

THE IMMIGRANT AND THE MACHINE:  
AN EVALUATIVE HYPOTHESIS

Ichiro Iwano

Department of British and American Studies  
Nanzan University

INTRODUCTION

In his book, *Our Country*, which sold more than 175,000 copies in thirty years since its publication in 1885, the Reverend Josiah Strong expressed fears and anxieties of the dominant segment of American society—the WASP's—in the 1880's who felt they were gradually being engulfed by the invasion of the "rabble," i.e., the so-called "new" immigrants:

Immigration tends strongly to the cities, and gives to them their political complexion. Many American citizens are not Americanized. It is unfortunate as it is natural, that foreigners in this country should cherish their own language and peculiar customs, and carry their nationality, as a distinct factor, into our politics.<sup>1</sup>

Strong argues that immigration created the "Catholic vote," the "German vote," and the "Irish vote" and that "popular government in the city is degenerating into government by a 'boss' who makes his bargain, and sells his ten thousand or fifty thousand votes as if they were so many cattle."<sup>2</sup> If these tendencies continue, Strong concludes, "the election may be decided, and the policy of the government may be reversed, by socialist, or liquor, or Roman Catholic or immigrant vote."<sup>3</sup>

What Josiah Strong feared, however, did not turn out as he predicted and the "rabble" were absorbed into the American populace and contributed, as Professor Michael Parenti pointed out, "massively to an industrialization that transformed America from a rural to an urban civilization. As voters they gave strategic support to an era of federal activism, thereby helping to move the nation toward new public commitment."<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the "melting pot" did not fuse all the different ethnic groups into one to make a distinctively new race of Americans, and still ethnicity is one of the important aspects of American life today. Because of anti-immigration sentiments in America, the door was finally closed in the mid-twenties, but the fact remains that almost 27.6 million people who migrated to the United States during the period from 1880 to 1930 still remained in and were absorbed by the United States.

How and in what way were these immigrants absorbed? the answer to this question has been given by many scholars and when political integration of these immigrants is discussed, there still exists a certain tendency of dismissing the "machine" and its "boss" as "vicious" and "immoral" within urban politics who preyed upon the "miserable" immigrants. But in the light of their absorption into American society and upward political mobility, it seems necessary to reevaluate the role of the machine in providing an avenue of political acculturation for the immigrants. This short essay has the aim of giving a hypothetical evaluative view of the function of the political machine to help the immigrants with their integration into American society.

## I. THE "NEW" IMMIGRATION: SOME STATISTICAL ASPECTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

As is often pointed out, in about 1880 the ethnic and national origin of the immigrants to the United States began to change drastically. This is the so-called shift from the "old" immigration to the "new." Up until the 1880's those who came from the Northern Europe including Great Britain, Ireland, Scandinavian and other northwestern countries and Germany constituted more than seventy percent of the total immigrants.<sup>5</sup> However, the 1890's witnessed tremendous shift of the ethnic

and national origin: those who came from Northwestern Europe constituted less than half (49.4%) and those from the Central, Eastern and Southern European countries such as Poland, Russia and Italy tripled from mere 16% to 47.5%.

The first decade of the twentieth century indicated another drastic statistical change. The number of those who came from Northwestern Europe declined both in absolute number and percentage and the inflow from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe increased tremendously: from 1.75 million to 5.82 million in number and from 47.5 to 70.9 in percentage. It is safe to say that this trend of massive inflow of the "new" immigrants continued up until the immigration restriction measures became effective in the mid-twenties although there was a sharp decline of immigration itself during the First World War.

According to the statistics on immigration taken since 1820, the number of immigrants to the United States totaled 47,497,532 up to 1976. The number of sharp increase by decade occurred in the 1880's, which coincided with the shift from the "old" immigration to the "new." Until 1880 the number of immigrants totaled about 10.2 million but the number of immigrants from 1881 to 1930 totaled 27.6 million. This fact implies that the shift from the "old" immigration to the "new" not only was the change of ethnic and national origin but also addition of a huge number of new stock to American population. The statistics of nativity and percentage of the white population around the turn-of-the-century era exemplified this aspect of population from a different angle. For example, in 1900 the percentage of foreign born white and native white who had foreign parentage were 15.3 and 15.9 respectively.<sup>6</sup> This means that about one third of the population at that time was either the immigrant or his offsprings.

This situation of mass immigration to the United States brought about problems of integration. Whereas a large proportion of the "old" immigrants were Protestants except Irish Catholics and some German Catholics, the religious affiliation of the "new" immigrants were mainly Catholic, Jewish and Greek Orthodox. At the same time, as the inflow of the "new" immigrants coincided with the age of urbanization, industrialization and disappearance of the frontier, they remained mainly in the large metropolitan area on the east coast and became factory

workers, shopkeepers etc., i.e., the so-called urban masses. Religious, cultural and occupational differences between the "old" immigrants and the "new" constituted friction between them and rising racism and reviving nativism paved the way to immigration restriction.<sup>7</sup>

It would be incorrect to assert that all the immigrants to the United States remained there and became citizens. Indeed, "during the 8 years from 1908 to 1915, total of 2.3 million aliens departed from the United States, most of whom were undoubtedly dissatisfied or homesick Italians, Poles, Germans etc."<sup>8</sup> However, the number of immigrants during the same period was more than 7.0 million and the rest, i.e., almost close to 4.8 million remained there and gradually integrated into the populace of the United States. The problems and process of their integration are matters which have hitherto attracted many scholars in almost every discipline; sociology, economics, history, religion and politics.

When we discuss "political" integration of the immigrants, especially "new" immigrants, we cannot overlook the role of the political machine. Professor Makoto Saito pointed out:

Through distributing personal and daily profits such as aid to application for naturalization, job hunting, and aid to the sick to the huge masses of immigrants to the unknown country and getting their massive votes in exchange for their amenities and patronages, the machine exerted a huge influence upon municipal and local politics. ... With drastic increase of immigrants in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the machines and bosses thrived tremendously by utilizing votes of immigrant groups as their assets, and constituted a great factor of corruption of municipal and local politics in America. Indeed, the machine and corruption are closely associated, *but we should not overlook the fact that the existence of machines had a kind of a function of social welfare for the newly arrived immigrants to a cruel and cold competitive society, or a kind of humanizing function in a dehumanized society.*<sup>9</sup>

However, the machine was not so highly evaluated at the time when the "new" immigrants arrived. "The picture of the boss and the machine in the late nineteenth century," as Professor John M. Allswang pointed out, "remained pretty consistent. The machine politician was

corrupt, and entirely self-serving."<sup>10</sup> Did foreign observers of the machine and the boss in urban politics share the same picture at the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century?

## II. THE MACHINE AND THE FOREIGN OBSERVERS: JAMES BRYCE AND MOISEI OSTROGORSKI

Two observers from Europe were impressed with the machine and its operation in this period: James Bryce from the Great Britain and Moisei Ostrogorski from Russia. Bryce's highly acclaimed two-volume study of the United States, *The American Commonwealth*, was published in 1888 at almost the same time when Josiah Strong's *Our Country* was published. Since its publication Bryce revised several times, but the main argument remained as it was in the original edition.

Most of the second volume of his book was concentrated on the nature of American party system. Observing the organization and work of party committees, Bryce recognized the array of party committees and conventions at all levels of government which dealt with the business of selecting candidates, organizing campaigns and elections and getting votes for offices. This party organization Bryce called the "machine."<sup>11</sup> He found the army of professional, full-time, and permanent party politicians working for the machine. Although at the outset, his terminology of machine seems not to have any bad implication, he identified the machine with the "bosses" and "rings" in large cities which implied "corruption." According to Bryce, the "boss" is the man who has a successful personal career starting his life as one of "the Boys" and became "one of a small knot of persons who pull the wires for the whole city, controlling the primaries, selecting the candidates, treating on behalf of the party in the city with the leaders of the party in the States."<sup>12</sup> "The aim of the knot is," says Bryce, "not only to get good posts for themselves, but to rivet their yoke upon the city by garrisoning the departments with their own creatures."<sup>13</sup> And gradually they combine themselves into what Bryce called the "ring." The leader of the ring was crowned the "boss."

Bryce pointed out that the American political institutions of numerous offices, frequent elections, and universal suffrage provided the arena

for the machine. Particularly in the great cities Bryce found that bossism was more likely to thrive because there existed "large masses of manageable voters as well as numerous offices and plentiful opportunities of jobbing."<sup>14</sup> Among the large mass of manageable people Bryce found a vast population of ignorant immigrants. They were, according to Bryce, "largely Irish and Germans, together with Poles, Czechs, and Russians, negroes, Frenchmen, Italians." Bryce continues, "From the more recent immigrants neither national patriotism nor a sense of civic duty can as yet be expected; the pity is that they have been allowed civic power."<sup>15</sup> Bryce concluded that to give enfranchisement was politically dangerous because those immigrants had no time to learn the political institutions of the country they adopted and they were easily manipulated by the party leaders who snapped them up when they landed. They were often moved by Catholic "religious" sympathy, by "protection of the liquor traffic," particularly with the Germans and the Irish, or by, in the case of American-Irish, narrow ethnic hatred which led to support the party most opposed to England.

In the last chapter of *The American Commonwealth* titled "Social and Economic Future," Bryce admitted "the amazing solvent power which American institutions, habits, and ideas exercise upon new comers of all races,"<sup>16</sup> but at the same time Bryce recognized that "new swarms of European immigrants" would constitute a danger that "they may retain their own low standard of decency and comfort, and menace the continuance among the working class generally of that far higher standard which has hitherto prevailed in all but a few spots in the country."<sup>17</sup>

Bryce also admitted that the members of the rings, or the great boss himself must not be supposed to be wicked men and that they are the offspring of American political environment.<sup>18</sup> However, because of this political environment which is devoid of stimulating issues and high quality personnel the machine politics thrived with vicious effects and therefore, Bryce advocated] institutional reform of the "war against bossdom": active involvement of "good citizens" into politics rather than in business, making an independent list of nominations and making a separate set of candidate to offer an alternative to corrupt parties, and abstention from voting for the names on the party ticket whom

one objects to topple them down.<sup>19</sup>

Judging from what Bryce described about the machine and the boss, it seems that Bryce's European and class-bound conception of politics is reflected in his argument. In other words, "one can find a clear presentation of ideas about machine politics that were common among interested middle- and upper-class people in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century".<sup>20</sup>

What Moisei Ostrogorski discussed about the machine is found in the second volume of his book, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, which was published in 1902. (It is interesting to note here that a preface of this book was written by no other than James Bryce himself.) Ostrogorski associates development of the machine politics with a peculiar urban environment of America during the turn-of-the-century era. To become a politician, he discusses, one needs not to have neither a distinct origin nor "politics of Aristotle." One only should have acknowledge of the party machinery and of the mechanism of election.<sup>21</sup> The aspirant begins with his immediate neighbors to recruit votes as his political capital. Ostrogorski depicts the birth of a boss:

"Owning" half a dozen or a dozen votes, he is received with open arms by the local organization of the party; they make much of him, ask his advice, put him on the committee of the local branch, and even show their gratitude for the voting which he brings them in a less platonic fashion. His career of "ward politician" has begun.<sup>22</sup>

The ward politician, through successful manipulation of votes, gradually climbs up the hierarchical political ladder, and finally he is

crowned city boss or state boss, as the case may be. At the head of his adherents, he forms with them what is called the "machine," that is to say an aggregation of individuals stretching out hierarchically from top to bottom, bound to one another by personal devotion, but mercenary, and bent solely on satisfying their appetites by exploiting the resources of a political party.<sup>23</sup>

It seems that success of a ward politician depends upon his power and skill of "getting votes." Fortunately for him, Ostrogorski argues, "The

agglomerations of European immigrants offer a no less favorable soil for the growth of the political manipulator of men. Germans, Italians, or Slavs arrive without knowing the language, the manners and customs, and the institutions of the country."<sup>24</sup> In return for his services to these immigrants, "they make over to him with perfect good faith the votes which have just been given to them, and which as a rule they do not know what to do with."<sup>25</sup> Those immigrants who came "from countries with less advanced political institutions, where they had lived in degradation and in misery, and incapable of promptly assimilating the spirit and the manners of the American democracy, . . . these foreigners, naturalized as American citizens, whose number is counted by millions, cannot but become an instrument of political demoralization and lower the political level of the Republic."<sup>26</sup>

According to Ostrogorski, the city boss who manipulated the votes of the immigrants was "in the majority cases, of foreign, Irish, extraction, the child of parents who have recently immigrated, " or a man "having himself landed on American soil at a very early age," who "has begun his public career in the streets of a large city as newspaper vendor, streetcar conductor, actor in a travelling circus, or better still, waiter to a saloonkeeper."<sup>27</sup> In this sense, it may safely be said that the boss was a successful immigrant himself and it is no wonder that an aspirant immigrant youth saw an image of success in the boss. In other words, interdependence between the machine and the immigrants is a kind of built-in mechanism which produces the strength of machine itself through providing channels of upward political mobility for the politically oriented immigrants. However, Ostrogorski shared the same conclusion with Bryce in regard to the machine and the boss as Professor Allswang pointed out:

Americans, he [Ostrogorski] felt, were too optimistic and too easy going; in a democratic polity this was a danger and had led, in the city, to the machine. He felt the answer lay primarily in the minimization of party and maximization of issues: "Down with 'party,' Up with 'League'"—the league being an *ad hoc* grouping focused on issues as its main concern. It can be said that although he understood the distinctiveness of American politics, he was like Bryce unable, in his preoccupation for melioration, to avoid European approaches, which

were, in the final analysis, inapplicable.<sup>28</sup>

It can also be said that both Bryce and Ostrogorski, particularly the latter, evinced the *Zeigeist* of the turn-of-the-century era, i.e., the spirit of reform in the Progressive Era in their analysis and observation: the reform ideology of middle- and upper-class American people toward the "good government" against a corrupt alliance of the "machine politicians" and "lower" class citizenry of "immoral" and "ignorant" immigrants.

### III. FROM REFORM IDEOLOGY TO EVALUATIVE CONCEPT

During the Progressive Era one of the central issues of municipal reform was governmental corruption, and the so-called "muckrakers" also contributed in debunking corruption of municipal politics. We can see its classical form in Lincoln Steffens' *Shame of the Cities*.<sup>29</sup> The advocates of municipal reform aimed at "the goals of eliminating corruption, increasing efficiency and making local government in some sense more democratic," and "these goals are parts of the larger whole" called "the Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle-class ethos."<sup>30</sup> Various proposals of reform such as nonpartisanship, the Australian ballot, the council-manager plan, and the master planning etc., were made. At the same time, checking the tide of immigration was also one of the aims of municipal reformers.<sup>31</sup> These aims were, of course, for coping with the great evil of the day, i.e., "boss-rule corruption." However, according to Professors Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, "it was not from the struggle against bosses and boodlers that the reform program got its logic." They continue:

It got that from the middle-class political ethos, and the logic would have been the same if bosses and boodlers had never existed. Indeed, it was in relatively small, middle-class cities, where indeed those persons had never existed, that reform measures were most popular. . . . Most of the large cities adopted some parts of it, but none ever adopted the program as a whole.<sup>32</sup>

Indeed, reform movements did not always bring about a workable substitute for the machine nor honesty in government in almost all of large cities in America. George Washington Plunkitt, the Tammany Hall boss in New York who coined the famous word of an "honest graft," stated:

I can't tell just how many of these movements I've seen started in New York during my forty years in politics, but I can tell you how many have lasted more than a few years—none. There have been reform committees of fifty, of sixty, of seventy, of one hundred and all sorts of numbers that started out to do up the regular political organizations. They were mornin' glories—looked lovely in the mornin' and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went flourishin' forever, like oaks.<sup>33</sup>

Not only did the machine survive inspite of reform movements, but, as Plunkitt rather proudly pointed out, "went on flourishin' forever." In the light of the sturdy machine, it seems necessary for us to take a different approach toward the machine in order to appreciate actively its latent functions of providing "humanized" and "personalized" assistance to the needy, particularly to those "ignorant" and "demoralized" immigrants. As we have seen, they were the target of criticism by the reformers as well as by such observers as Bryce and Ostrogorski.

Professor Oscar Handlin, an expert of American immigration and ethnic history, dealt with the machine and the boss sympathetically in his Pulitzer Prize-winning *The Uprooted*. The quality of life for the urban immigrant was that of marginal subsistence and they lived in a world without social welfare such as workmen's compensation, old-age pension, not to mention medical care; a world where private charity could be inadequate and humiliating. When they could find a job, it was only a menial, dirty and poorly paying job. Moreover, the immigrants were often illiterate and ignorant of American political and Social institutions. Therefore, they were at a loss how to cope with the laws in a new world which were unfamiliar with them. "Between the rigid, impersonal rulings of the statute and the human failings of those ignorant of its complexities," Professor Handlin argues, "he [the boss] stood as mediator."<sup>34</sup> And those who were involved in troubles with laws

"had to come to him because they knew he was *fair* with his *favours*."<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, "The image, his own and theirs, was that of the kindly overlord, the feudal noble translated from the manor to the ward—above the law and therefore capable, if properly approached, of doing better justice than the law."<sup>36</sup> As to the criticism given to the machine and the boss by the reformer, Professor Handlin admits that the boss felt a threat to his position. However, he says that those "reformers did not alienate the boss's constituency; they merely endowed him with the additional romantic aspects of a Robin Hood."<sup>37</sup>

One of the most evaluative considerations about the machine was offered by a sociologist, Professor Robert K. Merton. He argues that the machine, centralized organization of political power, developed as an alternative to the decentralized formal political structure. In other words, "the functional deficiencies of the official structures" for satisfying the needs of the mass of the people "*generate an alternative (unofficial) structure*" and in our prevailing impersonal society, the machine, through its local agents, fulfills the important social *function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of assistance* to those in need."<sup>38</sup> Merton was quite accurate in pointing out middle- and upper-class bias of reformist ideology toward "good and honest government:"

To adopt an *exclusively* moral attitude toward the "corrupt political machine" is to lose sight of the very structural conditions which generate the "evil" that is so bitterly attacked. To adopt a functional outlook is to provide not an apologia for the political machine but a more solid basis for modifying or eliminating the machine.... [U]nless the reform.... involves a "re-forming" of the social and political structure such that the existing needs are satisfied by the alternative structures or unless it involves a change which eliminates these needs altogether, the political machine will return to its integral place in the social scheme of things.<sup>39</sup>

Thus the machine helped the immigrant with their integration into American life. At this point we must take into our consideration not only the kind and quantity of patronages offered to the immigrants by the machines but the method and style of dispensing them. Really, from psychological point of view, the "humanizing and personalizing

manner" does count.

Obviously, an evaluative presentation of the machine does not intend to invalidate and nullify totally the observations of Bryce and Ostrogorski as well as the reformers. This is only to exemplify the different point of view which would be more ideology-free in observing and analyzing the process of Americanization of the immigrants. As Professor Michael Parenti pointed out, "Although most students of urban politics recognize the contributions made by the city machine, popular perception to this day is still largely colored by the excoriations of muckrakers and early civic reformers." However, he asserts:

That the immigrant became the boss's ready collaborator was due less to venality than to necessity. We must understand ourselves of that extraordinary time in American history, when millions of indigent aliens were literally dumped onto our city streets without the barest provision made for their settlement, employment, or survival. Inadequate or, more often, nonexistent public services and chaotic antiquated governmental structure were the most distinguishing features of earlier municipalities.<sup>40</sup>

In other words, in helping naturalization, inducing electoral participation, the machine hastened political acculturation of the immigrant. Through this process of political acculturation, the immigrant paradoxically realized their political power as ethnic groups. Thus their ethnic identity has been kept up to this day. However, contrary to the fears of the reformers, "no other nation has ever absorbed such a vast number of foreigners and their children with so little challenge to its basic unity. The ethnics internalized a loyalty to the core political symbols, values, and institutions of the American polity."<sup>41</sup>

#### IV. THE DECLINE OF THE MACHINE?

It is often pointed out that the machine declined due to: (1) the impact of the reform movements, particularly reform in municipal civil service which eliminated patronage basis of the machine; (2) the rise of economic, social and educational level of the masses in general; and (3) the impact of the New Deal which eliminated welfare functions

of the machine in providing public welfare programs; and (4) the decline of immigration itself. Indeed, the passage of restrictive measures in 1921 and 1924 definitely provided substantial damage to the traditional and classical operation of the machine. Of course, immigration is not the sole factor of the machine politics, but without a supply of successive waves of economically poor, culturally alienated, and socially unequipped and swiftly enfranchized immigrants, the old-style bosses and machines could not have prevailed for such a long time. Although, as Professor Fred I. Greenstein pointed out, "the machines themselves, by helping to incorporate such underprivileged groups as the immigrants into American society, encouraged the development of the kind of attitudes which make voters immune to the boss's blandishment,"<sup>42</sup> the new type of machine politics which provides avenues of political acculturation if we include within our category of the "new" immigrants two major ethnic groups who have been migrating in increasing numbers into northern cities; the Blacks after the First World War and the Puerto Ricans after the Second World War who went into such large cities as New York and Chicago.<sup>43</sup>

As was mentioned before, during a period of half a century between 1880 and 1930 well over 27.6 million people came to the United States and almost half of them during the same period and more than sixty percent between 1900 and 1920 were the "new" immigrants. In those days Protestant, middle- and upper-class Americans feared crime, corruption and Catholicism of these "new" immigrants and regarded them as unassimilable foreign stock alien to Anglo-American cultural norms. Indeed, their assimilation, i.e., actual interpersonal social integration such as preferable companions, residential sections and marriage, among other things, was less certain than their acculturation, i.e., adoption to American customs and styles such as language, dress, recreation, work, and mass media, etc.<sup>44</sup> That is the reason why, contrary to the myth of "melting pot" hypothesis, ethnic identity of the immigrant has been kept and ethnic voting has also been persistent both in domestic politics and foreign affairs.<sup>45</sup>

Although the machine and the boss have not been a sole contributor for the immigrant to get politically acculturated into American society but they have, no doubt, helped the immigrant to get accustomed to

American political culture—party politics, election campaign, and above all power of voting—through providing quick naturalization and enfranchisement. In the light of this function of the machine, it is appropriate for us to make a new evaluative analysis of the machine in the United States.

#### V. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: SEVERAL SUGGESTIVE REMARKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In closing this short essay it would be appropriate to add several suggestive remarks for further research in order to substantiate the argument that the machine helped naturalization and enfranchisement of the immigrant. In critical as well as evaluative fashion many scholars who observed the machine pointed out that the machine helped the immigrant with their legal problems, particularly with their process of naturalization and we have hitherto subscribed to the idea without referring to statistical data.<sup>46</sup>

As far as the statistics on national data of naturalization is concerned, they are available since 1907 and prior to 1906, individual courts kept the records.<sup>47</sup> When we take a look at the number of those who got naturalized, for example, between 1921 and 1930 on the national level, the total number was 1,773,185 and that of previous decade was 1,128,972.<sup>48</sup> Compared with the number of immigrants this number of naturalization is unexpectedly small. Of course, as we have mentioned before, all those who came to the United States did not remain in the United States and it is also understandable that a substantial portion of those who came did not renounce their former nationality. Still, however, the number of naturalization is so small as to substantiate the argument that the machine helped the immigrant with their naturalization in exchange for their future votes. Should we modify and alter the argument? We should not jump into a hasty conclusion, because the data before 1906 might give us different aspect; and moreover, scrutiny of naturalization data of the immigrant city by city and year by year both before and after the year 1907 is necessary to substantiate the argument. As to the availability of those data we must rely upon the diligent work of American scholars who are in an advantageous position as to accessibility to those data, if there are any.

At the same time we must get ourselves familiarized with the legal aspect of naturalization.

It is natural to think that only those who have citizenship are entitled to vote and that naturalization, i.e., acquisition of citizenship, guarantees the immigrant the right to vote. However, participation in election in the United States has quite a different provision, say, from that of contemporary Japan: In Japan there is a general election statute called the Public Officers Election Act (Kōshoku Senkyo Hō) which is applicable to all the level of elections from local to national and no voter registration nor rigid residence requirement is needed. On the other hand, there is no generally applicable federal election law which stipulates the detail of every level of election in the United States except for several provisions in the Constitution and federal statutes. However, these provisions do not affect the practical execution of an election in the states or on the local level. That is to say, the election, particularly local election, is mainly regulated by the state laws and this is one of the aspects derived from the concept of decentralization in the American political framework.

Although the history of suffrage has been studied repeatedly—history of universal manhood suffrage, of women suffrage, and of Black suffrage, etc., —it seems that the history of enfranchisement of the immigrant has, inspite of repeated reference to the strength of their vote, not yet been studied thoroughly. Moreover, it would be a kind of shock when one comes across such a statement which betrays our common sense: “. . . the 1928 election was the first presidential election in which American citizenship was a universal prerequisite for voting. In particular, the period from about 1840 through 1910 was one in which a considerable number of States permitted aliens (those who had filed first papers, as a rule) to vote in elections.”<sup>49</sup> Those states which permitted aliens to vote were located mainly in the midwest and west where the impact of the “new” immigrant was relatively not so strong, and Professor Walter Burnham, the author of the quotation above, did not specifically elaborate as to the nature of alien suffrage. However, this is quite suggestive for us to investigate further the validity of ethnic voting in various levels of election, particularly late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century, in connection with the

impact of the machine upon the immigrant votes. Again we need collaboration of American scholars in finding out specific election regulations in various states and localities during the period mentioned above.

#### NOTES

1. Josiah Strong, *Our Country* (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1891), pp. 54-55, in Alexander B. Callow, Jr., (ed.), *The City Boss in America: An Interpretive Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). p. 15. Incidentally, this anthology on the boss and his machine is quite handy and useful in that it includes well-organized commentaries by the editor at the beginning of each part.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
4. Michael Parenti, "Immigration and Political Life," in Frederic Cople Jaher, (ed.), *The Age of Industrialism in America: Essays in Social Structure and Cultural Values* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 95.
5. The data on immigration in this paper are mainly based upon U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, 2 Parts (Bicentennial ed., Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1975). As to the breakdown of immigrants by continent, region, and nation of origin, see Series C 89-119, "Immigrants, by Country: 1820-1970," in *ibid.*, Part I, pp. 105-109. See also Donald J Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), esp. Ch. 14, "International Migration and National Origins of the Population," pp. 348-374.
6. See Table 14-6, "Nativity and Parentage of the White Population: 1890 to 1950," Bogue, *op cit.*, p. 365. See also Series A 105-118, "Foreign Born Population, by Sex and Race: 1850 to 1970" and Series A 135-142, "Native Born White Population, by Sex and Parentage: 1850 to 1970" U. S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 14 and 19.
7. In regard to nativism, racism and anti-immigrant sentiment, see John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925* (rev. ed., New York: Atheneum, 1963).
8. Bogue, *op. cit.*, p. 358.
9. Makoto Saito, *Amerika Seiji Gaikoshi* [History of American Politics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1975), pp. 121-122. Emphasis added.
10. John M. Allswang, *Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters: An American Symbiosis* (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977), p. 8.
11. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3rd ed., New York: The Macmillan, 1908), Vol. II, Ch. LX, "The Machine," pp. 82-89. It should be added here that

- another English scholar discusses the machine in a similar fashion. See D. W. Brogan, *Politics in America* (Anchor Books ed., Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960) Ch. IV "Machines and Bosses," pp. 104-148.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
  13. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.
  14. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
  15. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
  16. *Ibid.*, p. 861.
  17. *Ibid.*, p. 863.
  18. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.
  19. See *ibid.*, Ch. LXVIII, "The War Against Bossdom," esp. pp. 166-169.
  20. Allswang, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
  21. Moisei Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* trans. from the French by Frederick Clarke; Seymour Martin Lipset ed. and abridged, (Anchor Books ed., Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964), Vol. II, The United States, p. 179
  22. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
  23. *Ibid.*, p. 183
  24. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
  25. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
  26. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
  27. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
  28. Allswang, *op. cit.*, p. 14
  29. On the activities of "muckrakers" see Louis Filler, *The Muckrakers* (rev. ed., University Park, Pa.: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976). The original title when published in 1939 from Harcourt, Brace was *Crusaders for American Liberalism*.
  30. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and M. I. T. Press, 1963), pp. 138-139.
  31. "In Boston, for example, many leaders of reform were leaders of the Immigration Restriction League." *Ibid.*, p. 141.
  32. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
  33. William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 22, in Callow, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 191.
  34. Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (2nd ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 191.
  35. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
  36. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
  37. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
  38. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. and enlarged ed., New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 73 and 74. Italics in original. Merton quoted William F. Whyte's argument to strengthen his point. Whyte asserts, "*Politics and the rackets have furnished an important means of social mobility for individuals, who, because*

- of ethnic background and low class position, are blocked from advancement in the 'respectable' channels." William F. Whyte, "Social organization in the slums," *American Sociological Review*, Feb. 1943, 8, 34-39. Quoted and Italicized by Merton, *ibid.*, p. 78.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 76 and 81. On further discussion on the machine as social integrator, see Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups," 353 *The Annals*, (May 1964), pp. 28-39.
40. Parenti, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
42. Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) p. 49.
43. In regard to the recent migration of the Blacks and the Puerto Ricans into northern urban cities, see, for example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: the M. I. T. Press, 1971).
44. As to the conceptual distinction between "assimilation" and "acculturation" in this way, see Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," 61 *American Political Science Review*, (Sept. 1967), pp. 717-726. See also Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) on general discussion of conceptual distinction between "assimilation" and "acculturation" esp. Ch. 3, "The Nature of Assimilation" pp. 60-84.
45. Aside from various books and monographs on these topics, two anthologies are quite helpful to understand the scope and reality of ethnic politics in America: Harry A. Bailey, Jr. and Ellis Katz (eds. ), *Ethnic Group Politics* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merriam Publishing Co., 1969) and Brett W. Hawkins and Robert A. Lorinska (eds.), *The Ethnic Factor in American Politics* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merriam Publishing Co., 1970). As to the recent ethnic factors in politics, see Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973) and Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
46. For example, Bryce portrays the process of "citizen-making" in this way: "I was taken to watch the process of citizen-making in New York. Drove of squalid men, who looked as if they had just emerged from an emigrant ship, and had perhaps done so only a few weeks before, for the law prescribing a certain term of residence is frequently violated, were brought up to a magistrate by the ward agent of the party which had captured them, declared their allegiance to the United States, and were forthwith placed on the roll. Such a sacrifice of common sense to abstract principles has seldom been made by any country." Bryce, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
- 47 See explanatory notes on C 162-167, "Alien Naturalized, by Type of Provisions, 1907-1970" and C 168-180, "General note," U. S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 101.
48. See Series C 162-167, "Aliens Naturalized, by Type of Provision: 1907 to 1970," *ibid.*, p. 114.

49. See the explanatory notes prepared by Professor Walter Dean Burnham for Series Y 27-28, "Voter Participation in Presidential Elections, by State, 1824-1968," *ibid.*, Part II, p. 1068. Alien-suffrage states in the table with effective year of abolition are as follows: Arkansas (1925), Colorado (1902), Illinois (1870), Indiana (1921), Iowa (1857), Michigan (1894), Minnesota (1896), Nebraska (1910), North Dakota (1893-1902), Ohio (1851), Oregon (1914), South Dakota (1918) and Wisconsin (1908).