had taken on a disproportionate share of global problems and that other peoples should share this burden with them.

In sum, internationally the world changed drastically, moving from bipolarity to multipolarity. The consensus cemented by the Cold War consciousness was destroyed.⁴⁾

III. Reassessment of U. S. Foreign Policy—The Nixon Doctrine

The years of American primacy since the end of World War II were a period in the past. Under these circumstances the United States was required to reassess its postwar foreign policy. Dr. Henry Kissinger, the architect of Nixon's foreign policy, indicated the necessity of U. S. foreign policy assessment in saying: "An important task facing the government is that of creating a new foundation of theory for the foreign policy of the United States. We have reached a time when the notions by which we were guided in the postwar period are dying away."⁵⁾ This, to be sure, was the most urgent task that the Nixon Administration had to face. The result of this effort to create a new foundation of U. S. foreign policy materialized as the so-called "Nixon (Guam) Doctrine."

Prior to Nixon's trip to Asia in the summer of 1969, he and Henry Kissinger discussed how to relate American intentions to the concerns of allies and friends, particularly in Asia, over the new strategy under the Nixon Administration. On July 18 Henry Kissinger outlined the Administration's philosophy for a post-Vietnam Asia in a backgrounder at the White House:⁶⁾

The issue of the nature of commitments in the United States often takes the form of a discussion of legal obligations. But on a deeper level and on the level that has to concern the President, the relationship of the United States to other countries depends in part, of course, on the legal relationships but more fundamentally on the conception the United States has of its role in the world and on the intrinsic significance of the countries in relationship to overall security and overall progress.

What we do want to discuss is, as I pointed out, how these countries visualize their own future because, as one looks ahead to the next decade, it is self-evident that the future of Asia, Southeast Asia, which we will be visiting, will have to depend not on prescriptions made in Washington, but on the dynamism and creativity and cooperation of the region. We remain willing to participate, but we cannot supply all the conceptions and all the resources. The initiative has to move increasingly into that region. For that reason, it is important that we consider our views of their future.

About a month later, President Nixon on a stopover during his trip to Asia gave an off-the-record press conference on the island of Guam, in which he made two points clear: (1) the United States intention to keep

all its treaty commitments, and (2) the United States encouragement that Asian nations themselves should take responsibilities for their military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons. And he went on to note: "I want to be sure that our policies in the future all over the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the rest, reduce American involvement."⁷⁾ So July 25, it is safe to say, marks the date in which the U. S. shifted its stance after twenty years of unchanged postwar foreign policy.

In his remarks at Guam, President Nixon for the first time introduced a new element into U. S. foreign policy towards Asia. From now on, the U. S. would maintain a lower profile. This initial fruit of the Nixon Doctrine has its seed in his essay in the October, 1967, issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Nixon writes:

I am not arguing that the day is past when the United States would respond militarily to Communist threats in the less stable parts of the world, or that a unilateral response to a unilateral request for help is out of the question. But other nations must recognize that the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future. To ensure that a U. S. response will be forthcoming if needed, machinery must be created that is capable of meeting two conditions: (a) a collective effort by the nation of the region to contain the threat by themselves; and, if that effort fails, (b) a collective request to the United States for assistance.⁸⁾

In this citation he hinted at the necessity of revising American foreign policy principles established by the idea of containment, as seen for example in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of 1947, to cite just a few documents. To be sure, in a drastically changed world the United States needs a "policy for a world it can neither escape nor dominate."⁹⁾ Such kind of a possible policy is the Nixon Doctrine, because the doctrine is not aimed at isolationism, nor at withdrawal of U. S. forces, but at a reduction of U. S. involvement, discarding the idea of policing the world, and guarding its own national security interests. "The Nixon Doctrine," Nixon writes in his *Memoirs*, "was not a formula for getting America *out* of Asia, but one that provided the only sound basis for America's staying *in* and continuing to play a responsible role helping the non-Communist nations and neutrals as well as our Asian allies to defend their independence."¹⁰⁾

After all, the Nixon Doctrine is a product of an idea based on a balance of choice. This can be justified in President Nixon's remark: "Let us not . . . pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home."¹¹⁾ That is to say, his policy is one based on apparent world trends and the weariness on the part of Americans to overextend their commitments clearly produced in the protracted war in Vietnam. The United States, Nixon states, "cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace,"¹²⁾ and "the way to peace is not by giving up our friends or letting down our allies."¹³⁾ In order to build a structure of world peace, the United States is not permitted to have any intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before the United States is to formulate a policy or a doctrine with a thought of "how we can be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace."¹⁴⁾

IV. Three Elements in the Nixon Doctrine

The new doctrine seeks to reflect four possible realities: (1) a major American role in foreign affairs remains indispensable; (2) other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities; (3) the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines; (4) the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.¹⁵⁾ Based on these realities apparent in the world, President Nixon clearly formulated first in his Vietnamization speech of November 3, 1969, and secondly in his Foreign Policy Report of February 18, 1970, the Nixon Doctrine containing the following three elements as guidelines for new U. S. foreign policy:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, the United States shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with it or of a nation whose survival it considers vital to its security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression the United States shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with its treaty commitments. But the U. S. shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹⁶⁾

In order to carry out the new direction in U. S. foreign policy under the Nixon Doctrine, three basic principles are required as guiding prin-

ciples: (1) a partnership which guides U. S. relations with all friendly nations; (2) strength; and (3) a willingness to negotiate.¹⁷⁾ With these three guiding principles, the Nixon Doctrine aims at animating all the fields of U. S. foreign policy in its economic, defense, negotiating, and global postures.

V. Okinawa Reversion in harmony with the Nixon Doctrine

U. S. foreign policy toward Japan under the Nixon Doctrine aimed at forcing Japan to reassess the importance of its ties with the United States in a drastically changed world—particularly in the face of the possible realization of the Sino-U. S. rapprochement, the subsequent easing of tensions in East Asia, and forcing Japan both to play a more autonomous role in world affairs and to create a more reciprocal and equal relationship with the United States.

In his 1970 message on U. S. foreign policy President Nixon articulated the importance of Japan within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine as follows:

Our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts to help other Asian nations develop in peace. Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asian.... A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our common effort to secure peace, security and a rising living standard in the Pacific area.¹⁸⁾

Around the end of the 1960s Japan was approaching a turning point of great importance in its relationships with the United States. In the economic field, Japan had emerged not only as the largest overseas trading partner of the United States but its largest competitor. To be sure, Japan was considered to be a great and leading industrial as well as an economic power—the third economic power in the world. It was natural that Japan as a leading industrial nation should desire a more “independent” foreign policy. There was the “growing nationalistic urge in Japan to get out from under America's shadow.”¹⁹⁾

On the part of the United States, frustrated by the protracted war in Vietnam, there was felt a growing need to re-define American commitments abroad.

On both sides of the Pacific Ocean, opinion leaders and intellectuals began to put emphasis on the growing need for Japan and the United States to formulate and conduct a realistic foreign policy in response to

the changing realities at home and abroad. Edwin O. Reischauer writes:

American policies toward Japan must be formulated in the light of Japan's potential role in Asia and the sensitivities in Japanese-American relations. There is no reason for the United States to oppose either of the ground swells in Japan toward lessened dependence on American military defense and greater independence of American foreign policy. Only a Japan that feels independent of American domination in foreign policy will be able to see clearly the basic identity of Japanese and American interests or will be able to be an effective element in a multiple balance of forces in Asia. If a lessening of dependence on American military defense helps the Japanese gain this sense of independence of American foreign policy, this would be a helpful step.²⁰⁾

Richard Nixon wrote about the relations with Japan in *Foreign Affairs* in October, 1976:

Looking toward the future, one must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major power to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the ties Not to trust Japan today with its own armed forces and with responsibility for its own defense would be to place its people and its government under a disability which, whatever its roots in painful recent history, ill accords with the role Japan *must* play in helping secure the common safety of non-Communist Asia.²¹⁾

At the same time. Richard Nixon never forgot to write about the importance of the U. S. role in Asia, in concert with the importance of Japanese role in regional security:

Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism. And they are not alone; there is a tendency in the whole Western world to turn inward, to become parochial and isolationist—dangerously so. But there can be neither peace nor security a generation hence unless we recognize now the massiveness of the forces at work in Asia, where more than half the world's people live and where the greatest explosive potential is lodged.²²⁾

To a great extent, America's Asian policy under the Nixon Doctrine was directed towards Japan. "Japan's partnership with us," President Nixon said, "will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine."²³⁾ In response

to the growing nationalism manifested in the pressures in Japan for reversion of Okinawa and in order not to worsen the American defense relationship with Japan, the Nixon Administration decided to re-examine its policy toward Japan, listing Okinawa among the priority issues to be examined.

By the way, the problem of Okinawa had been pointed out by several opinion leaders and intellectuals both in Japan and the United States. In 1967, for instance, Edwin O. Reischauer wrote as follows:

There is one problem in our defense relationship with Japan, however, that has become more serious over the last few years. This is the problem of Okinawa, or the Ryukyus. The more that Japanese self-confidence has recovered, the greater has become the problem of American military administration over the million Japanese inhabitants of these islands The demand for full reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration, however, will inevitably keep growing Today this constitutes perhaps the gravest problem in Japanese-American relations.²⁴⁾

In 1968 he also wrote, "We shall either continue to have a friendly defense relationship with Japan and bases in both Japan proper and Okinawa, if these are needed, or we shall have effective bases in neither and a hostile Japan to boot." He went as far as to write "It is high time that we solved the Okinawa problem. The islands must be returned to Japan by 1970, or at least a clear, early date for their return must be fixed by that time."²⁵⁾

Before Richard Nixon's inauguration, the problem of Okinawa was apparently a "problem of *when* and *how* rather than of *what*," and if a mutual agreement as to when and how Okinawa should be returned to Japan was not made before 1970, it was likely that this problem would result in a deterioration of Japanese-American relations.²⁶⁾ On April 25 at a Review Group meeting and on April 30 at an NSC meeting, it was decided that under the Nixon Doctrine the Government would encourage Japan—the keystone of U. S. Pacific policy—to play in place of the United States a larger political role to some extent in a post-Vietnam Asia, and to make moderate increases in Japan's defense capability, even though the United States would not apply pressure on Japan to develop substantially larger forces. To be sure, the Nixon Administration hoped that the return of Okinawa could "serve as an incentive for Japan to assume greater

responsibility for Asian stability and defense."²⁷⁾ President Nixon wrote in his State of the World message for 1970 that "we chose the second course [the strengthening of our relationship with Japan over a long term] because our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts to help other Asian nations develop in peace."²⁸⁾ Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States wanted Japan to involve itself into the framework of U. S. military strategy as an equal partner.

As the 1960s drew to a close, there was growing a new nationalism in Japan. The Japanese wanted less dependence on American military defense and greater independence from American foreign policy. They were also urging for diplomatic activities in order to acquire international tutelage more proper to the economic power of the country itself. These movements were being supported for two reasons. The escalation of the Vietnam War gave rise to a dissatisfaction among most of the Japanese people with the security treaty relations with the United States. And about twenty years of national efforts had brought their country to the status of the third economic power in the world.

A new nationalism had produced a consciousness of "autonomous defense," which meant that the Japanese should have its own defense capabilities, while still under the American security umbrella. In October 1970, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Director General of the Defense Agency, made public a paper called *Nippon no Boei* [Defense of Japan]—Japan's first White Paper on Defense. He supported a buildup of an "autonomous defense capability" for the Self Defense Forces. The basic concepts were: (1) All military strategies are exclusively defensive; (2) Japan will take an independent or autonomous defense position under the Japan-U. S. Security system; (3) Japan will formulate a concept of a "non-nuclear medium sized nation" with appropriate defense responsibilities.²⁹⁾

Japan was willing to play a gradually growing significant role in Asia without assuming security responsibilities outside of her land within the framework of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty system. The article written by Kiichi Aichi, then Foreign Minister, is significant enough to understand the intention on the part of the Japanese Government to involve itself in a new relationship with the United States under the Nixon Doctrine by the materialization of the reversion of Okinawa to its sovereignty. His article reads: ³⁰⁾

Obviously a simple transfer of peacekeeping responsibilities in Asia from the United States to Japan is out of the question because of Japan's constitutional limitation and the great disparity in both actual and potential military power between our two countries.

... it is reasonable to assume that for some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing presence of American deterrent power to counter effectively any designs for large-scale military adventures in the area.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces are now making an important contribution to the keeping of the peace in East Asia because of the vital role they play in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan. As a result, the American military presence is able to devote itself to the ultimate mission which it alone is equipped to perform: the deterrence of major war. This same division of labor will be applicable to Okinawa, after reversion, when Japan will be prepared to assume full responsibility for local security against aggression.

VI. Okinawa Negotiations

On January 21, the day after Nixon's Inauguration, Henry Kissinger ordered an inter-agency study of U. S. policy toward Japan, particularly Okinawa. After several meetings the Nixon Administration arrived at an understanding that the reversion of Okinawa was "politically imperative," even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that U. S. Okinawa bases were inestimably valuable from a military and strategic point of view.⁸¹⁾

The Administration worked so fast that by the end of April it achieved a consensus on the major principles regarding U. S. and Japanese relationships. It was agreed that Japan was the cornerstone of U. S. Asian policy, that it must be a fundamental objective by the U. S. to make the relationship strong, that the United States would seek to continue the Security Treaty without amendment after 1970, and that the U. S. would encourage Japan to play a larger political role in Asia and to make moderate increases in its defense capability, though the U. S. would not put pressure on Japan to develop substantially larger forces.

An agreement was made with regard to these major principles at an April 25 Review Group meeting and President Nixon approved them at an April 30 NSC meeting.⁸²⁾

What is important is the problem of Japan's assumption of greater responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in Asia. This problem was summed up by Alex Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and a former Ambassador to Japan: "If properly handled, our reversion of Okinawa could serve as an incentive for Japan to assume greater responsibility for Asian stability and defense."³³⁾ On May 21 Takezo Shimoda made an emphatic response to Henry Kissinger, who discussed Japan's view of its future role in Asia along this line. Shimoda agreed that Japan would willingly assume Asian responsibilities to a far greater degree, if the Okinawa problem were settled in 1969.³⁴⁾

In June, 1969, the Okinawa negotiations were formally and diplomatically commenced between the two countries. Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi set forth Japan's basic positions concerning the reversion, which are cited above in his *Foreign Affairs* article. And in late July in Tokyo Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Kiichi Aichi discussed the problem of reversion to Japan of administrative rights over Okinawa. On August 3, Rogers confirmed in a press conference that the United States in principle had agreed to turn over Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty³⁵⁾

Under the Nixon Doctrine and through the Okinawa negotiations, the United States was successful in drawing Japan into the framework of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty system. A joint statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon on November 21, 1969, is nothing more than a statement of Japan's positive participation in the U. S. Asian policy based on the Nixon Doctrine. In connection with this, Rogers' statement before the hearings on Okinawa reversion treaty on October 27, 1971, is significant. He testified to the effect that the United States was going to maintain its interest in Asia and in the Pacific area, and that it was going to continue to play a very important role in the area, even though it could see an increasingly important role for Japan to play. He went on to say that "We hope and expect that Japan will play an increasingly important role in Asia. I have referred to the military aspects of increased budget for military purposes with Japan proper," and that in larger framework of international political environment the Okinawa reversion "would be a further step in carrying out the principles of the Nixon Doctrine."³⁶⁾

At the same hearings, Rogers answered that "under the terms of the

treaty, Japan has agreed to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa against outside attack.... Well, they will develop a military capability on Okinawa which does not now exist."³⁷⁾ When asked whether Japan would have to increase her military forces in order to meet the capability to take her responsibility to defend Okinawa, Rogers replied that "there will have to be an increase and they are prepared to do that."³⁸⁾ Thus the Okinawa reversion marked a turning point in the post-World War II Japan-U. S. relations. It opened the door to Japan's gradual strengthening of its Self-Defense Forces in two ways: by taking on the responsibility of the defense burden once assumed by the United States, and by serving as a sort of impetus for Japan's gradual development of its own security, independent of the United States.

VII. New Defense Strategy—One-and-One-Half-War Strategy

The Nixon Doctrine is a product on a global scale of the new U. S. defense strategy. During most of the 1960s, prior to the Nixon Administration the United States nominally had planned forces for a "two-and-one-half-war" strategy, the two major wars being the one in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the other one between the United States and Chinese-supported forces in Asia.³⁹⁾ According to this strategy, the United States was expected to maintain enough forces to defend NATO for three months against the Soviet Union, to defend Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale attack from the People's Republic of China, and to cope with a minor contingency.⁴⁰⁾

A reexamination of the military strategy undertaken by Henry Kissinger and his staff produced the finding that this strategy was ineffective and that above all it was beyond U. S. capability, because the force levels the "two-and-one-half-war" strategy required had not been reached, and particularly because the strategy was found to have been based on an unrealistic assumption—a possible simultaneous attack by both the PRC and the Soviet Union despite the Sino-Soviet conflict or "demonstrable antagonism between the two major Communist powers."⁴¹⁾

Recognition of the strife between the PRC and the Soviet Union made it possible for the Nixon Administration to establish the "one-and-one-half-war" strategy. President Nixon reported: "The prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both

because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U. S. conventional forces."⁴²⁾

President Nixon, based on Henry Kissinger's recommendation of October 2, 1969, decided to adopt a "one-and-one-half-war" strategy—Strategy 2 which "would maintain forces capable of either a NATO initial defense or a defense against a full-scale Chinese attack in Korea or Southeast Asia. That is, we would not maintain forces to fight on a large scale in Europe and Asia simultaneously."⁴³⁾ President Nixon reported:

In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "one and one-half war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peace-time general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.⁴⁴⁾

The adoption of the "one-and-one-half-war" strategy meant that the United States military policy did not see the People's Republic of China [PRC] as a principal threat, and that it distinguished the purposes of the PRC from those of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁾ This change in attitude toward the PRC was made public in the President's first Foreign Policy Report on January 18, 1970, two days before the Warsaw meeting: "The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community. In the long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than 700 million people. . . . many of our basic interests are not in conflict [with the PRC]. . . . it is certainly in our interests, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking."⁴⁶⁾

In formulating the "one-and-one-half-war" strategy, the U. S. took advantage of the conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union, even though President Nixon did not express which side he would take in the conflict.⁴⁷⁾ However, his Administration was in favor of the PRC against the Soviet Union.

A new national security strategy of realistic deterrence was spelled out, which was designed to prevent wars "by furthering the President's goal of building a viable structure of peace based on adequate strength,

true partnership, and meaningful negotiations."⁴⁸⁾ *Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace: Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* and *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973: National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* show that the new strategy is named the National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. According to the reports, its aim is "to discourage—and eventually to eliminate—the use of military force as a means by which one nation seeks to impose its will upon another," and it seeks to "deter war, but insures adequate capabilities to protect our nation and its interests should deterrence fail."⁴⁹⁾

The strategy is also based on the central thesis that the United States will take part in the defense and development of allies and friends, but it cannot—and will not—"conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world."⁵⁰⁾

Based on this aim and thesis, the United States is determined to provide adequate military forces so that it may deter war with its friends and allies.⁵¹⁾ In other words, the three key elements of which the Nixon Doctrine consists require a new defense strategy, in which the three basic criteria for national security planning are established.⁵²⁾

1. Preservation by the United States of an adequate strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.
2. Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces if deterrence should fail.
3. An International Security Assistance Program that will enhance self-defense capabilities throughout the Free World, and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional cooperation and/or security agreements among friends and allies of the United States.

These three basic criteria are implemented by four guidelines: (1) In deterring strategic nuclear warfare primary reliance will continue to be placed on U. S. strategic deterrent forces; (2) In deterring theater nuclear warfare the U. S. also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities; (3) In deterring theater conventional warfare—for

example, a major war in Europe—U.S. and allied forces share responsibility; (4) In deterring subtheater or localized warfare, the country or ally which is threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower, but when U. S. interests or obligations are at stake we must be prepared to provide assistance as appropriate.⁵³⁾ In other words, the United States expects or asks its allies and friends to share the burdens of defense by enhancing partnership, one of the three guiding principles under the Nixon Doctrine.

VIII. Improved Sino-U. S. Relations and Deepened Japan-U. S. Military Cooperation

The establishment of full diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States was made on January 1, 1979. It was a logical consequence of the Nixon Doctrine and the new military strategy, which also took into consideration the Sino-Soviet strife. Also as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, there has been a growing awareness of the importance of Japan-U. S. relations, military, political, and economic, in order to assure the security and stability in East Asia. The Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation agreed on November 27, 1978, have opened the door for joint planning and exercises and greater cooperation in many key defense areas. To cite one example of such joint exercises, on October 23, 1979, Maritime Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Yohei Ogawa announced that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would participate in a joint mid-Pacific naval maneuver to take place in spring, 1980, by the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.⁵⁴⁾

Mike Mansfield, U. S. Ambassador to Japan, said on June 16, 1978, "you know that the United States and Japan are much more to each other than economic partners and competitors. *We are military allies joined in a mutual security treaty* which is vital to the preservation of security and stability in Northeast Asia."⁵⁵⁾ [Emphasis added].

To sum up, United States foreign and defense policies formulated and executed under the Nixon Administration and continued by Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter have produced improved trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and the People's Republic of China, to the favor of the United States, in East Asia. Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said in

his speech "Changing Perspectives of U. S. Policy in East Asia" on June 16, 1978:

From the standpoint of security, the strategic balance that exists today among the four most powerful countries in the region[East Asia]—China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States—is clearly in our nation's interests. Although important differences remain with Peking, it is fair to say that the United States, China, and Japan share an interest in maintaining that stability—a significant and hopeful change from the pattern of the past half century in which U. S. Far Eastern policy constantly required us to choose, in effect, between China and Japan. This situation, true only since Henry Kissinger's 1971 trip to Peking, has created dramatic new opportunities throughout Asia. It is one of our main tasks not to lose these opportunities—which are diplomatic, strategic, political, and economic—through inattention, inaction, or misunderstanding.⁵⁶⁾

Notes

1. Richard Nixon, *U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1970), pp. 2-3.
2. Statement of Samuel P. Huntington in *National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1972), p. 106.
3. Nixon, *ibid.*, p. 3.
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, says that "By the time President Nixon assumed office the American consensus on foreign affairs was a thing of the past." ["U. S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 4 (July 1973), p. 709.]
5. *The New York Times Magazine*, June 1, 1969, p. 54.
6. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 222-223.
7. Richard Wilson, ed. *Setting the Course: The First Year Major Policy Statements by President Nixon* (New York: Funk & Magnalls, 1970), p. 307; *Public Papers of the United States: Richard Nixon* (Washington, D. C. : GPO, 1971), pp. 548, 549, 552, 554.
8. Richard Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1 (October 1967), p. 114.
9. Huntington, *ibid.*, p. 107.
10. Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: A Filmways Company, 1978), p. 395.
11. President Nixon's June 4, 1969, speech at the Air Force Academy in *Nixon: The First Year of His Presidency* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1970), pp. 66-67.

12. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, p. 6.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
15. Richard Nixon, *U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1971), p. 11.
16. President Nixon's November 3, 1969, speech in *Nixon: The First Year*, *ibid.*, p. 96; Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, pp. 7, 55-56; *Public Papers: Nixon*, *ibid.*, pp. 905-906; On December 7, 1975, President Ford delivered a speech at East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, after his trip to the PRC, Indonesia and the Philippines. In it he reaffirmed fundamentally the Nixon Doctrine by saying that American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and that the United States has the responsibility for assuming a major role in maintaining Asian peace as a Pacific nation. [*Wireless Bulletin*, no. 118 (Tokyo: American Embassy, 1975).]
17. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, pp. 4-13.
18. Nixon, *ibid.*, p. 58.
19. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Transpacific Relations," *Agenda For the Nation*, ed. Kermit Gordon (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1968), p. 437.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 438; See also: Philip W. Quigg, "Japan in Neutral," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 2 (January 1966), pp. 253-263; Nobusuke Kishi, "Political Movements in Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 1 (October 1965), pp. 90-99; George R. Packard III, "Living with the Real Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1 (October 1967), pp. 193-204; Henry Owen, "Foreign Policy Premises for the Next Administration," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 4 (July 1968), pp. 699-712; John K. Emmerson, "Japan: Eye on 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 2 (January 1969), pp. 348-362; Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 3 (April 1969), pp. 509-520.
21. Cited in Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 331; Nixon, *Asia*, *ibid.*, p. 121.
22. Nixon, *Asia*, *ibid.*, p. 123-124.
23. Richard Nixon, *U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping A Durable Peace* (Tokyo: American Embassy, 1973), p. 100.
24. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Our Dialogue With Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 45, no. 2 (January 1967), pp. 225-227.
25. Reischauer, "Transpacific Relations," *ibid.*, p. 440.
26. John K. Emmerson, "Japan: Eye on 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 2 (January 1969), pp. 358, 360.
27. Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 328.
28. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, p. 58.
29. *Nippon no Boei [Defense of Japan]* (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1970), pp. 12-41; This White Paper has a passage which reads: "Japan possibly can possess small nuclear weapons if they are within the framework of minimum necessity for defending its own country and if they do not exercise a threat of aggression upon other countries from a legal—constitutional—viewpoint, but it cannot do so. (p. 36.)

30. Kiichi Aichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 1 (October 1969), p. 31.
31. Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 327.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 327-328.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
36. *Okinawa Reversion Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1971), pp. 25, 7.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
39. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1978), p. 40.
40. *Ibid.*; Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, pp. 128-129; Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 220.
41. Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 221.
42. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, pp. 128-129.
43. Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 221.
44. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, p. 129.
45. Kissinger, *White House Years*, *ibid.*, p. 221.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 688-689; Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, pp. 140-141.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Melvin R. Laird, *Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace: Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1971), p. 1
49. Melvin R. Laird, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973: National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1972), p. 2.
50. Nixon, *New Strategy*, *ibid.*, p. 6.
51. Laird, *Annual Defense Department Report*, *ibid.*, p. 4.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 23; Laird, *Defense Report*, *ibid.*, p. 15.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
54. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 24, 1979, p. 1.
55. *Press Release*, no. 12R (Tokyo: American Embassy, 1978), p. 4.
56. *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 78, no. 2017 (August 1978), p. 2.